KGB Training Manuals Revealed

False Flags in US Institutions
in North Africa

54 pages

Inv. No [Redacted]

Secret

Copy No. [Redacted]

Acquisition and
Preparation of Agent Recruits for the Purposes of Intelligence Penetration of
USA Institutions (on the Example of a Number of North African Countries).
Analytical Overview

1988

[Redacted]

Annotation

This analytical overview studies the special features of the
methodology of selection and training of recruiting agents for work in
penetrating USA institutions under the conditions of North African countries
(Algeria, Morocco, Tunis).

322s

Table of Contents

– In recent years “legal” residents of the KGB find it harder and harder to recruit US officials as counter-intelligence has been strengthened, personnel increased, and new operational and technical means are used. Americans stepping up the security of their buildings of interest to Soviet intelligence. They inspect and track employees of these institutions better and their contacts with Soviets, they take measures to expose Soviet intelligence agents, they organize stings, they conduct surveillance of agents and their connections.

– The USSR KGB’s First Chief Directorate [PGU] has noted the necessity and importance of this activity.

– A number of previous works of the KGB and PGU Institute have covered false flag operations.

“Their study is quite useful, since the principles contained in these works have preserved their relevance both for the rezidentura operating in the countries of North Africa at the present time as well”.

p. 5

But some aspects haven’t received enough attention.

This survey will cover the role of recruiter agents in activating work with employees in American institutions; some questions of methodology in selecting recruiter agents; and organization of work with recruiter agents, their training and preparation including for false flag work and also the particularities of their communications and maintaining their security and checking up on them.

Decrees and instructions from the KGB and PGU have been used and also materials from the headquarters’ special collections; comments from agents with experience have also been taken into account.

This is for employees of the PGU 10th Department who work at the Center (Moscow) as well as in “legal” rezidenturas of the KGB abroad.

p. 6

The work of KGB is made much harder by harsh counter-intelligence measures of locals in Morocco and Tunisia in conjunction with intelligence agencies of US, France and FRG

“In the countries of socialist orientation, in particular in Algeria, where the political and operational setting for Americans is less favorable and where they sense the heightened attention to themselves of the local counterintelligence, the fulfilment of requirements for security are carefully maintained in USA institutions.”

– strict inspections, including body searchers; firing of suspicious persons; checking of personnel using surveillance equipment

“If before, the method of direct work on Americans in a number of cases yielded positive results and justified itself, in current conditions, work from these positions has become very difficult. At official USA representative institutions there are strict instructions not to allow contacts with Soviet workers beyond job duties. Thus many Americans refuse contacts with Soviet citizens even without prejudices toward the Soviet Union.”

– Soviets under greater surveillance, which means recruitment attempts run risk of being exposed and an occasion for provocation; “Increasingly, the enemy is undertaking such drastic measures as detention and arrests of the employees of our rezidentura”.

p. 7

– Spy mania campaigns more frequent, various prophylactic measures taken to neutralize the rezidentura

The rezidentura has the following flaws given these circumstances:

– recruitment is mainly done directly by legal rezidentura members due to the lack of recruiter agents able to recruit Americans

– false flags are used very rarely

– study of candidates is too slow, and vetting is not sufficiently deep

– some agents are not keep cover and prematurely showing their hand to potential recruits

p. 8

– More than 80% of agents in the network in 1980-1983 brought in by operational workers (agents) and only 15% by recruiter agents.

– participation in recruitment must become one of the chief methods of strengthening the agent network, aimed above all at getting important and secret information from the USA.

– using citizens of the countries targeted, or foreigners residing there in recruitment of US officials has a number of significant advantages

– recruiter agent doesn’t fall into the enemy’s field of vision if he maintains intelligence tradecraft konspiratsiya; the legal rezidentura will have a harder time of this

– ethnic Arabs are in the same milieu as the targets of recruitment among the local employees of the US facilities, as a rule are better than agents, they know national, psychological and other particularities

– false flag is easier to do – “This circumstance has important significance in the work on the American line since among the officials of the USA facilities who possess interesting intelligence possibilities for us, it is extremely rare to find persons ideologically close to us who will make contact and maintain relations with a Soviet citizen.”

– while work in recruiting Americans is very hard, in the end it yields a positive result and the chance of failures are reduced and security enhanced.

pp. 9-10

Conditions for false flag operations in North Africa:

– “presence of a large Western European colony in the countries under review, which gives the rezidenturas the opportunity to recruit from among its representatives the recruiter agents for work on the personnel in the USA facilities”;

– “activity of leftist forces in the countries of the region, in whose milieu the rezidenturas can recruit and train recruiter agents and spotters;

– “diversity of political parties, organizations and groups which creates a favorable soil for selection, creating of legends, and the use of false flags”.

– Despite strict control of US facilities, there are some factors that make recruiting easier — Americans might behave more freely abroad than at home, many live in separate villas, their behavior is not supervised, especially in pro-Western countries like Morocco and Tunisia.

“Vividly expressed individualism and a constant striving for personal prosperity, uncertainty of the future often leads to some Americans getting into conflict with the requirements placed on them by government service, including in particular they strive to use their stay abroad for personal enrichment”.

“The cheap work force, the high level of unemployment in the North African countries enable Americans to have personal house servants who are relatively accessible to our rezidentura from the perspective of acquiring from its midst an agent’s network capable of performing assisting task on the American line”.

– Number of local workers at the American facilities rather large (for example in Morocco in 1986, there were 96 Americans and 268 local personnel).

p. 12

“In the foreign intelligence of the USSR KGB, a recruiter agent is understood to mean a ‘specially-trained agent undertaking under the direction of intelligence the recruitment of persons of interest to it”. [Footnote no. 1 is to the Unified Dictionary of Chekist Terminology. Part I. Intelligence. Edited by F.D. Bobkov; KI KGB, Moscow, 1986, p. 5). Bobkov was head of 5th Department that kept surveillance over dissidents — CAF].

Sometimes such recruiters are brought in at the end of the process, in others they are present at all stages.

Character traits required:

1. – strong character able to adapt to any circumstances, get people disposed to him, subject them to his influence, run them, otherwise, this may happen: (example)

“In one of the countries of the region, agent “F” was in communication with the rezidentura, a correspondent of the print organ of a bourgeois nationalist party. Since “F” had a direct access to several local citizens working in the USA facilities, and was a vetted and fairly experienced agent in the operational sense, the decision was made to use him after the relevant training to recruit “X,” a local employee of the American facility who was of interest to us. Under the direction of agent [operational worker] “F,” we managed to establish good relations with the facility, conducted a study and analysis, but then everything stalled there. Despite the convincing conclusions on our part, that the development was essentially completed and we must move to the recruitment, “F” kept postponing the recruitment talk with the target under various excuses. Only after some time did he admit that he was not bold enough to reveal himself to the target being worked on, to cross the line in the trusting relations he had formed with him.”

p. 13

2. – Agent has to be able to develop a certain legend to have a plausible false flag under his institution, organization, firm, etc. The recruiter agent also has to be able to use the flag of the organizations in his legend.

3. – Extremely important that the agent is protected from counter-intelligence and is reliable from our perspective, “unquestionably loyal to us”. If he starts hiding things or is insincere, if he is not objective in his judgements, then better not to use him. Example:

“Recruiter agent “K,” a local businessman was brought in to develop and American citizen, the female “L,” the secretary at one of the USA facilities. After establishing friendly relations with her, “K,” determined that the American was burdened by material dependence on her relatives. Taking into account the factor of the material interest, the development of “L” was continued under the flag of a European firm, and information of interest to us began to come in from her. In his reports about his development, the agent wrote that he was in intimate relations with “L”. That turned out to be untrue, and after awhile, when she had the prospect of making a profitable marriage, the American woman lost interest in our agent. In the process of determining the reasons for the situation that developed, the agent admitted that he had deceived the operational officer due to male pride. Thus the insincerity of the agent led to the disruption of the recruitment work”.

4. – The recruiter agent has to be able to keep konspiratsiya, to make a correct legend for his actions and to be vigilant because sometimes he will have to work over people who have not been sufficiently studied.

5. The recruiter agent must be “disciplined and organized with the ability to fulfill our orders exactly with full responsibility”

“In practice, it is very hard to find a candidate who possesses all the enumerated qualities to a sufficient extent”.

– Often an agent will recruit members of his own family, and in these cases it is not necessary to have these qualities, since the recruitment depends on the level of his relationship.

p. 15

– often recruiter agents are taken from among existing agents who gather political information, etc. because they can get their relatives and friends, or co-workers and clients. “Usually such agents have passed through the following stages, roughly speaking: source of information – spotter – developer-recruiter.

– some agents who collected information and have outlived their usefulness could be used as recruiters

– the best results have come from using local intelligence agents since they can have a “cover” for their Soviet intelligence activity the flag of their local security services and avoid detection of our involvement in an activity.

“It should be taken into account that the local personnel in American institutions in the countries under review may be more likely to agree to cooperation with their intelligence services, regarding this as an inevitable necessity”.

Example:

“In one of the countries of the region, the rezidentura for a long time could not acquire agent positions in the USA Embassy because USA intelligence kept heavy control over the contacts of the entire personnel. The rezidentura took “M” to develop, an officer of the counterintelligence organ of the country of stay from the perspective of using him as a recruiter. “M” was brought in to cooperation under the Soviet flag. His operational training was based on performing concrete assignments from the rezidentura to study persons of interest to us. Through “M,” the rezidentura conducted the development and recruitment of “K,” a citizen of the country of stay and a technical employee at the American consulate, under the flag of the local counterintelligence. With the help of “K,” an operational and technical measure was successfully undertaken. Characteristically, after the discovery of the stashes, the enemy, despite every attempt, could not establish the involvement of Soviet intelligence to this measure. It is also important to note that “M” in the future was successfully used as a recruiter, since “K” did not betray our agent, fearing repressive measures on the part of the local intelligence services”.

– In using local intelligence people you have to be careful not to expose him to the local counterintelligence itself, which is watching the American facility.

– Agents from third countries, members of the diplomatic corps, representatives of governments in exile, national liberation movements and other foreign political organizations as well as interns and students can be used in recruitment of local and European employees of USA institutions

p. 18

– Particularly difficult has been recruiting employees of the encryption service, administrative sections, secretaries, registrars, and so on.

“The problem is that in the countries with a difficult operational setting (for example, in Morocco) a significant part of the acting agents’ network has little opportunities for development and recruitment of USA citizens. The feeling of superiority over the local population inherent in Americans; their higher standard of living is an obstacle which significantly hinders the possibility of their recruitment development by agents from among the local citizens.”

– Local citizens used as agents often can only be used “in subsidiary tasks like the collection of initial information on the persons of interest, study of their personal qualities, their surroundings and in some cases infiltration of surveillance technology at the American’s place of residence”.

– More useful to use citizens of Western Europe such as France, Spain, Italy, FRG or Canada with access to US facilities. Recruiters can be various professionals, merchants, or freelancers or journalists. Europeans working in the American organizations in North Africa offer wide opportunities for recruitment. Americans trust them more, there aren’t the national and psychological barriers for informal communications.

– Study of materials from recruiting efforts doesn’t enable us to say which country in Europe is the best; in each individual case, tailor it to the individual qualities and capabilities

p. 19

– finding a target for recruitment as a recruiter agent can take 2-3 years, as long as finding a good source of information; they only become useful then even some time after that, sometimes a rather long time.

– given heavy counterintelligence in Tunisia and Morocco, agents have to do a ton of work to prepare, they have to meet with targets many times, which can be hard doing without getting exposed

– a reason restraining more active recruitment work in Northern Africa is insufficient knowledge of the contingent of people who have access to employees at US institutions under legend.

– the agent has to have a very clear understanding of his target; he has to figure out what categories of local citizens and foreigners could maintain direct contact with Americans in these facilities under a legend

p. 19

– Existing KGB agents in the rezidentura don’t make for good recruiting agents because the “high demands for [the recruiters] significantly restricts the circle of people suitable for this goal”.

– Even so, not as active as it should be, though hard – takes 2-3 years to recruit and train an agent and “real use from an agent begins to be felt only after some period of time, sometimes rather significant”.

– Harsh counter-intelligence makes it very difficult

– Usually under these circumstances the often used method is to find someone ideologically and politically compatible; “This is justified and understandable since as an agent close to us in the ideological sense, other qualities being equal, he will be the most reliable. Such an agent operates as a rule decisively and purposefully, guided by the interests of the common cause and not pragmatic considerations”.

– Same goes for those with a purely financial motive from among those in the world of commerce. Not bad results yielded but even so, we must try to move to an ideological foundation with them.

– the flag most used for external intelligence in recruiting recruiters is the Soviet flag as this is mainly in the interests of Soviet intelligence which is why Soviet intelligence officers who are “legals” do this.

– But two lines have to be pursued in North Africa — to get into American facilities we have to work with citizens of the country plus foreigners there who have access.

p. 20

“Agent recruiters must select foreigners and local citizens who are outwardly favorable in the political sense, whose personality and activity does not attract attention to themselves on the part of the enemy’s counter-intelligence. Thus, for intelligence work in the countries of North Africa, persons connected to the local communist parties or other progressive organizations, in particular the societies for friendship with the USSR and other socialist countries, since they may be under the surveillance of the intelligence services of the countries”.

So categories to target:

– intelligence and police in the targeted country – they’re the best to work with American facilities; they can put covert surveillance on Americans and compromise them

– journalists, lawyers, owners of various firms, their employees, scientists, teachers with contacts at American facilities — without suspicion, due to the nature of their profession, they can meet Americans, study them, develop them, all under a false flag.

– government officials, politicians and trade union leaders are also good for this

“Local and foreign businessmen are the best suited for the role of recruiter agents to work with local officials of economic and information departments of US facilities under the flag of business. As practice has shown, the employees of USA facilities often eagerly make contact with businessmen which under the appropriate conditions can encourage them to cooperate with a private firm.”

– Another line is targeted recruitment of US citizens under false flag.

– Thousands of Spanish and French in Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia who are good for this purpose; also Portuguese, Italians, Belgians and others from NATO countries.

– Among them many journalists, employees at international organizations, business people, employees at various firms, teachers, scientists, doctors, engineers, grad students, students who can be potentially used as recruiter agents to get to Americans.

– Those who are permanent residents in the targeted countries or who were born there are best for this purpose because they aren’t going to be under as much pressure from local intelligence

– Europeans are going to have significantly greater opportunity for close contact with Americans than Arabs

– Businessmen a great category for recruits —

“Thus, for example a Frenchman who has a fairly high position in the office of a powerful French firm like ALSTOM who has interests in practically all the African countries and competes with American capital may well serve as a recruiter of American officials who are in the economic department of the US Embassy (USAID”. ALSTOM is simultaneously an appropriate flag. On the other hand, interest toward an employee of this French firm on the part of a Soviet trade representative looks quite natural, and contact with him can be well-legended.”

p. 26

– in Africa, another important area to target in American facilities are typists, secretaries, office managers etc.

“Attention should be paid to those person who acting under the appropriate legend under a false flag, can conduct effective study and development of them, using such special features of this category of women as their unsettled personal lives, loneliness in a foreign country, material interests. As practice has shown, the best results are obtained by recruiters who appear under the flag of various economic, trade, financial organizations both of a national and a regional and international nature (oil monopolies, banks, intermediary firms, OPEC, and so on”.

p. 28

– recruiters have to spend a lot of time studying their targets and making their legends and if they are married that can mean having to explain long periods away from home. It also means they can’t work overtime at regular jobs. That’s why “of first-most significance in the work with recruiter agents are ideological and political education, operational training, skilled guidance of their recruitment work and organization of communications with them to guarantee the security of their activity”

p. 29

– keep in mind they are often under a barrage of bourgeois, anti-Soviet and anti-communist propaganda so they need education

p. 30

– for agents who don’t share our convictions, study how they came by their own convictions closely – try to re-educate him but carefully, without being too hard. A mistake often made by agents is that they pay attention to the ideological factor in the beginning, but drop it later. But it must be done systematically and long-term. Agents must also be trained to be disciplined, organized, careful, loyal etc.

p. 35

Example

“In a North African country agent “D” was recruited on an ideological and political basis, an employee at a Western firm, a European, a citizen of a third country. The rezidentura began purposely orienting “D” toward comprehensive study of American personnel at a USA facility in this country, with which the agent’s firm was connected through commercial interests. First, the agent was given assignments to make an initial study of the persons of interest to us, in particular, his attention was directed toward the need to find in the Americans’ behavior certain aspects that could be of interest to us. The relevant methods for maintaining and developing contacts with Americans were developed with “D,” he was taught methods for conducting recruitment. Thanks to work conducted by the rezidentura for several years, “D” became an experienced developer agent, and then a recruiter agent. During the ideological and educational work, the agent’s anti-American sentiments were actively employed, the basis for his dissatisfaction with the fact that the country, a citizen of which he was, was in the backwaters of USA politics. After “D” successfully developed the legend supplied to him, and had fulfilled several additional vetting tasks, he was assigned to conduct recruitment work on a technical employee of an important USA facility in that country, “K,” a study of whom was made preliminarily through the agents’ network of local citizens. Through a specially-developed trick, “D” was brought to “K”. The acquaintance of “D” with “K” proceeded normally, and the relationship between them soon took on a trustworthy nature. Subsequent recruitment development of the employee of the US facility, conducted on a mixed material and mental-psychological basis, enabled the rezidentura to obtain interesting intelligence information which to a decisive degree defined the nature of our future actions regarding the American woman.”

pp. 35-36

Staff in US embassies of use to the Soviet Union (military, technical personal, coders, secretaries, administrators, etc.) who are hostile to the Soviet Union can be reached by false flag (either real or legended).

Example – “M,” a Soviet agent already watching an American office in a North American country spotted “R,” a man who wanted to put aside a large amount of money for when he returned to the States. He would make entirely speculative deals to raise this stash. “M” was limited in what he could do, as a Soviet, so he enlisted “V”, a European businessman who got the American into some illegal deals and thus created the pretext for his recruitment. V created a legend that prosperous European firm had ties to an American corporations; “M” was impressed as he was looking to find a good position, with the help of a “partner” (who turned out to be a Soviet agent in the US).

“The presence of a competent spotter, skilled selection and qualified management by the rezidentura of the recruiter agent were decisive conditions for the successful completion of this complicated recruitment, which required significant efforts over a fairly long time.”

p. 37

It’s best of all when the false flag is related to the professional or social position of the recruited agent. Then he will be more confident in his actions and have more trust in those planted next to him.

“Thus, for example, for a recruiter who in the past was a high-ranking diplomat with a large circle of friends, pro-nationalist minded, a nationalist organization can be chosen; for an agent working as a technical employee in a Western office (France, Spain etc.), the flag of that office; for an agent who is an active member of a party sympathizing the regime of one of the influential Arabic countries (for example, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, etc.) the flag of the intelligence service of that country.”

In false-flag operations with Arabs, be sure to that the target and the recruiter belong to the same ethnic group or faith (i.e. Sunni, Shiite, Ishmaelite etc.) p. 39

Recently the opportunity for false flags in penetrating US facilities has enlarged in North Africa with appearance of national liberal movements, radical regimes, trans-national corporations, oil-producing countries.

For Palestinians working in US facilities, the Palestinian flag can be used, given the large number of various political platforms of Palestinian organizations, each of which has its intelligence service.

– Study recruit carefully, his character, inclinations, position at work, family, contacts, political orientation

– Look for opportunities to move the operation to Soviet or Eastern European country which will make it easier

p. 39

Recently the opportunity for false flags in penetrating US facilities has enlarged in North Africa with appearance of national liberal movements, radical regimes, trans-national corporations, oil-producing countries.

For Palestinians working in US facilities, the Palestinian flag can be used, given the large number of various political platforms of Palestinian organizations, each of which has its intelligence service.

– Study recruit carefully, his character, inclinations, position at work, family, contacts, political orientation

– Look for opportunities to move the operation to Soviet or Eastern European country which will make it easier

p. 40

– While with other agents who obtain information or conduct operations, personal contact should be at a minimum, with no contact or brush contact, with the recruiter agent, personal meetings are required especially when he is being trained.

– Personal meetings needed to conduct ideological work and see his behavior

– With heavy counter-intelligence in place in Northern Africa, safe houses must be rejected in favor of other meeting places, either public places or work places

– But capitals in North Africa have few public places suitable for meetings with agents, so look for opportunities outside the capital under the guise of recreation, at the beach, fishing, tourist trips to historical monuments etc.

p. 41

– since meetings have to be frequent, have two legends – one to explain the acquaintance, and one for each specific meeting

– legend should be simple and convincing and able to be tested or better yet, never cause doubt

– prudent to use camouflage [maskirovka] and disguise the recruit’s outward appearance

– never carry any compromising materials

– have the ability to call a meeting any time

– also use non-contact meetings with signals, visual contact etc.; radio

communications

– use a system with memory and distance guidance to leave messages when agent is absent

– experience has shown that one-sided signals are not as effective as two-sided

– radio is good with countries with difficult operational conditions such as Tunis

– make sure you have a danger signal ready

p. 43

– make the signal easy to remember

– check the recruit while he is performing tasks, keeping to konspiratsiya and being tactful so as not to insult him

– a recruit can be more valuable than the agent himself, and therefore he has to look to his security as much depends on his own security and how much he maintains konspiratsiya

– a recruit made on material grounds can be easier to abort than one made on psychological grounds or compromising materials

– make him aware of counter-intelligence techniques of enemy

– be ready to abort the recruitment if threats arise

– don’t re-use agents targeting American facilities in Northern Africa if they have already one successful recruit

Example: pp. 46-47

– Citizen “B” in a Near Eastern country with friendly relations to the USSR was recruited in a Western embassy. He obtained political and operational info, then was made a recruiter agent and recruited others, including one from an Arabic consulate from his own country.

– mistakes often made include insufficient reliability of the legend, over-valuation of initial data about the target as to the basis for his recruitment and his willingness to maintain contact; incorrect determination of the reasons for his recruitment; counter-intelligence decryption of recruitment work; insufficient knowledge of the target’s position and national features of the facility targeted

The rezidentura checked up on “B” giving him hard assignments; they sent him packages and containers designed to be opened (using an extreme measure, they sent him a package that had to be opened under suspicion of being a bomb). Six years later, “B” left the country since supposedly he had come to the attention of local intelligence. But two years after that, the rezidentura acquired documented proof that “B” was a plant by local intelligence all along, who saw the operations being played to him and professionally responded to them. Since “B” was only used against third countries, relations were not ruined between the Soviets and that Near Eastern country.

p. 47

In vetting agents, keep in mind:

– most are recruited on ideological and political lines, so keep checking views, convictions, authentic political nature of the agent etc. very thoroughly;

– when vetting, check not only the agent, but the flag used; these can be done at different times

– after the recruit acquires enough knowledge of our methods of vetting, and sometimes himself takes part in vetting others; he can easily recognize vetting methods used on him

p. 48

– agent and recruit can often become close which is a good stimulus for work but it can also be a negative if the agent becomes more tolerant of mistakes and flaws in the recruit; this must be kept in mind while vetting

– keep in mind that US intelligence often looks for people to recruit who themselves would be of interest to KGB recruiters, meaning you could be dealing with a plant or provocateur

– care should be taken to create conditions that make recruit’s work successful – legend that he can explain to his family when he is away from home evenings; provide regular monetary compensation, especially if he has expenses in recruitment or suffers loss of income due to working less hours while working for KGB;

– a journalist, businessman, lawyer, civic figure, insurance agent has ready plausible explanations as to why he is away from home

– a student, teacher or scientist might also take extra work that would explain his absence from home and his extra income from KGB

– 50

Example (summary)

– KGB set up a plan for recruit “O”, whose job didn’t enable him to spend time on acquiring contacts, to have 10 months of journalist training to explain his absence from home, then got him a TV job then to explain more income. Given that his wife was happier with his better-paying job, his meetings away from home then weren’t as much trouble to explain to his wife.

– having to explain absences away from home to family is a major problem that should always be solved

– to avoid failures in operations, the agent must “constantly manifest inventiveness, resourcefulness, operational cunning, find new ways and means for the recruitment development of employees of American facilities”.

pp. 52-54

Conclusions and Recommendations

– difficult circumstances in North Africa mean security must be paramount

– use legends and pretexts

– but false flags create their own huge volume of work; the chief obstacle is insufficiently qualified recruiter agents;

– easier sometimes to use as recruiters reliable agents who may have lost intelligence value, since they are already trained; down side is they may have come to attention of counter-intelligence

– penetration of US facilities has high demands, so selection of agents limited

– efforts spent at careful study, long preparation, cultivation pay off

– the best way to train is to give concrete tasks

– organization of communications is key; personal meetings best

– vet the agent regularly to maintain security; check his material; use external surveillance; use the agents’ network and illegals to vet.

Use of the Capacities of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Ties with Compatriots Abroad in Intelligence Work 

Use of the Soviet
Committee for Cultural Ties with Fellow Countrymen Abroad in the interests of
State Security Agencies

Notes

Note: The following is a translation
of some pages from the manual.

pp. 27-32

Let us cite the example of the work of one of these groups.
In 1965, a small patriotic group was formed in Hannover headed by a certain
Simeonov, a traitor to the Motherland, sentenced in his day by a Soviet court
to severe punishment. The group established contact with the Representative
Office of the Soviet Committee [for Cultural Ties] in Berlin. For these
purposes, the Committee was used for both correspondence as well as trips by
the group members to Berlin for personal meetings with officers of the
Representative Office. From talks with these emissaries, the impression was
formed that the Simeonov group was well-organized, regularly conducted
patriotic meetings with fellow countrymen, and had launched work to attract
other emigrations to the organization who lived in Hannover and its suburbs.
Soon, after preliminarily clarifying our attitudes toward him, Simeonov himself
came to Berlin. Although he was subject to detention in accordance with the
sentence of the Soviet court, it was decided not to detain him, since this
could compromise the Soviet Committee, and most importantly, sever at the root
the foundations of the patriotic movement among fellow countrymen which had
been started in the FRG. After obtaining the relevant recommendations for
further development of the patriotic movement and expansion of his group,
Simeonov returned to Hannover.

Meanwhile, a serious mistake was committed in the work with
the Simeonov group. The thrust of it was that the staff of the Representative
Office, and also operatives related to this matter, did not take into account
the possible interference in the work of this group by West German intelligence
services. They did not immediately take measures to vet the members of the
group and its activity among fellow countrymen, having believed the information
passed to them by Simeonov and his close aides. However, subsequently, this
mistake was corrected. The first serious suspicion emerged after the receipt of
information that the “patron” of this group of patriots was a
Catholic priest, who provided church space for the group’s meetings and himself
often attended them. A check of the priest through operational lists indicated
that we were dealing with a former Hitlerite officer, a participant in the
“march on the East,” who maintained a connection to the local police
agencies.

Further vetting actions conducted subsequently indicated
that Simeonov himself was a provocateur. Taking into account the information
obtained, the appropriate correctives mere made in further work with this
pseudo-patriotic group. The main attention of the operatives was aimed at
discovering the West Germany agents’ network among the group members and
determining which of these persons were suitable for re-recruiting.

In connection to this example, it should be noted that in
the approach to creating patriotic groups, libraries and correspondents’
networks, the Soviet Committee should not be taken lightly. The main thing is
to see that the group not only disseminates our ideology but that it is under
our control, and not the influence of the enemy’s intelligence services,.

It must be known firmly that the “patriotic” group
whose leadership was seized by the intelligence agencies of the enemy can cause
irreparable harm to the patriotic movement of our fellow countrymen. With its
help, the intelligence service may, using the cover of the authority of the
Soviet Committee, “disseminate” our ideology in such a distorted form
that it will cause harm to both our ideology and our government.

The intelligence services of the capitalist governments
conduct serious work against progressive emigre organizations as well, which
had emerged long before the creation of the Soviet Committee, believing that
stepping up the activity of these organizations in recent years is closely
connected to the work of the Soviet Committee.

By infiltrating its agents’ network into these
organizations, the enemy’s intelligence services strive to resolve both
counterintelligence as well as intelligence tasks. On the one hand, they try to
expose the connections of the progressive organizations with the Soviet
Committee and embassies of the USSR in the capitalist countries, to establish
the persons making this connection and also fellow countrymen who sympathize
with the Motherland and so on, and on the other hand to create for its own
agents’ network the opportunity for eased entry into the USSR through various
channels, including by invitation from the Soviet Committee.

Thus, the Canadian RCMP’s counterintelligence service, for
the purposes of exposing from among emigrants persons who visited the USSR,
planted a certain “Khameleon”, who served as a middleman in filing
petitions by Ukrainian emigrants to enter the USSR. By spreading among Canadian Ukrainians the
rumor that such forms are filled out only in the Russian language, Khameleon
gained the opportunity to meet with many of his fellow country men who wished
to visit the USSR as tourists and also on private business. He used this
circumstance to discover intentions and study the moods of certain individuals,
learning their attitude to the USSR and to local authorities as well as their
affiliation to progressive organizations, and reported all this to the RCMP.
Khameleon tried on the same basis to establish close “business”
contact with the officials of the embassy’s consular section, but they rejected
his services.

The Belgian counterintelligence actively developed the Union
of Soviet Citizens (SSG), uniting fellow countrymen with Soviet citizenship but
who lived permanently in Belgium. The main objective of its attention were the
members of the organization who had the opportunity to visit the USSR, including
people connected to the Soviet Committee. Counter-intelligence had dossiers on
many members of the SSG, above all, on its activist core. It was conducting
study and development of these persons from the perspective of their possible
recruitment.

Thus, for example, SSG member Bekker was being developed.
When Belgian counterintelligence learned from its agents’ network that Bekker
intended to go to the USSR on personal business and at the same time visit the
Soviet Committee, he was invited to the police. One of the officers
interrogated Bekker in detail about the state of affairs in the SSG, his
intensions regarding the trip, and then tried to recruit him, blackmailing him
with the fact that the police supposedly had materials on him. While doing this,
he held in his hands a bulging dossier. Bekker refused to collaborate, but the
counter-intelligence agent who had talked with him still gave him his telephone
number and asked him to get in touch in the event difficulties arose, promising
to help him. Bekker informed the Soviet embassy of what had happened.

As a rule, the enemy’s intelligence services brought in
anti-Soviet centers in the work against progressive emigre organizations, and
with their help tried to disrupt the events held by members of the progressive
organizations, and discredit them in the eyes of the local authorities. In
addition, as has been noted, some anti-Soviet emigre organizations tried to
infiltrate their own agents into patriotic organizations and groups. For
example, the ZCh OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists Abroad), at their
VI Conference, passed a special decision obliging the so-called “security
service” of the organization to organize work against Ukrainian
progressive groups, envisioning the infiltration of their agents into these
groups.

In carrying out this decision, the Ukrainian nationalists
tried to compromise the Ukrainian progressive organization Association of
United Ukrainian Canadians (TOUK). They launched a criminal investigation
against a leader of the TOUK, Kravchuk, whom they accused of causing moral
damage to a number of Ukrainian nationalists in a book he wrote published in
the Ukrainian language under the title “You Cannot Cut Out What is Written
with an Axe”. In this book, Kravchuk using factual material exposed the
criminal activity of a number of authoritative Ukrainian nationalists during
the period of the German occupation of Ukraine and their collaboration with the
German Fascist authorities.

Precisely in connection with the publication of this book,
the Ukrainian nationalists intended to begin their attack on TOUK. However,
soon they rejected their own plan, since they were afraid of the documented
materials of their collaboration, which Kravchuk and TOUK possessed. A second
such attempt was made by Ukrainian nationalists in 1987 as well.

Progressive organizations and groups as well as their press
organs are subject to constant harassment on the part of nationalist and other
anti-Soviet formations. One of the basic methods in the work against patriotic
groups are informers’ reports to the police and counter-intelligence agencies
of the capitalist countries on the leaders and activists of progressive
organizations.

Thus, in the USA, for a long time a patriotic journal, Za sinyem okeanom [Beyond the Blue
Ocean], which propagandized loved for one’s people, history and culture,
published official materials on the achievements of the Soviet Union and often
spoke out against nationalist organizations. Informants’ reports systematically
went to the FBI about the editor of this journal, “Writer,” as a
person connected to the USSR Embassy who received funds from it for publishing
the journal. In connection with these informants’ reports, Writer was summoned
to the FBI several times, interrogated and intimidated. As a result,
Writer was forced to drop the
publication of this journal for the sake of his own peace and the welfare of
his family.

Often the intelligence services themselves and the bourgeois
press are used in the provocations against progressive organizations and
groups. Thus, Belgian counter-intelligence exploited the fact of a petty violation
of the customs regulations by one of the heads of the SSG who worked in the
Brussels Airport, broadly advertising this incident in the press, linking it to
the activity of the “Soviet agents’ network” in Belgium and reporting
that the “culprit” was a member of the SSG.

It should also be noted that all progressive emigre
organizations, groups and press organs, especially in the USA, are included in
lists of “saboteur organizations”.

In this connection, the Soviet Committee and especially the
rezidenturas, when they are involved in this, must observe the maximum caution
and konspiratsiya in work with the progressive organizations. This is
particularly the case with those countries where the progressive organizations
are in a semi-legal position.

Along with the agent network’s work, intelligence agents of
the enemy devote a lot of attention toward paralyzing the propaganda activity
of the Soviet Committee, opposing its ideological influence on its fellow
countrymen. For these purposes, in a number of countries (the US, France, some
countries of Latin America) special measures are taken obliging postal offices
to confiscate all the literature of the Soviet Committee sent to fellow
countrymen. Emigrants who receive newspapers from the Soviet Committee (if this
becomes know to the local authorities) are summoned to police and subjected to
harassment. Therefore cases are noted frequently when fellow countrymen,
fearing for their position, refuse to receive newspapers.

p. 64

As an example, let us review the case of
“Kapitan,” through whom state security agencies were developing a
staff member of the American military air intelligence, a Russian by ethnicity.

The state security agencies received a tip on Kapitan from
the Soviet Committee, where a letter was received from the fellow countryman
“Stary”. In that letter, Stary provided some information about
himself, his relatives and friends. In particular, he indicated that his nephew, “Kapitan,” was involved in
secret work in the US Army. This report drew the attention of agents of state
security who decided to obtain more information about Kapitan, using the
correspondence with Stary for this. Stary had to be drawn into correspondence
with the Soviet Committee and several letters were exchanged with him.

In the letters to Stary, our interest to Kapitan was
carefully encoded. Through indirect questions, we managed to obtain basic data
about Kapitan and the address of his place of residence.

A check of Kapitan on the lists and through the rezidentura indicated that he was an
officer of US air military intelligence. It was decided to immediately halt the
correspondence with Stary through the Soviet Committee and start the
development of Kapitan. But it turned out later that this measure was taken too
late.

When our agent visited Stary, through whom access to Kapitan
was intended, and introduced himself as a Soviet citizen, Stary immediately
warned that his correspondence with the Soviet Committee was known to the FBI
which was in the process of holding all these letters. He said that he had the
assignment to immediately inform the FBI about people who came to him and would
be interested in Kapitan. Stary advised our person not to visit him any more to
avoid unpleasantness.

Stary turned out to be an honest person and did not give
away our agent. But it could have been far worse. The reason for this failure
is only that when the operatives first caught sight of Kapitan, they selected
an incorrect path to study him. Instead of getting information about Kapitan from
the same Stary clandestinely, they launched an open correspondence which gave
the enemy the opportunity to intercept
our activity.

Table of Contents

Introduction

I. Political Intelligence

1. Tasks of intelligence in studying foreign policy of
capitalist countries

2. Tasks of intelligence in studying domestic policy of
capitalist countries

3. Tasks of intelligence in the military-political field

4. Tasks of intelligence in studying the economy of
capitalist countries

5. Fundamental objectives of agent network penetration

6. Agent operational measures in influencing certain aspects
of life of capitalist states

II. Scientific-Technical Intelligence

1. Tasks of scientific-technical intelligence

2. Some fundamental problems of interest to
scientific-technical intelligence

3. Objectives of agent network penetration

III. Counterintelligence Work Abroad

1. Work against intelligence and counterintelligence
agencies of capitalist countries

2. Work against foreign reactionary emigre organizations

3. Counterintelligence work in influencing and intercepting
enemy sabotage activity against representative offices and citizens of
socialist countries abroad

“Intel Targets”

Top Secret

Copy No. __

Fundamental Directions and Targets of Intelligence Work Outside the Country

1970

Table of Contents

Print run 50

Journal no. 174/7-38ss

Publication No. 6/31

Note: This is a summary translation of the original Russian document. Only lines with quotation marks are direct translations from the text.

Introduction

A reliable and dedicated agents’ network is the chief method of foreign intelligence for socialist countries. Intelligence gathered is used by socialist governments in foreign policy and economic planning and strengthening their international authority.

There shouldn’t be a strict separation of functions but close cooperation.

Political Intelligence, Scientific-Technical Intelligence and Counterintelligence Work Abroad

Each branch has their own lines of work and specific tasks and objectives for penetration but they are all interactive and subordinate to one goal, state security and strengthening foreign policy positions. There are ongoing and long-term tasks.

The state of relations between the socialist state and the Western country, the presence of foreign military bases, intelligence and other subversive organizations and subversive centers determine the nature of the intelligence tasks in a given country.

Before WWII, Soviet intelligence focus was on fascist Germany and imperialist Japan which were secretly preparing war against the USSR. Now the main enemy of the Soviet Union is the USA. , although revanchism in West Germany cannot be let out of sight.

Each country has its set of concerns, i.e. Bulgaria has to attend to Turkey and Greece, Czechoslovakia to attend to the FRG [West Germany] and Austria.

The targets of socialist intelligence are capitalist states, military, political and economic blocs of these countries and various international organizations (except those of the socialist countries).

In the narrow sense, the objectives are the government and other institutions, parties etc. to be penetrated, with three main lines noted above, by obtaining secret information; conducting active measures to weaken the enemy; exposing the enemy’s plans for preparation of a new war by imperialist states; support of national liberation movements; battle with enemy intelligence and counterintelligence agents; providing security for institutions and citizens of socialist countries abroad.

I. Political Intelligence Tasks on Study of Capitalist Countries’ Foreign Policies

Get documents and materials on:

a) secret political, economic and war plans regarding the USSR and other socialist countries; these include transcripts of meetings; secret instructions to diplomats and ministries; plans for creating military blocs, etc.

b) sabotage activity of the main imperialist states against socialist countries — US, UK, FRG, France, Japan; also get intel on their activity in each others’ countries; also intel from NATO, SEATO, Baghdad Pact, Asian-Pacific Council re: military and strategic plans, secret agreements, reports from leaders; inspection trip reports; transcripts of meetings. Get intel on role each member plays, taking into account American imperialism directs it; find contradictions and disagreements among the members; for example conflicts between US and FRG, France, UK, Italy on economic issues; differents between US and UK on Middle East as well as France; get info on nature and depth of these conflicts; find the weak links; deepen the conflicts and contradictions; find out which new members they want to bring in;

c) plans directed against national liberation movements in Africa, Asia, Latin America; plans on their puppet governments and neocolonialist methods; their economic, political and ideological penetration in order to thwart them. Get secret info on methods and means to suppress independence movements; hold events to expose their plans; find out secret agreements and expose them; get intel on concessions, loans etc. to expose

d) activity of political parties and organizations in leadership roles as well as opposition if they influence domestic and foreign policy; their attitudes toward the socialist countries; get meeting transcripts, statements made privately to small groups of people;

e) contradictions between capitalist countries on key international policies. Get secret information especially on US, UK, FRG, France, Japan; details on their differences; positions of party leaders; memos on differences and disagreements; transcripts of ambassadors’ meetings; instructions sent to posts; off-the-record statements of government and party leaders.

Documents on intentions, thinking, and plans are most important to get.

The imperialist countries are afraid when they see the success of socialist countries.

The monopolist circles of the USA suppress workers’ and democratic movements and disrupt socialist community; they create aggressive blocs; fuel the arms race.

But the imperialists are checked by the Soviet Union’s nuclear potential and prevention of war. For this, intelligence has to find out the military plans of the imperialists; the state of their economies; their activity in international organizations, etc.

2. Intelligence tasks on Study of Domestic Policies of Capitalist Countries

Intel must reveal correlation of class forces; reveal plans and measures of government and parties; expose true reasons behind them. It must answer the question: which forces are used by reactionary circles for anti-democratic, reactionary purposes; which support the peace-loving policy of the socialist countries.

What are forms of class and national liberation struggle; differences and disagreements among bourgeois parties; the peace movement.

Imperialists prepare for new war to suppress the progressive and democratic movements.

Find out composition of government, political parties, organizations, groups; opposition; monopolies; ruling circles; reactionary groups against the communist party; media and propaganda; on the situation of ethnic minorities

Government composition; how solid are positions; social and economic forces they rely on; inter-party struggle in parliament; activity of opposition groups; directives and secret instructions to local governments; conflicts within ruling circles; popular attitudes toward the government.

Also external factors that influence domestic politics; chief among these are the pressure that the main imperialist countries puton the smaller ones.

Political parties and organizations

Get info on political activity, program and tactics of various parties; characterization of their leaders; their attitudes to socialist countries; faction fights; for example need intel on both Democratic and Republican parties in US and in English, both Conservative and Labour; get info on behind-the-scenes activity; which parties conduct the line of foreign powers; which parties can the socialist countries rely on.

Monopolists’ activity

Bourgeois governments virtually carry out the will of major monopolies, so intel on them is paramount; find out their foreign and domestic policy lines; study the degree they are subordinate to the government; find out unofficial contacts and connections; on the degree of influence of foreign monopolists

Bourgeois propaganda activity

Various government ideological and propaganda organs are the chief weapon of propaganda in bourgeois countries; knowing the press is a key intel activity; studying their propaganda services, channels to influence socialist countries, tour groups, delegations etc; USIAm which carries out subversive propaganda activity and espionage and diversionary activities against socialist countries, and the international communist, workers’ and national liberation movemets.

By penetrating press and propaganda organs, socialist intelligence agencies can not only get information but disrupt plans for ideological sabotage and influence public opinion.

Study the sources of financing; characterize the top editors and journalists; see how top parties use the media.

3. Intelligence tasks in military and political field

Study military policy, economies, number, organization and deployment of armed forces; tactics and strategies; likely theaters of action; find out about military tech; strategic, operational and tactical intel.

Obtain secret info, expose plans for war; study influence of military groups; reactionary/fascist parties; e.g. influence of military-industrial complexes in US and FRG, National Democratic Party in FRG etc.

Get intel on diplomacy, making of allies; preparation of war in economy; ideological warfare.

Expose military plans; find out practical preparation (especially of US, UK, FRG, France, Japan); intentions on use of missiles including thermonuclear; other weapons of mass destruction.

Find out main bases, military potential, plans against socialist countries; also plans of bodies such as NATO, SEATO, Baghdad Pact;

Study contradictions among US, England, FRG, France Japan and their allies.

Plans can differ depending on role in international arena; military might; geographical location. Find out allies and scientific/technical intel in military.

Military-political situation

Plans and intentions; participation in blocs; covert or overt role in blocs; connections to main imperialist countries.

Military-economic potential

Wars depend on economy as never before; dependency of battle capacity on economy; strategic plans are realistic only by taking into account military and economic potential.

NATO countries are the priority.

Study military industry; info on militarization of the economy; state of agriculture; material reserves; strategic raw materials; dependency on foreign markets for materials; what imports they need; what funds available for military

Sometimes foreign intel and military intel have joint plans or exchange information with other countries, in order to weaken the defense of the socialist countries.

4. Intelligence tasks on capitalist countries’ economies

Get info on the secret side of their economic policy which is significant for development of trade and economic ties; proceed from the Marxist-Leninist definition that politics and economics are interrelated and develop as a whole;

“Politics is a concentrated expression of economics” – Lenin

Also get scientific and technical info; secret info on economic policy; hidden economic springs of domestic and foreign policies;

USA is the priority; find out plans to subvert economies of socialist countries; secret talks between capitalist countries; boycotts, discrimination etc; relationship of capitalist business circles to socialist countries; find out which are ready to cooperate with socialist countries; expose weaknesses; contradictions; internal disputes; relations inside Common Market.

Industry and military industry; what are needs; procurement orders; will they help socialist countries.

Get intel on contradictions in US; forms and methods of expansionism; agressive policies of reactionary circles; competition for raw materials; markets for capital investment.

American monopolists now have it hard as socialist countries compete with them and their popular masses resist them; American expansionism can hide under other forms, i.e. help to developing countries; various pacts and agreements; thus the need for secrect intel that will expose this.

The aggressive policy of the US reactionary circles is closed connected to the expansion of American capital; these are the real reasons for the capitalist contradictions so socialiast intel ineeds info on this, on sources of raw material, markets, and influence on capital investment.

Economic expansion leads to resistance by masses; even the local national bourgeoisie may resist against the US.

Need intel on secret plans to remove the internal contradictions; state of industry; strategic assets; domestic and foreign trade; hard currency reserves; plans to print currency, etc.

Also on prominent industrialists and financiers; on assessment of them and their prospects.

5. Fundamental targets for agent networks’ penetration

As they conduct their aggressive policy against the socialist countries and prepare for a new war, the capitalists have reduced the circle of those with access to secret material of interest to intelligence. But if operative work is correctly organized, targets can be penetrated.

Such targets are government, party, science, technical, military, economic and other institutions;

– offices of heads of states

– foreign ministries

a) cabinet of ministers

b) classified/encryption department through which telegrams go from ministries abroad

c) political departments of governments; economic departments;

d) treaty and legal departments

e) typists’ bureau

f) consular departments

g) diplomatic communications departments

h) archives

– diplomatic missions in other countries

– parliamentary and governmemt commission; economic committees in parliament

– ministries and agencies with access to intelligence, involved in counterintelligence against the enemy and socialist countries

– ruling parties’ executives

– local government offices

– telegraph agencies, press and propaganda organs

– intergovernmental bodies like NATO, SEATO

– ministries of defense

– ministries responsible for defense manufacturing, procurement of raw materials; monopolists who fulfill military orders

– staff of cabinet of ministers, presidential council on economy in US; committee on economy in UK; ministries involved in finance and trade.

– budget offices; statistical offices, i.e. Bureau of Statistics in US; Central Statistics Agency in UK

– monopolists such as the Steel Trust, General Motors, Standard Oil; in UK, Imperial Chemical Trust, Lloyd’s of London; in France the Rothschilds trading house; central banks; in US, First National Bank, Morgan, Chase Bank, Rockefellers; in England, Barclays and Midland Bank; British Federation of Industrialists

Work on gathering economic intel differs from other info as analysis of the materials on the spot by the rezidenturas plays a much greater role.

Important to compare intel gathered with existing official data; following all official economic publications can only be done in country, and therefore determining the value of economic material is the responsibility of the rezidenturas in capitalist countries. The work has to be assigned to intelligence officers who have the relevant training and systematically study the country’s economy.

Some issues on study of penetration targets

Targets must be studied carefully and systematically by both the Center and the rezidenturas. The Center should keep files on all materials obtained about a given target. Rezidenturas in the given country will provide information as well as those in other countries, from legal sources.

Studying a target means collecting info on its organizational structure; tasks, functions, personnel, in order to determine what secret info might be there used for influence and other active measures, regarding government institutions, parliaments, political parties etc.

Keep in mind structures and personnel can change; surveillance has to be constant. If the Center has no info, and the rezidentura doesn’t have any agents in the target, then you have to start with legal sources and look for approaches.

Find the most important links, know which department has which info; who is responsible for secret documents; look for ways to get at files; know the work schedule, location of the archive, who’s in charge.

Study personnel most of all, determine which ones are candidates to be recruited; but penetration can be done not only with recruitment; agents can be infiltrated in some cases Use agents that may have ties to personnel inside, relatives, business contacts, friends.

6. Agent measures to influence life in capitalist countries (active measures)

Foreign policy of socialist countries can be helped by intelligence not only through getting secrets but through active measures in politics, economics, ideology, science, technology, armed forces, intelligence, counter-intelligence. Active measures are certain offensive actions by socialist countries’ intelligence along all lines of their activity. Above all they should:

1) foster strengthening of the USSR’s position as well as socialist countries for successful foreign policy lines

2) disrupt enemy activity from imperialist powers; intensify their conflicts among themselves;

3) expose actual nature and aggressive aims of NATO, SEATO etc.

4) weaken and disorganize activity of various reactionary parties and unions;

5) compromise agencies that engage in ideological sabotage and other hostile operations;

6) expose preparations for new world war, neocolonial policies against other nations;

7) create difficulties in the work of intel and counterintel agencies; expose their sabotage

8) facilitate the destruction of emigre centers that cooperate with imperialist intel;

“Agent network influence” is the term for active measures carried out by a network of agents.

An agent of influence can be a minister, prominent government or party figure; major journalist; publisher of a newspaper; influential civic or religious figure, etc. People who may not be so prominent but still have influence on government and civic figures, i.e. their close relatives, lovers, a priest, etc.) are also in this category.

The agent network of influence isn’t used so much to collect info as to perform actions that will help the socialist countries.

This would include criticizing foreign policy; making statements in favor of socialist countries; getting decisions made in favor of the socialist countries.

The peace movement in all the capitalist countries has broad segments of the workers’ and peasants’ classes but also a significant part of the intelligentsia; some capitalist countries have prominent politicians, scientists, etc. involved who are for peaceful settlements of disputes, talks with socialist countries.

Exploiting this situation, agent of influence can only oppose the government’s actions aimed at the arms race and destruction of remnants of bourgeois democracy; they can oppose the government budget for the arms race; the mismanagement of government funds; they can oppose American economic expansionism.

Material and moral support of political parties, organizations, press is in the interests of the socialist states. They can provide secret support to political, cultural, religious, media etc. organizations.

But the strictest conspiracy must be maintained in giving aid so as not to harm these parties, etc.

Example: After a government crisis in a capitalist country, a new government was formed in a coalition with agrarians and socialists, with a foreign policy totally subordinate to American imperialism. This government suppressed democratic freedoms and the interests of the working class, and was especially oppressive of the communist party. The economic situation in this country was terrible. Many plants closed due to the pro-American position, leading to workers’ unrest as well as that of small and medium bourgeoisie. A new party with a pro-Soviet line was formed calling for the development of domestic industry. This part was progressive in being anti-American, pro-national dependence, and friendly to socialist countries. The Soviet rezidentura used this situation to do a number of active measures.

The rezidentura had intel that since 1946, a “Union of Fatherland Defenders” had existed which united some intelligentsia, middle-level bureaucrats and some liberal bourgeoisie. They called for independence from the US and UK, normal trade relations with the USSR, etc. It began to get more attention, but had little funds and didn’t even publish its own newspaper.

The agentura studied the head of this group (“Bob”), found that he was a supporter of the USSR’s peace-loving policy; they were able to get him interested in taking subsidies for his party. He was recruited for various active measures then; he started a paper, “Union,” where he published a line carefully cultivated with Soviet intelligence’s help. The agentura also provided him with factual material; exposes of corruption; American monopolists’ intrigues, etc. and advocated economic independence.

American intelligence was upset and tried to infiltrate this group and destroy the organization with internal unrest; A certain “Khlost” was suspected of working for the US in this group; Soviet intelligence decided to put their agent in the group (“Sned”) so that he could oppose the US agent.

Sned had a cover as an industrialist; Bob was recommended to call for trade with the USSR and ask industrialists to join his Union. Sned put money into the group; he became prominent. He didn’t reveal his ties to Soviet intelligence; he kept watch over Khlost, saying that he was disseminating provocative rumors and slandering Bob as corrupt and unprincipled, supposedly having Nazi ties in World War II. Khlost also criticized the Union’s program; he advocated getting economic aid from the US as otherwise the country couldn’t overcome its economic problems. Khlost found like-minded members to form an opposition within the Union.

The rezidentura found that Khlost had been in France doing business when the Nazis occupied it and had cooperated with them, exposing some emigres from his countrymen. He feared retaliation at home and didn’t return home right away after the war.

Soviet intelligence exposed him and provoked lack of confidence in Bob, but this is when Sned began to rebel and demand proof of Bob’s collaboration with the Nazis. Khlost tried to smooth it over but Sned insisted. He told other members that he believed Sned had been sent into the group to disrupt and split it. If he couldn’t come up with his claims of Bob’s collaboration first with Nazis, then with Communists, the opposition within the group should stand down.

As expected, Khlost couldn’t come up with the proof; Sned then accused Khlost of collaboration with the Hitlerites; Khlost then accused Send of libel and threatened him with a lawsuit. But most of the opposition expressed no confidence in Khlost; Sned promised to gather kompromat on him; he used his ties with police which were given to him by the rezidentura.

Khlost didn’t come to the next meeting; he was expelled in absentia and that was the end of the group’s internal opposition. The media picked up the story and implied that the Union’s enemies were so concerned about their influence that they were bent on weakening it; but American intelligence failed.

The Union became so influential that there was prediction that a new party would be made on its foundation; Bob did not have the capacity to lead a larger party, he was a poor organizer, even if popular; a civic figure was recruited to lead the Union and the Center ensured that the rezidentura was tasked to put “Lauren” another agent of influence in the leadership. He was already known widely as a progressive; industrialists gathered around him, as well as some advocates of political neutrality and restoring the national economy; they saw Lauren as a leader but didn’t do anything; Soviet intelligence took the tactic of having Lauren appear reluctant and turn down offers to lead the party, biding his time; several weeks before the parliamentary elections the Center gave the order to have Lauren accept the proposal to lead the Union; he published a major article exposing the government’s destructive economic policy and urging independence of his country; as a true patriot he couldn’t stand aside from the anti-war movement.

At a Union presidium meeting, Lauren was made leader and Bob general secretary and newspaper editor; the announcement of his new leadership brought a flow of new people and more demand for the newspaper. Union nominated candidates to parliament; thus as a result of the detailed and difficult work of the rezidentura, mission accomplished.

Another example of a reactionary party’s destruction:

In a certain capitalist country, the issue was being decided whether to keep a democratic regime or liquidate democratic achievements, which the American imperialists were especially interested in, having unleashed an anti-democratic campaign in this country through their intelligence.

A progress democratic party that took part in the government was subjected to increasing attacks, especially by the National Party, the most reactionary in the country. There was fear this party would create a crisis and take power.

With the approval of the Center, one of the socialist intelligence agencies hatched an active measure to weaken the reactionary party and prevent them from isolating the democratic party.

An agent code-named “John” had earlier been recruited from the National Party; he had personal differences with the head of state and the head of the party and kept to the sidelines of party activity. The rezidentura decided to use John for an active measure. He said he had a number of supporters in the party; he wanted an immediate, open attack on the leadership, the creation of an opposition newspaper, and bringing in a regional leader of the party as the head of a new party.

But the rezidentura thought this plan was premature and instructed John to hold back or he’d simply be expelled from the party. He was told to gradually unite his supporters while maintaining an outward appearance of loyalty and keeping the rezidentura informed.

Then the rezidentura learned about the plans of reactionary parties to provoke a government crisis; John was ordered to speak out against the government with his group then appeal to change the party’s leadership. The party leadership was thrown into confusion; many members said they supported John, and the party split within a matter of days. This helped the democratic party stay in power.

Compromising reactionary political parties and figures

In order to disrupt the influence of hostile, reactionary parties, kompromat has to be organized depending on circumstances, i.e. exposing immoral acts or political, financial etc. machinations; publishing of letters. “The compromising material must be mainly plausible, otherwise no one will believe it.”

Exposure of anti-democratic activity and plans of reactionary forces

American imperialists libel socialist countries and mislead the masses in the media; socialist intelligence has to expose these lies and fabrications.

Publish secret information; publish only excerpts of documents with brief annotation; publish photo-copies; reveal true plans of the parties.

Disinformation is one of the effective means to influence various sides of political and economic life, parties, organizations; these pre-planned actions aimed at leading the enemy into confusion on various issues in ways advantageous to socialist countries.

“Work on disinformation requires from intelligence exceptional attention, detailed knowledge of the issue being prepared for disinformation, and careful study of all circumstances concerning the target of disinformation. To the extent possible, one must know what means the enemy has or will have to obtain reliable information on a given issue, the degree of the enemy’s knowledge of the issue, etc.”

“Disinformation documents are developed in such a way to be plausible in content as well as form. The fabricated ‘facts’ or ‘events’ in such documents must be logically justified, relevant to the existing course of events and must be combined with real facts.”

“The means for planting disinformation materials on the enemy may be various: press, radio, agents’ network, ‘confidential’ conversations exposed by technical eavesdropping on the enemy; ‘losses’ of documents or invented creation of conditions for the ‘theft’ or ‘secret’ confiscation of documents by the enemy containing disinformation.”

“The most often used and effective means of disseminating disinformation are the agents’ network channels and the use of detected enemy eavesdropping technology. The transfer of disinformation materials by foreign intelligence through its planted agents has the advantage that this information, if it is well-prepared, will be quickly reported to offices (in the government, general staff, etc.).”

Study the target carefully, check all the materials about it.

Choosing the moment is of great significance. Keep in mind that it is “useless, and even dangerous to conduct active measures if they are based on materials that do not reflect the real state of things.”

Example: “A certain socialist country’s intelligence agency regularly received materials on internal conflicts in a political party in a capitalist country. The analysis and re-checking of these materials was not done with sufficient thoroughness, as a result of which the rezidentura came to unfounded conclusions that the conflicts in this party had gone so deep that two wings may be formed in it.”

It was thought that most party members would go into the progressive wing, and the leadership would be left with having to make a compromise with the splitters and make concessions.

But in fact it was otherwise; the conflicts were not so deep; an attempt at splitting the party was risky and dangerous; and that’s how it happened. While the party was damaged, its reactionary part, which was a large part, preserved its unity and the opposition was isolated and then expelled from the party.

II. Scientific and Technological Intelligence

1. Tasks of scientific and technical intelligence (STI, known as NTR in Russian)

STI obtains information about achievements and discoveries abroad with the capitalist countries a priority, focusing on those which accelerate development and can be used by the enemy for his aggressive plans. Science and technology development in the capitalist countries is focused on preparation of a new war; proof of this are the huge sums allocated in the US and a few other imperialist countries to financing science and technology work in military agencies; this is key for conducting war. A country’s military and economic potential depends on such scientific development and training of qualified cadres.

Socialist intelligence needs science & technology intelligence not just for defense but for development as unlike the imperialists it puts such technology to the benefit of the people.

Fundamental tasks of STI:

a) provide military agencies with information on technology with military application and all new achievements in this field

b) provide scientific research and manufacturing organizations with information to help the economy

– defend the Motherland from attacks by aggressors who hope to use their technology on them;

– use the information obtained to advance world industry for the workers’ welfare.

2. Some basic problems of interest to STI

The aggressive imperialists of the USA and NATO don’t count on the moral resolve of their soldiers in preparing for a new war. That is one of the reasons why they use various automatic forms of weapons and weapons of mass destruction.

Enormous sums are spent on developing atomic and thermonuclear weapons and their delivery and targeting systems; also expensive work on developing bacterial and chemical weapons; poisonous substances designed to disrupt the nervous system.

Great attention should be devoted to rapid reaction bombing aviation; long-range escort jet fighters; guided missile systems; intercontinental ballistic missiles; radiation weapons. Also electronics, especially radio, radar, automatic systems, calculation systems for guided artillery weapons’ detection of enemy fire.

Synthetics — plastic with new features such as heat, acid, and frost resistance; concentrated fuel for jet mortars; high-temperature capacity; iron and steal; special alloys needed for new forms of weapons

Priorities:

a) atomic energy; natural and artificial materials, thorium, uranium, plutonium; equipment and technological processes; data on theoretical designs in nuclear physics; study of atomic nucleus and its properties; construction of atomic and thermonuclear bombs; atomic energy stations; engines for submarines, boats and planes; plasma nuclear engines; space ships, satellites, etc.

b) bacteria; types and features of bacteria and viruses used; methods of mass production;

c) electronics – diagrams, plans, radar, computers; guided missile systems; radio communications

d) organic and inorganic chemistry, polymers; new explosives, poisons; production of strategic chemical materials; acids; ultra-strong and heat-resistant materials; special-purpose alkalines

e) iron and steel – basic production improvement processes for cast iron, steal, non-ferrous metals; specials means of processing of poor ores; technologies for producing special alloys and smelting of rare metals; titanium, beryllium; with wide application for energy usages; technology for obtaining super-pure metals; metals with high mechanical durability and anti-corrosive metals.

3. Targets for agents’ network penetration

The increasing militarization of the imperialist economies, especially the US, UK and FRG lead to the expansion of scientific and technological work applied to military purposes and a widespread participation of industrial firms in such military production; all of this requires an expanded STI targets:

– state agencies involved in planning, organization, funding, and research of applied military industry; central government agencies like the department of defense mobilization in the US and its special committees on scientific research; the British department of scientific and industrial research and supply; French national center for scientific research; Italian national council on research, etc. Also general staffs where documentation is concentrated and testing of new forms of armaments is ordered; French Commissariat for Atomic Energy or American Commission on Atomic Energy

– state and private scientific research centers and laboratories; design bureaus; testing stations, proving grounds, experimental factories;

– high technology institutions, universities, societies, academies with military contracts with government or training cadres for these fields;

– private and state industry involved in manufacture of military equipment and technology

– patent bureaus, archives, libraries with secret technical literature from state and private firms and scientific institutions

Given the large number of targets, need for clear and focused organization of intelligence work to get intel of most use to socialist states; need for careful planning, definition of topics needed; route for penetration.

Need for agents to keep briefed on scientific/technological developments; concentrate their attention and efforts on targets that have the most interest at the given time and most favorable conditions for getting intel.

The agents’ network working inside the target is the best means. But studying the target with agents not always possible. Then you have to use open or semi-official sources, reference books, scientific press, various corporate publications, studying them carefully.

The Center has resources on targets, either grouped on topic or separately on a given product which will ease the work of agents studying the targets. Daily, detailed work needed in studying targets.

Scientists are to be recruited by the agents’ network as well engineers, and other personnel in research centers, libraries, industrial plants etc.

Only highly-qualified personnel have access to the most secret materials, so agents have to be recruited from among the leading scientists and technicians at research centers, ministries, major libraries with broad specialization; look for senior science officials, executives of firms performing special orders. Sometimes typists, secretaries, librarians, workers at publishers, etc. are useful.

III. Counterintelligence Work Abroad

Capitalist intelligence and counterintelligence organizes sabotage inside socialist countries and against their offices and citizens abroad. Foreign counterintelligence leads the struggle against such hostile activity by the enemy and by various factions of emigre organizations abroad.

Capitalist intelligence and counterintelligence tries to recruit unstable and hostile elements from within socialist countries and also infiltrates its spies into these countries to sabotage institutions, organize provocations, and recruit agents.

Various hostile emigre organizations are used for this purpose. All the threads of sabotage lead to the capitalist countries, so the CI agents’ work is eased by getting intel on plans from capitalist intel. Foreign CI is involved in intercepting enemy’s attempts at infiltration.

Basic CI tasks:

– work against intel and CI agencies in capitalist countries; expose and disrupt their sabotage of socialist countries;

– work to disrupt and paralyze reactionary emigre organizations, among the chief bases for hostile intel and spy recruitment;

– CI work on exposing sabotage against socialist institutions abroad;

– work at exposing sabotage intentions

– help to socialist state security agencies and CI activities abroad;

I. Work against intelligence and CI agencies of capitalist countries

Work includes exposure and interception of activity by capitalist intelligence and CI; exposure of enemy agents’ network dropped or prepared for dropping into socialist countries.

Job is to penetrate their networks and study structure, personnel, methods of sabotage; battle hostile CI; expose plots, channels of infiltration of their agents; routes of their networks; passwords, meeting places; learn what they know about socialist countries’ intelligence.

Study forms and methods of work; training of cadres; conduct disinformation; distract enemy’s efforts and means to solving secondary problems, etc.

Top priority are intel and CI agencies penetrating socialist countries, get their codes, card file of gents, etc.

Penetrate their schools; expose agents being prepared to be dropped into socialist countries.

2. Work against emigre groups

Reactionary emigre organizations try to show they are political organizations only acting from ideological and political consideration, independent of the countries where they are located, and not connected with foreign intelligence.

But as we all know, they are all sell-outs, are on the dole with imperialist governments; and serve as a base for their recruitment of spies, saboteurs and terrorists.

Many emigre groups have their own intel agencies; they organize sabotage against socialist countries; this makes them very important targets for penetration.

Penetration is achieved by recruiting leaders of these groups; getting into leadership; get info on intel in US, UK, FRG, France; study the cadres, methods, means of sabotage; get into their schools where spies are trained; one of the important tasks is to recruit teachers and service personnel in these schools.

Active ways of penetration into emigre organizations is through operational “games” under a legend which help expose the enemy underground centers, their communications with foreign intelligence agencies, etc.

3. Counterintelligence work in exposing and intercepting diversionary activity

The capitalist countries have various offices, missions, trade representatives, press bureaus, etc. in the socialist countries. In some countries — Algeria, UAR, Burma, Mali, Guinea, etc. there are large numbers of citizens from socialist countries, specialists and works helping industrial plants, medical institutions, universities. These personnel are the object of intensive interest from imperialist CI, and they organize various provocations against them and try to recruit them and their family members — teachers of foreign languages, janitors, stokers, translators, tailors, hairdressers, etc. The rezidentura has to be on the look-out to intercept these:

– agent penetration against socialist offices; provocations; need to learn enemy plans in advance

– recruitment of agents’ networks from among locals working there

– recruitment of socialist citizens who come on business to these countries

Materials coming to socialist countries’ citizens must be checked thoroughly an prophylactic measures taken; counterintel work abroad is extremely important and has to be at the center of the rezidentura’s attention constantly.

Table of Contents for Recruitment of Agents’ Network

Chapter I

Recruitment of an Agents’ Network as One of the Main Operative Tasks of Intelligence of Socialist Countries

1. Tasks of recruitment work

2. Recruitment contingent

3. Factors influencing organization and conduct of recruitment work

Chapter II

Detection and Selection of Persons Representing Recruitment Interest

1. General principles of selection

2. Methods and means of detecting persons representing recruitment interest (obtaining leads)

3. Study and vetting of leads

4. Vigilance and securing of conspiracy in the course of study and vetting of leads

Chapter III

Recruitment Process and its Component Elements

1. Fundamentals of recruitment

a) Ideological-political basis of recruitment

b) Material basis of recruitment

c) Mental-psychological basis of recruitment

2. Form of recruitment

a) Form of gradual involvement

b) Form of direct offer

3. Types of recruitment

a) Recruitment under foreign flag and its features

b) Detection and selection of candidates for recruitment under foreign flag

c) Conduct and completion of recruitment development under foreign flag

) Transfer of agent recruited under foreign flag to flag of socialist state

4. Methods of influence on recruited

Chapter IV

Recruitment work, its conduct and completion

1. Concept of “recruitment work”

2. Tasks performed during recruitment work

a) Concretization of basis of recruitment

b) Determining intelligence capacities

c) Detecting personal qualities

d) Selection of form of recruitment

e) Selection of recruiter and his introduction into work

f) Selection of time and place for conducting recruitment talk

3. Plan of recruitment

a) Development of plan of recruitment

b) Conduct and reinforcement of recruitment

4. Securing conspiracy and recruitment work. Measures in case of failure of recruitment.

5. Incorporating new agent in intelligent work

CONCLUSION

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RECRUITMENT OF AGENTS’ NETWORK

Copy No. ___

1969

Table of Contents

Notes on Recruitment of Agents’ Network:

Agents have to be ideologically trained and taught conspiracy as well as how to conduct themselves properly in work, society, and life.

Agents have to be constantly recruited because some drop out naturally or are removed for cause. Their motives and capacity for getting intelligence have to be studied.

Failure to prepare recruitment sufficiently can lead to worsening relations with capitalist countries, exposure of the intelligence agent and recruit and cause harm to intelligence.

It’s hard for socialist intelligence agencies to recruit citizens of capitalist countries so they have to influence their world view, ensure their discipline.

Chapter 1

Intelligence operations aren’t just about gathering information but about disrupting hostile plans of the enemy, intercepting the sabotage of socialist countries and actively influencing the life of capitalist states to the advantage of socialist countries.

Recruiters should target places where government’s political line is developed and where most secret political documents are located, such as cabinet of ministers, foreign ministry, leaders of political parties, major monopolies, especially as related to socialist countries.

Also science and technology are a target, especially nuclear warheads for intercontinental missiles and innovative technology, new models of production.

Penetration of the enemy’s intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies is one of the most important but also most difficult jobs.

A priority is influence of political and economic life of capitalist countries; need to acquire agents who can conduct political actions useful to socialist countries.

2. Recruitment contingent

Two tendencies in the world – 1) rapid economic growth of socialist countries and improvement of their populations’ welfare and success in the fight for peace; 2) reaction, economic and political instability of capitalist countries, impoverishment of workers, sabotage of peace colonial wars, worsening of contradictions.

Therefore, socialist countries are getting millions of sympathizers who are a broad contingent for recruitment by socialist countries.

Some openly fight capitalism and have progressive views; others fear losing their government or factory jobs but have anti-imperialist sentiments.

Hundreds of millions of people see now that capitalism leads to economic anarchy and periodic crises, unemployment and poverty, wars, so opposition is growing in government, military, science.

The peace movement has more and more people of various classes, social groups, parties, unions, including world-renowned scientists, engineers, doctors, business people, religious figures, petty bourgeois etc.

Some of these participants in the peace movement can be brought into intelligence work. But each recruit has to be studied carefully as his open opposition may be more useful in fighting the capitalist world than his work as an intelligence agent.

Hundreds of millions are also involved in the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. While they may not be for a socialist system per se, they’re against imperialism.

Contingents for recruitment: coders, secretaries, stenographers, couriers, typists, etc. with access to classified materials.

Also many emigres from the socialist countries in US, Canada, Latin America who can be used, and they have relatives at home.

Many people with materials needs in capitalist countries even if employed.

There’s an ebb and flow of available contingents depending on circumstances; social countries become more powerful and influential and this has an impact.

But certain failures and mistakes in socialist countries including intelligence failures as well as anti-socialist propaganda can have a negative impact.

Police oppression and other negative factors in capitalist countries can reduce the contingent due to fear but also induce outrage which can be used. There is increasing repression against communist parties and progressive organizations. Socializing with people from socialist countries is viewed as sabotage and can even lead to arrest.

Very difficult conditions for recruitment in capitalist countries, but existing rezidentura and illegals network can help. Ultimately, proper methods of recruitment and management required.

Eligibility for recruitment determined by age, sex, ethnicity, religion, social, material and family status; also the person’s temperament. Gradual involvement may work for one recruit, and direct offers of secret collaboration work better for another.

Chapter II

Above all, the actual possibilities for intelligence work has to be studied for recruits and their ability to penetrate facilities.

An ideal example: bureaucrat in foreign affairs ministry with access to coded telegrams. If he is devoted to capitalism, he’s not a good prospect, but if he hates the capitalist system and thinks it will be replaced by socialism, or at least is unsure about the stability of capitalism, he’s a good candidate. Another prospect would be one with debts if these can be taken care of for him.

Very important to understand recruit’s political views before recruiting, which can be hard as progressives hide their views to avoid arrest or loss of prestige or trust in society or their family.

Also have to determine if he is decisive, bold, smart, etc.

2. Methods

Use legal methods first to study prospect, and use his associates and connections. Existing covert agents and central intelligence office can also have information. Recruiter would study a political party’s information and members for example, and then contrive to meet them at a film showing. For example, “Lauer,” who wants to increase friendly relations with the Soviet Union but hides his views in his party so as not to lose his position. He was recruited also because of his anti-American views.

Citizens of socialist countries are restricted in their movements in the capitalist countries and are under surveillance which makes the role of the agents’ network more important.

The recruiters shouldn’t reveal to their agent their interest in a subject for which they have a lead but just get a list of his friends, a characterization, etc. This is especially important in the early stages of recruitment until he is vetted.

Case: An intelligence operative had to make an agents’ network in diplomatic circles but had no connections except one former, elderly journalist who had no ties to the diplomatic world. But since the journalist had once published a small journal edited by a prominent Frenchman, the operative made an approach to the Frenchman and asked if he wanted to edit a diplomatic journal. The journalist and French editor were then given the journal to put out and in six weeks all embassies and missions had copies as well as local aristocrats. Once the Frenchman had business cards printed with his title as editor, he had an entree into the embassies to get leads for recruits.

Recruiters have to be careful not to damage leaders of progressive organizations who would be compromised by exposure of their collaboration; they shouldn’t recruit members of communist and workers parties because it endangers those parties as a whole; experience of recent years indicates the imperialists will make direct provocations in these cases and thus obtain the formal right to persecute these parties.

3. Study and vetting of leads

Leads given by existing agents have to be double checked and additional info gathered to avoid ballast and harmful agents, using open sources and personal contacts. The agent’s network shouldn’t know about the recruitment intentions, although sometimes exceptions have to be made. Surveillance and bugs should be used to determine family and material situation. Information obtained has to be verified with Moscow center.

The target shouldn’t know he’s being studied so approach has to seem natural, i.e. through receptions, sports events, fishing etc.

For socialist countries’ emigres, use recommendation letters from their relatives, friends, etc. and ask for help in buying a home, meeting the right people, etc.; a relative might say the agent making the approach saved his life or helped him financially. Illegals have more freedom of movement and less likely to be followed; legals can use their official position on the other hand.

4. Vigilance and conspiracy

Watch out for plants and set-ups and beware of surveillance; don’t let enemy’s counterintelligence detect you; check with Moscow center.

Example of how checking with Center enabled detection of a plant, “Hopper,” an editor and publisher of a bourgeois journal who was friendly to the USSR and critical of American foreign policy. He hinted that he could provide help to the Soviets. Approach was made at a Hungarian mission reception, and he agreed to meet at the Soviet embassy; at the meeting expressed his support for Soviets and indignation at a parliamentarian who supposedly had created a reactionary organization. Hopper said he could get intel on the organization and intelligence operative approved this. Hopper came back without warning with a report on the group and said he would join it to get more intel. The operative checked with Moscow and found there was kompromat on Hopper exposing him as an agent of German intelligence who had spied against the Soviets since 1933. He was instructed to break off politely with Hopper using an excuse.

When a target himself offers cooperation he always has to be checked, even if recommended by an agent, who may be unaware of a provocation.

Another case: a rezident was instructed to recruit agents within a foreign ministry, this task was given to an intelligence operative who had an agent called Mars who worked in the foreign ministry; Mars was tasked to find recruits through his connections. He provided a report of a deputy foreign minister (Sax) who was removed from his post thanks to the British because he was supposedly too close to nationalists who were anti-British. Sax was described as having collaborated with British intelligence and advanced his career for this reason; Sax could be talent for the Soviets because of his connections. But the recruiter failed to take into account that the British might obstruct him further. Sax was recruited and gave the Soviets a list of people connected to British intelligence; among them was Leon, a vetted agent. This caused the Soviets to suspect Sax and ultimately they discovered his removal was faked by British intelligence as a dangle. They planted a document on Mars then. The Soviet intelligence operatives should have wondered why the British were so harsh with supposedly their own creatures.

Chapter 3 – Recruitment Process

The targets material as well as spiritual needs are studied; there are three types of work — ideological-political, material, and psychological. The threat of exposure is part of the psychological line and could affect the material. Emotions such as jealousy, love, hatred are also used.

1) Ideological-political basis

This has to do whether his political views coincide with the interests of the socialist camp, and whether they are firm enough to serve as motives.

Even if they are ideologically compatible, citizens of capitalist countries may not want to collaborate with intelligence of socialist countries as practice has taught — far from it. They may have a false understanding of its role; a sense of patriotism to their homeland; and a fear of being exposed. But sometimes the idea of just “peaceful coexistence” is enough.

Sometimes the candidate has to be drawn in with further ideological work, i.e. explaining how the capitalist countries are exploiting his country and about the peace-loving nature of the socialist countries. The candidate will come to understand that he can’t stay on the sidelines given American imperialist expansionism.

A Soviet agent called Sufrant had a connection called Shmidt who was a major mathematician and engineer and head designer at an artillery factory, and an emigrant. He had several sisters still in the Soviet Union with whom he had lost contact after emigration, wasn’t involved in politics, and hated communism.

An approach was made to have Sufrant convince Shmidt to meet an officer of a Soviet trade agency. It was determined that while he feared communism he hated the Germans due to their militarism and this was used as a basis to work on him to explain the peace-loving foreign policy of the socialist countries. Later, Shmidt then turned to him to help find his sister to get her assistance which strengthened their ties. He was worked on, came to see the error of his ways, and became convinced that he had to fight imperialism if he wanted to oppose German militarism. He then agreed to pass on a type of ammunition he had designed and then continued to work in Soviet interests.

Illegals should only try to recruit those that are ideologically compatible that they’re sure of and ideally in third countries to reduce risk as they must expose themselves as intelligence operatives.

Intelligence officers can then make a trip from the Center to vet the recruit. Ideologically compatible are more reliable.

b) Material basis

Look for strong motivation to be recruited like illness, debts, illness in the family, large family, education for children, securing pension, etc. Look for merchants who want to make a profit in socialist countries; government officials willing to sell their country’s secrets due to material needs. The person raised in a bourgeois country will need to have personal success as his chief goal in life, not the join work of people; especially Americans. The sociologist Robert Merton says success is understood as getting money, which is rooted in American culture; sociologist Ch. Right Miles says money is the only indisputable metric for success. More Americans have been recruited on the basis of material incentive than those from other countries.

But such agents aren’t as reliable as those recruited on ideological grounds; therefor they need constant ideological education. Especially recruitable are those who like to party excessively and get into debts as a result.

Case of a coder in an American embassy in a capitalist country named Fin who was courting Nona, the daughter of a famous doctor, who wasn’t interested in him. Fin was loyal to the US regime but was vain, loved to dress well. Nona was part of the peace movement, was sociable, liked to go out to restaurants and clubs; Grom, an experienced agent of the rezidentura knew Nona’s father.

With Grom’s help, Nona was recruited and then Fin was drawn in, using the acquaintance with the father. Nona was assigned to draw in Fin by going out to restaurants and theaters with him and getting him to spend money so he needed cash; she gave him loans. Fin was eventually recruited in order to pay his debts.

c) Moral-psychological basis

Use features such as vanity, envy, jealousy, vengeance, obsession, sympathies, love, hate etc. to recruit people. Don’t go by socialist morality but the morality of the bourgeois country. For example in Iran, it is not shameful to have multiple wives and in some Western countries, sexual immorality is ignored, and the porn industry facilitates this.

While theft is viewed as wrong in socialist societies, a theft of a million in a capitalist society like the US is viewed as big business.

Case of journalist agent Claude who was given the assignment to become acquainted with a young single woman Zhanna who was a secretary to an ambassador and study her for recruitment. He seduced her, went to dances and restaurants with her; she fell in love with him and Claude began to see her less; she was hurt but he said while he loved her his journalism career was suffering. He hinted that if she would show him material that crossed her desk, he could meet with her more often.

Sometimes Soviet intelligence uses the threat of exposure to recruit people who have been compromised. The recruiter should appear to offer help to the recruit to get out of a bad situation rather than directly pressuring him. Theft of funds, extramarital affairs, etc. can compromise the target as can exposure of participation in plots to overthrow bourgeois governments. You can only compromise a person if he hides these facts and fears their publicity. Kompromat has to be backed up with documentation, photos, etc. i.e. someone with an affair. Getting such documentation can be very complicated. A person recruited with kompromat cannot be viewed as reliable especially if hostile to socialist countries.

Case of a female agent planted with a diplomat in a capitalist country; she obtained his trust to the point where she could read his correspondence and get the key to his safe. Knowing the diplomat was cowardly, he was recruited by showing that his secret documents had been taken from his safe, to compromise him. In order to save his career, he agreed to collaborate. This doesn’t work, as there are cases where a target agrees to cooperate and then backs out and reports the recruitment to his counter-intelligence.

BACK TO MAIN ARTICLE 

Table of Contents 

I. COMMUNICATION — IMPORTANT AREA OF INTELLIGENCE WORK

Concept of communication in intelligence

Fundamental requirements for communication

II. PERSONAL COMMUNICATION WITH AGENTS’ NETWORK

General Principles

Selection of Places and Means for Conducting Personal Meetings

Special Features of Conducting Meetings Under Various Conditions

Selection of Time for Conducting Meetings

Preventive Measures in Case of Detention of Intelligence Officer and Agent

Actions to Secure Reliability and Efficiency of Personal Communication

Permanent Conditions of Communication

Identifying Features

Countersurveillance

III. Non-Personal Communication [Cut-outs]

Near-field Communications and Signaling

Communication through Dead Drops

Using the Press for Communication with Agents’ Network

IV. Intermediary Communication

Messengers

Couriers

Transfer Center

Safe Address

Safe Telephone

Safe Apartment

CONCLUSION

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Copy No. __

COMMUNICATION WITH THE AGENTS’ NETWORK

1970

Signed for printing 5.V-70

Print Run 100

Author’s Sheet 3,73

Journal No. 174/1445ss

Edition No. 6/182

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTES

Note: This is a summary translation of the original 75-page Russian document. Only lines with quotation marks are direct translations from the text.

I. Concept of Communication

“‘Communication’ in intelligence means constant interaction between divisions and links in the intelligence and agents’ apparat, exercising espionage tradecraft [konspiratsiya] with the aid of special means and methods.”

“Espionage communications are usually established between a central intelligence apparat (the Center) and ‘legal’ and illegal rezidenturas [intelligence base of operations] of the intelligence agencies of socialist states in capitalist countries, inside rezidenturas, between staff and agent groups and individual agents.”

– The Center runs all the work and supplies cash and operational technology.

– The rezidentura in capitalist countries reports intelligence to the Center and makes suggestions how to develop it.

– The legals and illegals run agent networks, train them and get materials from them.

Communications are vital because the Center may need to issue an assignment or warn an illegal of a threat. Information obtained by socialist intelligence in capitalist countries loses value if it can’t be communicated quickly. Communications are also the most vulnerable point; the greatest percent of failures or disruptions of work is caused by poor organization of comms channels. The success of the whole intelligence service depends on communication between officers and agents; within the rezidentura and with the Center.

Capitalist intelligence agencies have stepped up their counterintelligence, which has created significant difficulties for the legals. Agents have to fight consistency and use simplified means of communication.

o Espionage tradecraft — maintain total secrecy not only from outsiders but those not directly involved, even if in intelligence. Use methods to guarantee comms won’t be deciphered or intercepted.

o Vertical comms from Center to rezidentura, from intelligence officers to agents and visa versa, from intelligence officer to rezidentura, from rezidentura to Center. Horizonal comms are not allowed, in order to ensure security. It’s harder to determine the location of failures if they are allowed.

o There will be cases when one agent is known to another if the assignment requires it. But don’t allow lines to cross; it makes it easier for the enemy to intercept.

— Tradecraft [Konspirovka] also means the ability of the officer and the agent to adapt to the surroundings, and blend in; not to stick out. Making a pattern is the most harmful and dangerous thing for konspirovka; don’t use the same places to meet, or same dead drops, or the same time. Constantly check the reliability of the comms channel; use camouflage and cipher.

— Reliability of comms — no interruptions, no interceptions; make sure agents know how to use technology.

— Use only reliable communications agents, couriers, agents who maintain safehouses; make sure their cover is convenient for comms among various nodes in the network. Think ahead to what changes might dictate adaptation, and prepare in advance other means of communication i.e. meetings, signals, etc. Sometimes use redundancy when there isn’t confidence comms are going through. Have some messengers and radio stations in reserve. Check the reserve channels to make sure they’re working.

– Use radio comms as fastest means.

Excessive clutter and complication are just as harmful as using simplified comms or the same comms or having a pattern.

II. Personal Communications

Personal meetings enable the giving of instructions accurately and the resolving of issues on the spot; they enable the controller to provide political and moral influence and to react quickly to negative behavior or moods. Personal meetings enable the agent to be trained in the use of technology and tradecraft; his personal qualities and capacities can also be studied. They are especially useful for new recruits.

But because personal meetings are so vulnerable to counterintelligence, especially with intensification of bourgeois intelligence counterintelligence against the socialist fraternity and increased surveillance, special attention must be paid to security; reduce the number of personal meetings to a minimum; they should mainly be used for new recruits for training. Hold separate meetings for instructive chats, discussing increased responsibilities, etc.

Brush meetings, either parallel or head-on, should be used to transmit materials; agents do not let on that they know each other; they should do this in crowded areas, say, at the escalators in stores or the metro, at theater box offices, during rush hour, in post offices; in narrow passageways etc.

Before making a head-on brush pass, decide exactly where the location is, in which hand you will carry the material, what the back-up plan should be. Make the time of meeting precise to the minute.

Don’t set patterns, be inventive, change the times, or you will be discovered. Calculate for changing conditions. Have a legend ready in case of arrest.

– Selection of location

Take into account the time and nature of the meeting, i.e. long or short; whether hand-off is small or large volume of materials; the age and sex of the officer and agent.

Know the city and transportation routes; know layout of parks, squares, streets, sights, libraries, stores, cafes, hours they are open. Know locations outside the city.

Stay away from police posts; places where counterintelligence agents might be, i.e. buildings that are guarded, prohibited areas, government buildings, foreign embassies, residences of foreign diplomats, hangouts of criminal elements. Chose a place where you can tell if you are being followed.

Take into account methods of local counterintelligence; how well qualified its agents are; how modern their technology is.

Take into account culture of local population, especially in countries of the East; will the appearance of a European provoke curiosity or suspicion? Take into account racial discrimination in the US and other countries.

Watch out for political events (strikes, demonstrations); declaration of martial law; increased police activity.

The type of place depends on the purpose and whether short or long, i.e. training or discussions with the agent about his capacities, instruction on the use of tech, etc. It’s better to use a safe house for these longer meetings; if they are not available, use places where you can walk outside the city; remote restaurants or cafes far from the center; automobiles.

If the meeting is to hand off documents, written assignments, intelligence reports, you can meet in museums, at exhibits, in libraries, in movies and theaters, elevators of big stores. These should be kept short to minimize detection. Locations should be selected that enable disappearance from sight for a few sections — a corner to turn, a store vestibule, a crowd.

If a large object or volumes of materials must be transferred, use suitcases, bundles of books, rolled-up tubes, magazines, newspapers etc. in the tram, metro, bus; in change rooms of athletic clubs, public pools, ski stations; laundries — any place where a suitcase or package will not provoke suspicion.

Legal agents of rezidenturas must select a place where he is not known as a representative of a socialist country and where he is least likely to be recognized as a foreigner.

If an intelligence officer lives in a small town or his cover requires prominent position or a lot of friends, then he should not have meetings in that city, but go to another. If he appears in a restaurant, cafe, on the street, at the theater, at a stadium with a local resident he may be recognized. Fishing trips, hunting, excursions to see sights outside the city may be used as cover for meeting agents.

The agent’s legend should fit the place, i.e. if a wealthy person meets in a cheap restaurant in the workers’ quarter, he may stick out; or conversely, meeting in an expensive restaurant if he is a petty clerk could provoke suspicion.

If the agent is a prominent civic, political or government figure, then he should only meet in situations that are the most “legal” – diplomatic receptions, official visits, interviews or at safe houses. Keep in mind that embassies may be bugged by the enemy.

A cover story needs to be provided to explain long absences from home, otherwise as practice has shown, wives may get jealous. One wife hired a private detective to follow her spouse who found him meeting with an intelligence agent.

Take into account the sex of those meeting; in the capitalist countries, there are places such as certain bars or restaurants where only men or only women may be accepted.

Meetings on the street have a greater chance are not likely to be bugged and have a greater chance of not falling under surveillance.

If a long conversation is needed, it is recommended not to meet on noisy, crowded streets but on side streets, or far from the center, away from government buildings. Agents can look like people coming home from work or going into the city.

A beach swim, picnic, fishing expedition, ski trip can provide cover for meeting outside the city.

In Western Europe and America, almost all classes of people go to cafes and restaurants where they can spend an unlimited amount of time reading or playing games or having business meetings. So they make good cover, but keep in mind that police and counterintelligence are also watching them. Go to a cafe or restaurant where the owner and waiters don’t know you. Avoid places where there are black marketeers and other criminal elements, because there may be police raids.

Don’t meet in cafes known to be frequented by foreigners or emigres or diplomats.

Meet on major streets where patrons don’t know each other and where agent and officer can appear to meet accidentally. Pass materials in the parking lots which are often available.

Use safe houses when the agent needs a place to prepare reports or use special technology like radio, cameras, cryptograms, encoders, etc. A safe house sometimes has a photo lab to take pictures of materials that have to be immediately returned to an agent. The cover can be the lab of an amateur photographer.

Safe houses should ideally have a cover as the home of a doctor, lawyer, music teacher, foreign language teacher, tailor, etc. to account for a lot of visitors.

A safe house preferably should not have elevator operators, concierges, etc. with free entry where foreigners will not be conspicuous.

Check the safe house periodically to see if it is under surveillance. The keeper of the safe house needs to work out a danger signal in advance if he suspects counterintelligence at work or if there is a raid of the safe house.

In capitalist countries, neighbors may be put to work spying on a suspicious safe house, or the apartment may be bugged or photographed.

If a safe house is raided, it is much harder to keep a cover story than if found on the street. That’s why the keeper of the safe house needs a good legend as a professional who could have visitors.

Only meet with vetted agents at a safe house and only if there is a necessity. Each agent needs a separate safe house.

– Use of automobiles

It is better if the officer does the driving so that the agent isn’t made nervous by the presence of a third party, the driver. Or with advance preparation, convince the agent that the driver is reliable and knows no foreign languages.

Avoid heavy traffic so as to reduce chance of a ticket and attention to oneself. Police know the license plates of the socialist embassies. Plan the route in advance. The conversation can take place not just while driving but at a parking lot hidden from view. Ensure that when the meeting is over the agent can exit in a place where he won’t draw suspicion.

The car should be used not only for meeting agents but other ordinary activities so as to reduce suspicion, and preferably should not have diplomatic plates. The car should also not stand out in model or in paint color. Check to see if you are being followed.

Check cars frequently, especially before meetings, to see if there are any bugs. Use rental cars to attract less attention. Don’t meet in places where agents live, where they might have an accidental meeting with someone who knows them. Don’t meet near military or government buildings or near any laboratories or science centers or plants that might be under guard. Don’t meet near embassies or residences of diplomats; don’t meet near jewelry stores or banks, where there may be guards, especially at night.

Don’t meet in areas where there may be criminal elements, where police may show up.

– Time of meetings

It is better to meet agents in the evening after work, and where it is easier to escape surveillance in the dark. Meet agents at times when cafes are most crowded and waiters are too busy to watch you. Know when street life dies down in a city. Don’t stand out by meeting at a time when people aren’t out on the street. In some countries of the East, people go to bed very early and no one is out on the street after 6 pm.

Be on time, so that neither an officer or agent become conspicuous by having to wait. Make sure watches keep time accurately.

Mix up the times to foil local counterintelligence.

– Preparation of agents

Because capitalist countries have stepped up counterintelligence, meetings have to be prepared carefully, especially if several agents are involved.

Plan the route and have back-up options. Have a reserve of intelligence officers and technicians in case someone isn’t available.

Discuss the plans for meetings with the rezident [station chief] or his deputy and get approval; sometimes the Center must approve the meetings.

Ascertain if you are under surveillance; do this always, not only on the day of a meeting. Do this with sophistication so that the enemy can’t detect you. Have a plausible legend ready, for example visiting a park, cinema, store, museum, library, etc. Intelligence officers should having outings and contacts with neutral persons to foil counterintelligence.

If an intelligence officer only goes outside on certain days and only to meet agents, he will draw the attention of counterintelligence. If he sees he is being followed, he has to suspend meetings with agents but keep up his regular trips outside for business or personal reasons. Only after he is sure the surveillance is suspended should he meet with the agent, checking all the while.

Organize trips into town by other intelligence officers to distract surveillance, and enable the intelligence officer who is meeting an agent to go out undetected. Don’t use as a cover a visit to the movies or other entertainment during the day because this can look suspicious. A visit to a doctor or tailor could be a cover.

Make up a cover story of a business trip or sight-seeing vacation of 1-2 days if a meeting must be made in remote areas. In many capitalist countries, officers from socialist countries have to alert the foreign ministry of their plans and obtain special permission.

Assign the purchase of tickets to another intelligence officer to distract from the one making the meeting, especially if he knows the local language well; the agent can do this if justified by the nature of the trip. Get unreserved seats for flexibility. In the US and England, some unreserved tickets can be bought on board.

Leave in plenty of time to perform cover activities before the meeting. Know the city well so as to detect surveillance. In the event a tail is found, don’t go to the meeting unless there is an extreme emergency, i.e. when materials have to be returned to an agent. Then measures should be taken to shake the tail in such a way that it seems natural, that the tails lost him. Careful checks are needed not only before the meeting but during and after it.

If a tail is discovered, don’t let on that it has been noticed. Shorten the meeting but end it naturally, not cutting off conversation suddenly. The officer should warn the agent but carefully, so as not to frighten him. He can say he doesn’t like the behavior of someone and that the agent should check to see if he is being followed afterwards. If the officer and agent know each other officially, they have a cover and don’t have to try to shake the tail, since doing so would provoke more suspicion. It is categorically forbidden to go from one meeting right to another even if no tail is detected, since both agents then may be compromised.

The officer should train the agent to leave time to get to the meeting, teach him to check for tails, and stipulate what the back-up plan is.

Signals should not attract attention to themselves; use a book, newspaper, glove, cigarette etc. — these can be put on a table in a restaurant, for example. Danger signals can be such things as removing a hat, lighting a cigarette, wiping your eyes, etc. Act natural, and don’t attract attention of counterintelligence. Don’t rely on an agent to detect his own surveillance; check it for him. Have a back-up meeting place, after first establishing eye contact at the first location.

The intelligence officer takes the initiative for all contacts; the agent should not approach the officer before the agreed signal or give the impression he knows him. Make the meeting look like they are between business colleagues or friends — don’t whisper, put on a secretive face, break off conversations as others approach, or look all around you. The behavior should fit the location, i.e. at a tennis court, play tennis, then while resting, have the conversation. Don’t look as if you are impatiently waiting for someone. Don’t talk to service personnel if you don’t know the local language fluently. The intelligence officer should not arrive at the location first.

– Precautionary measures in case of detention

Make sure every meeting has a cover story — a legend has to be created for the circumstances for how the intelligence officer and agent first met; the reasons for their meeting; the nature of the topics discussed. Work out the legend in advance so both officer and agent have it mastered and can testify to it in case of detention. The legend should be simple and clear and correspond to the place of meeting, and the professional and social status of the person met, their personal characteristic (age, inclinations, etc.). It should explain an accidental or long-term acquaintance. If officer and agent know each other through their official work, that can be the legend for the meeting.

The legend should provide an explanation for why either agent or officer has intelligence materials on them, i.e. the intention to work at home or the desire to consult a specialist — the explanation should be based on the agent’s real abilities.

The intelligence office should not carry on his person or have in his home any notes that will reveal his intelligence activity (notebooks with encoded meeting conditions, telephones, assignments to agents, list of questions to ask an agent, etc.). All such materials should be kept at the rezidentura. Any materials received from an agent must be well-hidden at his home, with an eye to how to get rid of them in an emergency.

Officer and agent should keep their stories straight so they do not diverge in case of arrest. If any meeting is to be prolonged, don’t transmit intelligence materials, large sums of money or operational tech to avoid being compromised as intelligence workers. If an agent happens to bring intelligence reports to a meeting, they should be taken but the meeting cut short. Or if the location is not appropriate, agree to meet elsewhere for the transfer.

In the event of arrest, demand a representative from the embassy and do not give any testimony. “During arrest and investigation, you must behave in such a way that the interests of the socialist state are not harmed, that the interests of the intelligence organization are damaged, and also not to expose involvement of the arrested person in intelligence.”

– Security Measures

To keep communications going and prevent disruption, use these types of meetings:

– Regular meeting

This is a planned meeting at a certain time and place; the agent is obliged to show up unless he is sick or has a work excuse or discovered a tail.

– Back-up meeting

This is used in case something goes wrong with the first type to keep communications going — it can be a few hours or a few days after the original scheduled meeting, and should be planned in advance. There can be several options for back-ups. The back-ups should be in different places than the regular meetings.

– Emergency meeting

This must also be planned in advance with an agreed signal. These meetings are used to give warnings of danger or materials suddenly received. The time and place of the regular or back-up meetings can be used, or not as long as the agent can remember it and not get mixed up. The signal can be graphic or by radio, a post card or telegram, or an ad in a newspaper, etc. as long as tradecraft is preserved. Don’t use the location or signal for prolonged meetings which might lead to exposure by the enemy’s counterintelligence.

– Brush meeting

The officer and agent don’t let on that they know each other, don’t talk, but just transmit the secret materials quickly at the right moment, as they are synchronized. Have a back-up plan for another meeting to avoid failures.

– Visual meeting

The officer and agent don’t speak or make contact, but make visual contact and communicate by signals. Examples: “the materials must be transmitted” — hold the newspaper in the right hand; “everything is ok” or “the telegram was received” or “the assignment was understood” — wear a red tie. Signals should be such that they do not attract any attention of any possible surveillance. If properly organized, this is the safest type of meeting. The farther apart the people meeting are, the harder for counterintelligence to detect it.

Visual meetings are held if the agent has to stop his intelligence work for a time due to threats or failures or other reasons; they can also be used to signal danger for a schedule meeting so it can be cancelled.

If a meeting to transfer material is made, visual contact should be made first to determine whether to go to the meeting place.

– Permanent Conditions for Communication

The meetings previously described don’t guarantee us from possible loss of connections with an agent or an illegal. The reasons are varied — an agent mixes something up, an intelligence officer has to go out of the country urgently. Due to lack of inexperience, an agent may make steps to re-establish communications that make things more complicated.

Therefore, permanent communications have to be established with a recurring date and place, i.e. first Friday of every third month; be prepared for another intelligence officer or messenger to meet the agent instead of the original one. Make the time easy to remember. If a cafe or movie theater is closed or under repair, meet at the entrance.

– Identifying marks

This is obligatory, as another person may meeting agent besides the original officer. If, for example, in Germany, most men on work days carry a briefcase, then the agent should have a briefcase of a particular color or a secondary sign of recognition that won’t stand out. Carrying a magazine or newspaper in his hand will stand out, as most Germans put the newspapers inside their briefcases or in their coat or jacket pocket. But in the USA, a newspaper folded in half or magazine carried in the hand will look completely natural and can be used as an identifying mark, and the name of the newspaper or magazine can be specified.

Identifying marks can be not only objects but features of clothing. But they should blend in with local customs and the time of year.

– Password and response

These are pre-arranged phrases or personal items which one person says or show to another to prove he is authorized by intelligence, to be used for the purpose of maintaining espionage tradecraft and security. They should be simple and easy to remember and not arouse suspicion.

An intelligence officer might ask, for example, whether he has ever met the agent before, citing the name of a city, resort, country, firm, the name of a fictitious acquaintance, university etc. Then the agent can say, no, it was another place. Sometimes the officer simply asks for directions in a city, and the agent replies with a route that is unusual but could be supplied by an ordinary passer-by.

To restore communications that have been disrupted, the intelligence officer needs to know exhaustive information about the agent, his exact home and work addresses, his route to the office, his home phone, his home situation, his neighbors, his car, its license plate etc. to be able to look for him.

Countersurveillance

Several intelligence officers may be involved in scanning a pre-arranged route to see if it is under surveillance. The external surveillance watchers are constantly perfecting methods and means and have the latest technology. The agent who beats the enemy in counter-surveillance has good operational training, great endurance, and cleverness and operational inventiveness.

He has to be able to detect a follower without letting him know it, and to act calmly and naturally. An officer shouldn’t contact any agent if he is not sure he is being followed or not.

Because the target countries have complicated police regimens, an inexperienced officer may not be able to detect a tail. So in legal rezidenturas, counter-surveillance is done by other, experienced officers.

Counter-surveillance on the agent is more difficult but if the route is agreed in advance it can be done but unforeseen circumstances can arise. Sometimes other intelligence officers cannot be told the description of the agent or it is dangerous for an officer alone meeting an agent to conduct the counter-surveillance. Even so, counter-surveillance must be done for security. Agents should be taught how to detect tails and shake them.

III. Non-personal Communications

The chief advantage of non-personal comms is that if they are done correctly, they are more secure, especially at a time of worsening conditions for socialist intelligence in the capitalist countries. These comms have to be prepared just as carefully as personal meetings.

– Near-radio communication and signals

These have begun to be used more frequently in recent times. Information, danger signals, summons to meetings, etc. can be conveyed in this way for distances from several dozen meters to 3-5 kilometers.

The best feature is that near-radio comms are not dependent on the local electricity network, and its compact form enables use from pockets, briefcases, purses, etc.

One-time connection can be arranged with signals to an ordinary radio receiver, and two-way comms can also be made within the radio’s range. Two-way comms within short distances can be arranged with a device that plugs into a regular electrical socket, to have conversations between separate rooms, or even separate buildings a few blocks from each other if both devices are plugged into the same electricity network with the same transformer station.

Signals is an addition to all forms of comms. An ordinary pocket flashlight can be outfitted with an infra-red filter which can give signals to agents within 3-5 km in the dark, if they have a special device to receive them.

– Dead drops

Such secret hiding places are specially-selected or adapted places for clandestine transfer of messages and materials. Photos, microdots, small packages can be passed through these, but also larger items like cameras, samples of new tech, sketches, and models. Some dead drops can contain cash or operational tech. So the type of dead drop used will correspond to its purpose.

In selecting a secret hiding place, take account of the police regimen, the features of the city, the lifestyle and customs of the local population. Great inventiveness must be used, taking into account the special features of each city or country or culture. They can be organized in parks or squares, on the sides of roads, in a foundation or cracks in a stone fence, in ruins, at stadiums or race tracks in public toilets, etc.

Officers must find hiding places that can’t be accidentally discovered by outsiders, but that the agent can easily find. They shouldn’t be near guarded locations, prohibited areas, military installations etc. Approaches must be well visible but the dead drop should be in a place that can’t be seen by external surveillance when used. The place should be a natural location for the agent so as not to arouse suspicion. Time of date and climate should be taken into account. Don’t have a hiding place on the side of the road in winter where the approach may be covered with snow, and where an agent will leave tracks.

A dead drop could be in a park or stadium in the summer, but in the fall, if there are rains, it will seem suspicious. Accessing the place should be simple and not require physical effort or a lot of time, or that may attract counter-surveillance from the enemy or outsiders. The place should not be mobile or accessible by others or picked up by mistake, like a garbage can. It has to have signs to be easily found by the agent. Its description should be short and precise especially if a messenger has to find it who doesn’t know the location.

Here are some descriptions of dead drops used by socialist intelligence agencies that became known to American counter-intelligence:

1) “New York, Manhattan, Riverside and 96th Street, men’s toilet at a children’s playground. Far right stall if you stand facing the stalls. While sitting inside the stall by the left hand, a magnetic container has been attached inside the only pipe there, on which the wall of the stall is mounted. The size of the container is 2x3x10 cm.”

2) “New York, Manhattan, Symphony movie theater on Broadway and 25th Street. Enter the auditorium, go to the left, climb the stairs to the balcony. On the far right seat of the last row of the balcony. While sitting in the seat, with the right hand, the dead drop operation is made — the material is placed under the rug, opposite the seat. The containers are flat.”

When the intelligence officer or agent sits in this seat, they discover that they do not have to bend over for the container; the floor with the rug is at elbow level, the rug is nailed to the floor, but at this spot it is a bit torn away from the floor, so that an insert can be made.

3) “New York, Manhattan, end of Amsterdam Avenue. Go to the sports court; from a position facing toward East River, on the right side of the square, a path leads downward along the park. You must go down this path looking toward three smokestacks on the opposite side of the river, to a large dry stump which will be on the left side of the path. The dead drop is in the roots of this stump. A container can be placed in the roots under the stump from its left side, if sitting on the stump and looking down toward the river.”

The place was surveyed. There was no other stump there.

4) “New York, Central Park, pond with boat station. At its northern part, where a stream falls, there is a small wooden bridge across this stream. While standing on the little bridge facing the lake, and leaning on the railing, a container like a pushpin is placed under the railing strictly at the center of the stream, in the place where the angle is formed between the upper board and the beam of the railing.”

After a dead drop is arranged and adapted for use, it is necessary to check to what extent is guarantees clandestine nature of a communication.

Testing of the dead drop is done by placing in it some object. In doing so, the placement of the object in the hiding place must be well noted. If upon inspection several days later, this object is still in place, then it can be supposed that this dead drop is suitable for putting in action.”

Don’t use objects that may draw attention. In the best case, a passer-by might take the item; in the worst case he might call the police.

Dead drops can be used not only in intelligence agencies but in other illegal organizations; even children can use them in games.

There was a case in New York where an officer found a small bag in a place selected for a dead drop. He tried to take it out of the hiding place while sitting on a bench but it was too heavy. He decided not to take it out but notified the rezidentura. An hour later, when two intelligence officers returned, it was gone. Thus holes in trees, caves in mountains and other natural but obvious repositories visible to passers-by are not suitable for dead drops. They should not attract attention.

If something is to be left in a dead drop no more than an hour, the hiding place does not have to be in a hidden receptacle; it left near some marked place, and the container can be something disposable, suitable for the locality.

Each dead drop should be used only by one agent, and it is strictly forbidden to use the same one for multiple agents. It should look natural. One young illegal made a hiding spot in the forest, using a glass jar with a twist-off cap. He packed the jar into the earth and put a small rock at that place. So it was safe from weather. But it wasn’t a good idea because counter-intelligence would see not only a stone, but a jar underneath it, which would give away the fact of an intelligence operation.

A natural hiding place is good if there are no traces of anything after the materials are removed from it; even if counter-surveillance detects it, it won’t tell anything. This is why it is not a good idea to make containers out of door handles, handles of garbage cans, etc. in public places. Such containers would only be there for the operation, but a dead drop should appear as an ordinary object when it is not being used.

Dead drops are divided into two types: open and concealed hiding places. Concealed are there only for a certain time of the day or night. Open hiding places are outside in parks, forest, on the street etc. There are also compact, large, simple, and magnet dead drops.

The least risk is when a dead drop is used only once. But if systematic information is needed, a dead drop has to be devised for regular use. Yet patterns and templates are dangerous here, too. Multiple dead drops can be devised and numbered, then through signals, certain ones are used.

Visual, radio, graphic, or telephone signals can be used for three operations: 1) placement in the dead drop; item in the dead drop received; closing of the dead drop (if it was detected or anything suspicious is happening).

Graphic signals can be used on an agent’s daily route or on the intelligence officer’s route, and are destroyed after reading. The same checking for tails as in personal meetings are to be applied to dead drops. Some counter-intelligence agencies use trained dogs. Therefore both agent and office should confuse the trail by taking various forms of transport, going into crowds, etc.

Great attention should be paid to masking – an old, empty match box or cigarette pack; a tin can; a piece of crumpled newspaper; a piece of a pencil; a cigarette butt. If the hiding place is in the ground, use a piece of metal tube sharpened at one end to be able to stick it into the ground without difficulty.

Materials concerning the organization of intelligence work should not be put in dead drops, e.g. identifying data and addresses of agents, safe houses, instructions for meetings.

In emergencies, such materials can be sent through a dead drop and even ID for illegals but there must be a set time and the dead drop must be watched by the person who placed the materials there until they are taken. Visiting the location should be explainable in the event of arrest or if accidentally meeting an acquaintance.

A dead drop can link one officer with another or an officer with an agent that shouldn’t be contacted directly. But there is a disadvantage. “The lack of personal contact with an agent with the use of a dead drop deprives the intelligence officer of the opportunity to constantly deserve the agent, follow his moods, have moral and political influence on him in a timely matter, more fully determine his possibilities as an agent, that is, it hinders the operational guidance of the agent’s work, his study and vetting.”

Another disadvantage is that the officer’s materials are let out of his hands, and if discovered by the enemy, disinformation can be planted in their place to damage socialist governments. Or sometimes an ambush is laid near a dead drop to catch an officer and use this for propagandistic purposes. One-time dead drops are increasingly used because of the difficult situation in the capitalist countries. There should be multiple one-time dead drops with a clear system for their use and signals for them.

– Use of the press

The intelligence officer and agent agree to use certain newspapers, magazines or other periodicals for coded messages, i.e. an article on a certain topic or an announcement. Placement of an article naturally allows for a wider message and makes the encoding easier. But this is hard if intelligence doesn’t have an its agent at a periodical. An editor may make changes or cuts that damage the message or make it impossible to decipher.

Ads are much easier to use. Bourgeois newspapers gladly place all kinds of announcements from private persons, organizations or firms.

To use this method, the nature of the paper must be known; the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the [London] Times have many hundreds of want ads for employment, rental of apartments, sale of automobiles and other property. Various countries have their own customs and rules for these ads. Sometimes the ads have to be placed in person; sometimes by post, and will appear the next day or several days later. Normally, no identification has to be presented, and an address doesn’t have to be given; a receipt number can be referenced if needed. Sometimes an address is required, then a third party’s address must be given, or you can say you are just passing through town and don’t have a permanent address.

Keep in mind that counter-intelligence looks for announcements in newspapers that look suspicious. So study the form and content of real ads to copy them, so they don’t stand out. Don’t talk about lost and found items as that may draw the attention of the police; don’t get too original so that police may notice it.

Make it easy for the agent to find it. For example, in the capital of one of the Balkan countries, this ad was placed: “The director of a British trading house will be in our capital for several days…Tomorrow he leaves for Istanbul where he will spend 5 days. Those interested in the assortment of goods traded by this house may find him at this address…” Thus a courier from British intelligence let his agent know that he was coming to town with that ad.

Ads can be used to send signals about the arrival of a courier; a summons to a meeting; a warning about danger; and brief information. Repeated texts can’t be used as they draw suspicion. Such ads are good for reaching agents who are far from the rezidentura or even in another country, since the main newspapers are distributed abroad. Periodicals sent through the mail or put in post boxes can also be used to include cryptograms or by pin-pricking letters in relevant articles.

IV. Mediated Communications

These are comms through trusted agents. Having a third party between an officer and agent is not desirable for security reasons. But if organized skillfully under certain conditions, it can be effective.

Intelligence officers working under cover of official socialist government institutions are usually identified by counter-intelligence after prolonged surveillance, making personal meetings dangerous. If the agent has a prominent professional or civic position sharply contrasting with the legal rezidentura, a third party may be necessary, if he cannot make personal contact or even use impersonal methods. This is particularly true of agents working under tight security or living in remote areas. The third-party agent selected for this task should have convenient professions that enable such interactions, i.e. taxi drivers, librarians, gas station attendants, hair-dressers, theater cashiers, pharmacists, repairmen.

The agent serving as an intermediary has very secret and complicated work, so he must be honest, reliable and devoted and led by ideological and political motives. He must not be compromised in the eyes of local authorities by having progressive views, activities, membership in progressive clubs, etc. and must not draw suspicion for any reason. Agents who are tested by practical work but who had to be retired may be used.

Categories of intermediary agents:

– messengers who maintain clandestine contact between agents in the target country or directly with the Center;

– couriers used with agents in third countries or in the same country but at a distance;

A messenger may be authorized to discuss operational issues verbally with an agent and hear his opinion on various issues; he may make decisions only in concert with the intelligence officer. His function is to give and receive secret mail in closed form, and is not to know anything about the agent contacted. In most cases, he is making impersonal contact through a dead drop. He must know the information about an agent needed for his work; he may know his name and work addresses but the agents’ network shouldn’t know the messenger’s true position, unless he is a personal friend of an agent recommended by the agent.

– owner of a clandestine transfer location, through whom a source agent sends material to his intelligence officer or visa versa

– owner of a safe address who provides cover for correspondence and sending secret mail;

– owner of a safe telephone used to contact an agent;

– resident of a safe apartment used by intelligence.

– Messengers

It’s best if the messenger cloaks his intelligence functions under an official cover that enables him to contact agents for legal and justifiable reasons. Such covers include taxi driver, delivery man, laundry man, mailman, theater cashier, cloakroom attendant, waiter, etc.

If the messenger has to go out of town, he needs a legend for absenting himself from work or family, and having cash for the road. Covers include railroad conductor, ship steward, traveling salesman, bus driver, newspaper correspondent.

The messenger should have a legal reason for visiting out-of-town locations where he will contact an agent or officer. He can meet with the agent personally or use a dead drop or safe phone. He must be given instructions:

– on the setting

– how he is to contact the agent and in what form he is to receive material

– description of agent and terms of meeting

– location of dead drop and how it will be used

– both officer and messenger can together work out a legend about his trip that the messenger should master

– the messenger should be warned to keep the trip secret and avoid accidental acquaintances, patronizing hotels of dubious reputation, getting involved with women, drinking, etc.

– he should be trained to detect a tail.

Instruct the agent how to behave if he is arrested or if material is seized.

Materials should be encrypted or microdots used. They should have nothing on them to indicate their origin in case they wind up with counterintelligence. They should be concealed or masked from outsiders, in a natural way. Agent or courier as well as the transfer location should also be concealed naturally.

Now and then, to test the reliability of the agent, the officer should meet with him himself to determine if he is transmitting items or cash correctly and maintaining proper relations. “The intelligence officer should always have the ability to establish contact with an agent aside from the messenger.”

– Couriers

Couriers are needed for deliveries with large volume of materials, cash, and special technology. It’s best if they have a cover as a plausible profession, or as a relative. Good covers are tradesmen, traveling salesmen, service personnel on a commercial ship, plane crews on international flights, diplomatic couriers, etc. A courier can be put in a delegation going to the target country; he can go there on business; or he can pose as family if there is a good reason. If there isn’t a cover, the courier can be given fake ID, but that has greater risk. Sometimes a courier can cross the border illegally where security is weak.

To organize a courier run successfully, you must have a good legend, the necessary documents, training on how he should behave, and a reasonable means of contact with the agent or officer. Using a dead drop or transfer station are the most prudent means. Materials to be transmitted must be disguised – hidden in a suitcase or a jar with a double bottom; hidden in clothing; written in code; put into goods or everyday items; sent in microdots.

– Transfer center

A good cover for a transfer center is a store, snack bar, library, tobacco kiosk, pharmacy, hair-dresser, watch repairman, private clinic, gas station, car repair shop, etc. where agents can visit it easily with easy-to-explain covers. Larger materials can be sent through a gas station, car repair garage, etc. The agent comes under the cover story, he hands the materials to the owner, who then passes it to the agent. The agent sometimes provides instructions for this.

Both agent and officer cannot give the slightest indication of the nature of the transaction with the owner so as not to attract suspicion. Each visit has to be justified. If it is a book store, a book must be purchased or at least an inquiry made about a book. If other clerks are on duty, the agent must address them. Their behavior must blend in with the real customers.

An agent or officer should visit the cafe, gas station, library etc. not only on the days when they have a hand-off or pick-off but on other days so as to look natural. To avoid too much attention going to the transfer center, the agent or officer should go to similar cafes, gas stations, libraries as well.

– Conspiratorial address

This is an address secretly used to receive mail in which agents’ operational materials are inserted. Agents who are tested and reliable and who have a good reputation, and are not under suspicion by counterintelligence should be used for this role. They should also have some kind of occupation and a circle of relatives or friends they can be in regular and extensive correspondence with. Agents who work as lawyers, merchants, hotel managers etc. may provide such safe addresses.

In some eastern countries, there are streets and lanes with no numbers, and to receive mail, the residents go to the post office or a store to get mail. Such a store owner can be brought into cooperation with intelligence to provide such a pick-up address.

The material sent through such an address should be encrypted but in such a way that it doesn’t differ from an ordinary telegram or letter. Phrases shouldn’t stick out. The text should look natural. A pre-arranged signal can be made through a collection of small items, for example in a perfume shop. Micro-photography is the most convenient way to send materials which can be well concealed in a package.

The sender must know the addressee’s personal details so as to ask about them in a letter, as if to a close relative. The style of the letter should correspond to the level of development, culture and literacy of the person running the safe address as well as his correspondent. If the person maintaining the safe address is a merchant in a stall, an uneducated person with little culture, then the letter should be written with spelling mistakes and the use of folk expressions, since a letter with perfect grammar in a literary style may draw suspicion. Use a typewriter font that fits with the typewriter that the owner has, not known to counter-intelligence as belonging to socialist intelligence agencies.

Since the handwriting of legal officers in the rezidentura may be known to counterintelligence, they must use people whose handwriting isn’t known. Be careful not to leave fingerprints on the letters – use gloves when sealing the envelope, or a paper overlay. Don’t use a fake return address or this will draw attention. In the event no return address is available, use the address of a hotel, pension, firm, office, or as a final resort, a private address if it exists. Don’t use the same type of paper or envelopes for mailings to different addresses. Don’t use the same handwriting for mail to different people. These are clues that counter-intelligence can use. Know the rules for sending mail – how to write an address in the designated country, the cost of stamps, where to put the stamp, the rules for international correspondence. The handler of the safe address should not open the mail. They will be marked as intended for intelligence with a pre-arranged sign.

Safe telephone

This is a telephone secretly used by officer or agent to send signals and encoded operational or intelligence reports. A tested and reliable agent is needed to handle such a phone. It can be at his apartment or work place. An unwitting person’s phone can be used by having a cover story related to his personal or business life, or a request to help an organization he supports.

The best covers are lawyers’ offices, doctors’ offices, watch or auto repair shops, tailors, etc. since they have a lot of clients. If done correctly, the calls shouldn’t attract suspicion.

– The officer and agent shouldn’t have open conversations about intelligence with the holder of the safe telephone.

– The code words should fit, i.e. if a tailor, then words should be used about measurement, fashion, suits, coats, the date of a fitting, etc.

– Codes should be kept as simple as possible so as to be easy to remember, and messages should be kept short.

– Neither agent or officer should not call the phone from their offices or homes. Always use a pay phone.

– The password and response should be simple so as to recognize the agent without mistake.

– Safe Apartment

Such an apartment can be used for meetings of agents or keeping operational technology or materials or to run illegal radio stations or prepare agent materials. If necessary, they can be outfitted with hiding places for materials and the ability to make clandestine photographs. The apartments of reliable agents are used who have lost other intelligence capacity or especially-recruited agents.

The loyalty of the agent (the apartment owner) and the suitability of the apartment itself are the main conditions for its use. The safe apartment can be used to meet only one agent. If it is used to meet several agents, this is a violation of the elementary rules of tradecraft.

CONCLUSION

“Communication with the agents’ network must function clearly and reliably in any setting.” This is especially true if diplomatic ties have been broken with the target nation or there are the onset of military actions between countries of the imperialist camp or with the socialist community.

If war breaks out, some agents will have to leave; some will be called to military service; and comms may be disrupted. The officer must choose the most tested and valuable agents in the case of such emergencies and decide which of them will be handed over to illegals; which will deal directly with the Center; which will answer to a group head. Comms should be so secure that they can be continued even with a move to another country, by making arrangements ahead of time.

In organizing comms, determine in advance: through what countries lines of communication with the Center will run; forms of comms; means of comms with each agent; where safe houses and addresses are located; transfer stations and dead drops, and terms for their use.

If there are lines of communications, it is necessary to prepare back-ups, reserve channels in case of emergency.

“Under conditions of war, what is required are extreme flexibility, the ability to maneuver, inventiveness and bravery in finding such forms of communication with the agents’ network and means of using them that that will guarantee their secrecy, reliability and timeliness.”

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PRINCIPLES OF WORK WITH AGENTS’ NETWORK

1. Ideological Commitment in Work with Agents’ Network

2. Determination and Specificity

3. Individual Approach

4. Constant Study and Checking of Agents’ Network

5. Tradecraft [Konspiratsiya] in Work with Agents’ Network

II. IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL EDUCATION OF AGENTS’ NETWORK

1. Indoctrination of Agents’ Network, Recruitment on Ideological and Political Basis

2. Political Indoctrination of Agents’ Network Recruited on Other Grounds

3. Indoctrination of Agents of Influence

4. Ideological and Political Indoctrination of Group Leader Agents and Agent Recruiters

5. Some Specific Features of Ideological and Political Indoctrination of the Agents’ Network Among Emigres

6. Special Features of Ideological and Political Indoctrination of the Agents’ Network in Communication with Illegal Rezidenturas

III. MANAGEMENT OF AGENT’S ACTIVITY

1. Creating a Legend and Camouflage [Maskirovka] of Agent’s Intelligence Activities

2. Training of Agents’ Network to Perform Intelligence Assignments

3. Strengthening and Expansion of Agent’s Intelligence Capacities 

4. Special Features of Work with Agent Recruited for Future Use

5. Work with Agent Recruited under False Flag

6. Methods of Influencing Agents’ Network

IV. STUDY AND VETTING OF AGENTS’ NETWORK

1. Study of Agent by Personal Communication

2. Vetting of Agent Through Other Agents’ Network

3. Analysis and Comparison of Agent’s Materials

4. Setting Verification Tasks

5. Vetting by External Surveillance and Devices

V. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND AGENT

1. Building Relationships with an Agent

2. Guiding Role of the Intelligence Officer

3. Intelligence Officer’s Attentiveness, Sensitivity and Objectivity

4. Constant Vigilance and Monitoring of the Work and Behavior of Agent

VI. METHODS OF ENDING WORK WITH AGENTS’ NETWORK

1. Preparatory Activities to End Communication

2. Conservation of the Agents’ Network

3. Not Meeting Agent as Means of Breaking Communication

4. Breaking Communication Under Legended Pretexts

5. Open Break of Communication with Agent

6. Extraction of gent to Another Country

In 1973, a former CIA operations officer in Latin America walked into the KGB rezidentura in Mexico City with what he claimed was a tranche of invaluable secrets about the United States’ covert operations in the hemisphere. The “resident,” or Soviet station chief, was wary of too-good-to-be-true offers coming from seeming Western volunteers. So, believing he’d been sent an obvious double agent bearing conspiratorial gifts from Langley, the spymaster showed Philip Agee the door.

Oleg Kalugin, at that time the head of counterintelligence for the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, which handled the Soviet Union’s foreign intelligence, would later tell that tale with chagrin: “Agee then went to the Cubans who welcomed him with open arms. The Cubans shared Agee’s information with us. But as I sat in my office in Moscow reading reports about the growing list of revelations coming from Agee, I cursed our officers for turning away such a prize.”

That “prize,” as Kalugin further noted, had “reams” of actionable intelligence about ongoing CIA operations, including the names of 250 covert operatives in the Americas, and was a propaganda windfall. Agee published a book, Inside the Company: A CIA Diary, that became a best seller in 1975, and in the years to come Agee, by then a Soviet agent codenamed “PONT,” would be used to help compromise some 2,000 CIA officers whose identities were quietly provided by the KGB for publication in the Covert Action Information Bulletin (which was actually founded “on the initiative of the KGB,” as the agency’s former archivist Vasili Mitrokhin noted), and in a book he co-edited called Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe.

Still, it’s hard to blame the Mexico City resident retrospectively for suspecting what in spook parlance is known as a “dangle.” It’s exceedingly rare that a trove of genuine intelligence will ever cross the transom of a foreign embassy. More likely, if you think you’re being handed the keys to an enemy kingdom, you’re actually being invited to don its shackles. If you’ve read John le Carré’s Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, then you’ll recall that “Project Witchcraft,” the infamous operation that guides the plot of the novel, is in fact a beautifully orchestrated KGB dangle, using a Soviet cultural attaché who connives with a British double agent to defraud “the Circus,” or MI6, which thinks Alexei Polyakov is actually its man.

Both sides in the Cold War played this game, even before there officially was a Cold War, and now we know that the Soviets had ample case histories showing the lengths to which their democratic rivals would go to lure KGB officers into elaborate traps.

o Table of Contents 

o Notes on KGB Manual on Dangles (1971)

o Download Russian Original of Exposure of Enemy Set-ups (1971)

This is the first of a three-part series based on never-before-published training manuals for the KGB, the Soviet intelligence organization that Vladimir Putin served as an operative, and that shaped his view of the world. Its veterans still make up an important part of now-Russian President Vladimir Putin’s power base. All were trained in the same dark arts, and these primers in tradecraft are essential to an understanding of the way they think and the way they operate.

U.S. intelligence operatives understand this only too well. Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told CNN earlier this month Putin is “a great case officer,” suggesting he “knows how to handle an asset, and that’s what he’s doing with the president”—that is, the president of the United States.

“I am saying this figuratively,” Clapper went on, when asked to clarify his remark. “I think you have to remember Putin’s background. He’s a KGB officer. That’s what they do. They recruit assets. And I think some of that experience and instinct of Putin has come into play here, and he’s managing a pretty important ‘account,’ if I could use that term, with our president.”

* * * 

Reacting to the first installment in the series, John McLaughlin, a former deputy director of Central Intelligence, drew a direct line between what’s contained in these manuals and the cases being examined by special counsel Robert Mueller: 

fetching tweet…

o Table of Contents

o Notes on Political Espionage from USSR Territory (1989)

3) The KGB Playbook for Infiltrating the Middle East

As with the previously discussed training manual for KGB officers looking to recruit agents on Soviet soil, this document remains classified by the Putin government owing to its utility as a “historical” case study for contemporary foreign intelligence officers, according to a source in that European service who requested anonymity. Whereas the earlier document discussed how Westerners might be snared and turned on Soviet soil, “Acquisition and Preparation” examines the tradecraft necessary for recruiting American officials in the Middle East and North Africa as well as the necessary network of local agents who might help with their recruitment. (Of particular value as targets were retired U.S. or NATO officials.)

Certainly, one can see the continued relevance of such a study considering the Kremlin’s dramatic return to the region in the face of perceived American withdrawal from it, with hyperactive Russian military and diplomatic activity in Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Turkey.

A compliment, of sorts, to the vigilance of the main adversary and its allied services, the analysis is an exercise in self-criticism. It acknowledges that by 1988 the United States had learned from prior mistakes of laxity and sloppiness in counterintelligence, forcing Moscow Center to adapt to far less hospitable environments. By the time of perestroika the KGB’s efforts to recruit Americans in Arab countries had clearly seen diminishing returns. U.S. spies, the document states, “inspect and track employees of these institutions and their contacts with Soviets better, they take measures to expose Soviet intelligence agents, they organize stings, they conduct surveillance of agents and their connections.”

For the latest analysis of the Kremlin’s manipulation of media in the Arab world, see Eliot Stewart’s report, The Kremlin’s Anti-Western (and Remarkably Successful) Middle East Media Project.

o Table of Contents

o Notes on False Flags and US Institutions in North Africa

o Download Russian Original of Acquisition and Training of Agents (1988)

4) The KGB Playbook for Turning Russians Worldwide Into Agents

The fourth and final set of intercepted KGB documents given to The Daily Beast by a European intelligence service shows just how paranoid Moscow Center was about Russian exiles. “The Use of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Ties with Fellow Countrymen Abroad in the Interests of State Security Agencies,” as it’s called, resembles the previous two documents in its thoroughgoing obsession with counterintelligence threats and botched operations. Where this document deviates from the other two is that it delves into greater anecdotal detail about some of those screw-ups and even names names-or codenames, anyway.

Such added color may owe to the fact that unlike the other two, which were produced in the late ’80s, this file was published for internal KGB use in 1968, an annus horribilis for the Soviet spy services, which failed to predict and preempt the Prague Spring. Surely an excellent time to fret about what “compatriots” were getting up to everywhere inside and outside of the Warsaw Pact’s jurisdiction.

In a sense, this relic of Cold War tradecraft is as much a monument to the West’s nimble manipulation of émigré circles as it is a manual on how to recruit them for Moscow.