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Col. A. A. Fabrichnikov

Maj. A. M. Danilin

“Adviser”

Survey of the Topic False-Flag Recruitment

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INTRODUCTION

The increasing difficulty in recent years of the intelligence operational environment in a number of capitalist countries, and the stepping up of activity of the enemy's intelligence services against Soviet intelligence, urgently require from every Chekist working in intelligence the constant improvement of methods and forms of operational work. This means not only searching for new ways to penetrate the enemy's secrets but to creatively apply the already known and tested long-standing forms and methods of reconnaissance practice of Soviet intelligence.

This survey is devoted to a review of false-flag recruitment - a difficult but productive method of intelligence work. A skillful application of this method by our officers will unquestionably increase the effectiveness and operational level of Soviet foreign intelligence activity.

In working on this survey, the authors set themselves the task of reviewing the issues most difficult in an operational sense which arise for our workers in false-flag recruitment and demonstrating how they resolved them. In the authors' opinion, such difficult issues include: the selection of the recruitment agent and his involvement in cultivating the target of interest to us; the choice of the flag and the recruitment of the target on behalf of foreign intelligence; the transfer of the agent recruited by "foreign intelligence" to cooperation with the Soviet Union's state security agencies.

It should be noted that this last stage of recruitment cultivation under a false flag is the most crucial and difficult and requires a quite scrupulous approach. Not always and not every agent recruited under a false flag can and should be converted to direct collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence. More often, you must keep working with an agent under a false flag, which of course creates additional and sometimes serious difficulties. Therefore, where it is feasible and there are favorable conditions, you must strive to convert the agent to direct collaboration with our state security agencies. It is best when such a transition is prepared in the process of work with the agent under a false flag.

The measures described in the survey to recruit "Adviser" under the flag of West German intelligence and his transition to direct collaboration with Soviet intelligence are not ideal. In this case it would have been possible to achieve the goal in other ways as well. Nevertheless, what was achieved by operatives yielded positive results.

If this review of the case of the agent cultivation of Adviser elicits interest in operatives, and provides an impetus for creative searches and to some extent instills a taste for such intense and difficult measures as false-flag recruitment of agents, the authors will consider they have fulfilled their appointed objectives.

When Maj. Pavlovsky took over the Adviser file, the subject had the rank of 2nd-class legation Adviser¹ and was one of the leading officials in the same office for foreign affairs of the Austrian Presidential Chancellery² where he had begun his diplomatic career. Adviser had direct involvement in the preparation and development of issues of the foreign relations between Austria and the Soviet Union.

Pavlovsky read the Adviser file carefully. A report from agent "Schneider" dated March 24, 1954, was the first item attached to it, noting that a new official, Hans Adolf Baumgarten, had appeared at the foreign affairs office, hired in the service as a protégé of "Kruger," an aide to the foreign minister. Then reports followed from the sources "Zeta," "Nenisk," "Nordpol"³.

At first the reports were brief, indicating only certain basic data on Baumgarten, then the volume of agent materials increased. Each agent provided his assessment of Baumgarten, which depended not only on how a given source regarded a greenhorn diplomat, but on his own relations with Baumgarten. But not a single source noted that the new official named Baumgarten was

¹ 2nd class legation Adviser (from the German legationsrat 2 Klasse) or Adviser to the mission is the diplomatic title of an official of the foreign ministry of Austria and West Germany. Persons with such a title usually occupy midlevel executive positions, up to deputies of department heads. As a rule, these are well-informed workers, who when sent to work at foreign offices work most often as Advisers to embassies and missions.

² After the parliamentary elections in Austria in 1959, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was formed, and the department where Baumgarten served began to be called 6, or the Eastern Department.

³ All last names and nicknames mentioned in the review have been changed in the interests of secrecy.

a protégé of the minister's aide. Such things spread quickly in the bureaucrats' milieu and become a topic for conversations and gossip. The rumors about Baumgarten spread at the foreign ministry were supplemented with facts in abundant, at times even spicy detail. But even in gossip, as is known, if it is not deliberately malicious, there is always a grain of truth.

In the end, from the reports of many sources, what was really interesting and necessary was selected, and this served as a basis for the cultivation of Adviser. The main points were covered in a few lines: Adviser was married to the younger sister of the wife of the minister's aide, and as a relative, was a frequent guest in his home, where top officials of the foreign ministry often gathered, as well as top officials from other Austrian government ministries and foreign diplomats. Adviser's father was an émigré from Bavaria, where his relatives lived. Adviser himself was drawn to Germany, although he did not openly display his sympathies. He regarded the USSR without antipathy. Adviser's wife, Anna-Louisa loved to dress in fine clothes, and tried not only to imitate her sister in her outfits, but to outdo her, capriciously, playing the main role in the family. Unable to satisfy his wife's extreme needs, Adviser was almost never out of debt.

Pavlovsky read the documents carefully and made notations in his work notebook. It was clear to him that if he were in the place of the operatives who had previously run the case, he would have paid attention to this ordinary official as well. He had the real support of an influential relative; prospects for

promotions in the service, connections among government officials in the country - all of this provided a reason to work on the young diplomat seriously.

And that is what the operatives did. They planted near Adviser the agent "Nordpol", who worked at the same office of foreign affairs and had a real opportunity to get close to Adviser. Agent "Nordpol" was notable for a rare quality - the ability to listen to a person, even the most talkative, with such attention, and treat his complaints and suffering with such sympathy and understanding that inevitably he was liked by everyone who talked with him.

He was also able to win over Adviser, who began to share with him even family hardships that arose due to material difficulties.

Study of Adviser was made through other agents as well, but they added little to what come in from "Nordpol".

Looking over the reports from "Nordpol" and other sources, Pavlovsky noted that Adviser had been studied in a one-sided manner. Essentially, his material situation had been determined and everything related to it: his relationship with his wife, the amounts of the debts, his attitude toward his fellow officials who loaned Adviser money and so on.

Therefore, Pavlovsky was not surprised when he read in a report that Adviser "would be recruited on a material

basis". But the recruitment failed: Adviser refused to cooperate with Soviet foreign intelligence.

Why didn't Adviser enlist? What did our operatives who conducted the recruitment conversation with him fail to take into account? Was it worth continuing to work on the Adviser file or should it be sent to the archives? Pavlovsky tried to find an answer to these questions, but without success.

There was no account of the failed recruitment in the file. Instead, there was a report with a proposal to cease the recruitment cultivation.

Nevertheless, after a thorough analysis of the file materials, Pavlovsky came to the conclusion, or rather, made the supposition that the workers who had tried to recruit Adviser had not found the correct basis for recruitment or had improperly used the factor of material interest to incline Adviser toward cooperation with us. Pavlovsky did not rule out that Adviser's refusal could have been caused by the fact that the officer for collaboration came from Soviet intelligence. Finally, it could be possible that Adviser, by his nature and views, was opposed to collaboration with any intelligence at all.

Pavlovsky believed that it was extremely necessary to find an answer to these questions tormenting him. Furthermore, he was convinced that the cultivation of Adviser must continue. But conviction is not yet proof. Facts were needed to confirm Pavlovsky's opinion,

without which it was pointless to raise the question of continuing the cultivation of Adviser.

The first confirmation came from the rezidentura, from which a list had come of employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1960, from which it was clear that Adviser was a top official at the Eastern Department. Thus, Adviser's job position provided the basis for speaking of the advisability of continuing work on his case.

This circumstance alone, however, did not provide a reason to decide the question positively. Such a decision could be made only by analyzing the reasons for the failure of the recruitment. The only reliable source who could clarify this was one of the recruiters who had held the talk with Adviser. Fortunately, it was not hard to find him. It was Captain Sokolov. He worked in a division of the Committee for State Security⁴ in Moscow and quickly responded to Pavlovsky's request to brief him on the Adviser case. In recounting the recruitment, Sokolov remarked that he and his comrade had made a miscalculation on one very important matter. Engrossed with the material basis, they missed Adviser's political complexion. And it was not so simple as it might seem from the agent materials in his file.

In the written report about the failed recruitment of Adviser, which Capt. Sokolov prepared at Pavlovsky's request, he noted: "A one-sided approach to the study of Adviser was sensed in the course of the recruitment

⁴ The KGB - The Interpreter.

talk with him which was conducted at the Zur Linden restaurant in Vienna. To our offer to provide help to the Soviet Union for monetary compensation, Adviser replied, not without malice: 'I really do need money, and you're right on target finding out this circumstance. But why are you certain that I am indifferent as to whom I get the cash from? I respect your country, but it is not the one I love. And these are two different things. Don't you think?'

With these words, Adviser made an emphatically polite bow to us and left the restaurant. My comrades and I had nothing left to do but pay for the expensive table service and follow him out.

After this setback I thought long about this cultivation. After all, a failure is no less a school for any operative than success, if not a greater one. In my view, we had been too hasty as well. I suppose Adviser should have been brought in through "Nordpol", not only in debts, but in work, too, that is, to get information from him, and then meet with him with "evidence" in hand. But at that time, we had not appreciated this enough. It had seemed so clear to us - we give him money to meet his wife's demands, and he gives us information. Who would turn down cash, especially quite a bit?! There had been people I myself had occasion to recruit on a material basis, they worked well, without deception. But here it fell apart with Adviser".

Capt. Sokolov's information significantly fleshed out Pavlovsky's impression of Adviser. Now it seems we

could think about a renewed effort to cultivate Adviser.

What was "opposed"? The recruitment had failed, there was a refusal to collaborate with us, and loyalty to the West. That meant it was pointless to recruit him on behalf of Soviet intelligence. That would be the same thing again.

What was "in favor"? The situation in the Foreign Ministry, in a department which likely the Germans wanted to get their hands on, there was talk about a new "Anschluss". In such an environment, the head of West Germany intelligence, Reinhard Gehlen, must be interested in getting information about relations of our country with Austria. And it would not hurt us, either, to have our "controller" in this department, and if necessary, a hindrance to German plans. For that sake, it was worth putting in some work.

Checking his conclusions, searching for ways to approach Adviser, Pavlovsky kept returning to his notes. On Capt. Sokolov's note, he had underlined in red pencil this sentence: "I am not indifferent from whom I get the cash...I respect your country, but it is not the one I love".

In these words of Adviser, Pavlovsky saw the key to his failed recruitment, and also the paths to take to win Adviser over to collaboration.

"There's no question that Adviser will take the bait for cash," reflected Pavlovsky. "That meant the material reason should remain. But they had to take into account that he would not take money from Soviet intelligence. Then from whom? Austrians were excluded. From the Americans? But the case materials indicate that he does not respect the Americans, nor, for that matter, the English and French, whom he considers occupiers of his country. Consequently, that left only the Germans. In the agents' reports it was noted that Adviser was drawn to Germany. What was the basis for this attraction? Only because his father was an émigré from Bavaria, or were there other factors of a personal, political, or other type, which linked Adviser to Germany? And with which Germany? West Germany or the German Democratic Republic?"

It was not yet possible to find the answers to all these questions in Adviser's file. Only further development of Adviser, and additional study of him, could provide them.

This task was then set to the rezidentura, which renewed work on the case and within half a year, was able to collect material that substantially added to the data we had on Adviser.

We learned that his father, Friedrich Paul Baumgarten, a native of Bavaria, had in the past been a member of a ruined Junker family, and during World War I, had the rank of lieutenant and had been at the eastern front, and after becoming wounded, lived in a small Bavarian town and served as the trade agent of a firm. On one of his trips to Salzburg, he made the acquaintance of

Margaret Friedrich, whom he married several months later. She was the daughter of a local priest and Germanophile who fancied the reserve officer of the army of the German Kaiser Wilhelm not so much because of his looks but because of his devotion to the ideals of a great Germany.

After settling in Salzburg, Adviser's father became involved in commerce. Soon he was able to put together an estate for himself, and at the time when Austria was seized by the Hitlerites, he was the owner of two large stores. Baumgartner had two sons and a daughter from his marriage to Margariet Friedrich. He raised his children in a chauvinist spirit, trying to instill believe in them of the exceptionalism of Germans, constantly emphasizing that their homeland was Germany.

Baumgartner's elder son, blinded by the exhortations and ideals of his father, from the very first days of the invasion of Hitler's forces into Austria, went to serve with the Germans, joining their army, and in the end, dying at Ardennes. The chauvinist zeal could have swallowed up Adviser as well but he was saved, apparently by the fact that from the age of 16, he had lived far from his family in Vienna and the irreconcilability to other peoples instilled in him by his father since childhood was gradually forgotten under the influence of his environment. At any rate, it was his student years that brought Adviser to a rejection of Hitlerism, as a means of achieving Germany's greatness. The total defeat of fascism in the second world war confirmed him in this opinion even more.

This did not bring him to a rejection of Germany's right to greatness, however, to primacy in the world. But in Adviser's opinion, Germany could come to this only through bourgeois democracy. In Adenauer's policy, he saw the embodiment of such a democracy, and in the existence of the GDR, an obstacle for the rapid restoration of a great Germany's unity and might. The facts of persecution of democratic elements in the country he regarded as an episode uncharacteristic of the policy of the Bonn government.

Adviser did not usually express his sympathies for West Germany, but in a circle of close friends he was characterized to a certain extent as a Germanophile, convinced that Austria could only achieve success in domestic life and on the international arena only in union with Adenauer's Germany.

According to information from several agents, Adviser was also linked to Germany by the fact that apparently his sister lived there, whose husband held an important post in a metallurgical company.

Adviser's life and work in the period of World War II was not sufficiently covered in his case materials. It was only known that in the capacity of a translator, he had been in the active army on the Western Front, and then in the occupying forces in France. In late 1943, after recovering from a heart ailment, he was demobilized from the army and lived with his parents in Salzburg until the end of the war, where he did literary translations and gave private French lessons.

These facts, together with what we had previously was quite sufficient to make the decision about the direction of work on the Adviser file.

After reviewing Adviser's case once again from cover to cover (Pavlovsky always had a habit of reestablishing all the details of a case before making a decision about it), he came to the following conclusions:

- recruitment of Adviser was advisable and could be carried out on the material basis under a false flag;

- as a recruiter, an agent should be selected who could act on behalf of West German intelligence, the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and by his personal qualities would be able to influence Adviser.

Pavlovsky's choice fell on Agent Safo.

A native of the Volga Region and a member of a Germany family, Safo had lived his entire conscious life under the Soviet government. He graduated from university, worked for a long time in the Soviet press, and as a correspondent had taken part in the war with the White Finns in 1939. During the time he was on the Soviet-Finnish front, Safo was recruited by the army's special department, and after return to his previous place of work, put in touch with local state security agencies.

In 1940, he was sent to Soviet foreign intelligence, which began his training for deployment on German territory. It so happened that Safo fell ill, however,

and spent several months in bed. During that time, the question of sending him outside the Soviet Union was dropped.

When the German Fascist hordes attacked our country, and the state security agencies of the Soviet Union faced the task of training and dropping agents into regions of our country which could be occupied by the Hitlerites, Safo was sent to Kharkiv as a correspondent of a regional newspaper. He was supposed to obtain legal cover there and take measures to penetrate German intelligence agencies.

Safo performed this assignment brilliantly. Passing himself off as a person who had never shared communist views and who had deliberately avoided evacuation to the inner part of the country, in order to serve his German motherland, he rapidly became trusted by the occupiers. At first, he edited a local pro-fascist rag, and then a half year later became the translator and close friend of the deputy commandante of the city. Approximately at this time, he was recruited as an officer of Abwehrgruppe-104 and used by them as a spotter and recruiter, and then as a resident of this agency. By late 1942, Safo had become a translator in the Abwehr department, involved in selecting and training agents from among the traitors to the Motherland who were designated to be dropped at the rear of the Red Army. From that time and almost until the end of the war, with his work, Safo largely enabled our internal agencies to seize and disarm quite a few groups of German spies and saboteurs and also use them in operational games with the Abwehr.

After becoming an officer of Abwehrgruppe-104, Safo was forced to change his residence in connection with the deployments of the intelligence agency during military actions. From August 1942 to March 1943, he operated in Stalingrad Region, and then in the city of Morozovka in Rostov Region, In April 1943, the Abwehrgruppe-1024 moved to Vinnytsia and then Sumy Region, and later to Kyiv Region. The Abwehrgruppe-104, together with German troops rolled to the West through Zholnov in Lviv Region and at the end of the war wound up on the territory of Czechoslovakia, now already under control of American forces.

Safo, like other officers of Abwehrgruppe-104, had secondary documents which enabled him in case of danger to pass himself off as an ordinary person.

He was able to go into hiding in the Carlsbad District. Only after American forces, under an agreement among the Allies left Czechoslovakia was Safo able to get in touch with our agencies. Since the documents given to him by the Germans enabled Safo to obtain legal cover without hindrance in Austria or even in West Germany, it was decided to remove him to the American zone of occupation of Austria. After thorough training in a safe house in Bratislava in August 1945, Safo was deployed to Vienna, from where he continued to Salzburg, which was occupied by American forces. Here he became a correspondent for a large newspaper, Salzburger Nachrichten.

Salzburger Nachrichten is a provincial newspaper published in Salzburg, covering all of Austria. It was founded by the Americans after World War II. A

reactionary, bourgeois newspaper of American-German and monarchist-antisemitic orientation. Salzburger Nachrichten made harsh attacks on the USSR and harassed Austrian communists, employing all possible unscrupulous means.

When it was decided to use Safo on the Adviser case, great changes had taken place in his situation. He had not managed, as had been envisioned in the plan for his extraction, to base himself in West Germany. He was prevented by the espionage organization of Gen. Reinhard Gehlen⁵ who had been used for many years by American intelligence.

Gehlen's thugs had managed to find out through their agents' network that the modest correspondent for Salzburg Nachrichten was an officer of the Abwehr for economic issues. To be sure, Safo brought this about himself to quite an extent, since he hinted at his past in a conversation with one of Gehlen's agents he knew.

For the Gehlenites, Safo was a find. Just at that time they were launching their agent work in Austria, aimed against the Soviet administration and the group of Soviet forces. In the person of Safo, they acquired their own "old comrade-at-arms," who had experience with agent work and, most importantly, knew the "Russian question" and the "Russian soul" well. Of course, a quite significant circumstance was that besides Germany, Safo had an excellent command of

⁵ Until 1956, Gehlen's intelligence organization was subsidized by the U. S. Department of Defense and existed semi-officially in Germany. In April 1956, the Bundestag (parliament) of the FRG declared "Gehlen's organization" the official intelligence organ of the Bonn government, which began to be called the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND).

English and Russian and spoke Ukrainian sufficiently well. He could lead an agents' network of traitors to the Motherland, conduct direct work with officials of the Soviet administration, and if necessary, even represent Gehlen's service to the American intelligence agencies in Austria.

Soon Safo became a resident of "Gehlen's service" in Austria. He was given the assignment in person, and through his agents' network, to cultivate officials of the Soviet military administration and other Soviet agencies and offices in Austria, to actively recruit an agents' network, to take measures to work over and turn Soviet soldiers to treason against the Motherland. Safo took on these assignments, but with one condition, that he would not himself directly work with Soviet people, so as not to put himself accidentally under fire. Safo made this condition on orders of our agencies, which tried to protect Safo in the future from suspicion toward him by the Gehlenites and Americans and to prevent the Germans from accusing Safo in case Gehlen's intelligence was able to expose our agents infiltrated into it through Safo's capabilities.

After taking on this assignment, Safo was supposed to make his way to Vienna, in accordance with the Germans' instructions, where he was hired as a correspondent for a large newspaper, *Weiner Tageszeitung*⁶, in which his articles began to appear regularly, mainly about the economic situation the Soviet Union and Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. The headlines of the

⁶ The publication of the Austrian Popular Party financed by a group of industrialists and agrarians. Since 1955, has been called *Osterreichische neue Tageszeitung*.

articles were, as a rule, objective, and therefore to a certain extent enabled Safo to become well known in journalists' circles as a person of independent views. This created the possibility for him to broaden his circle of acquaintances not only among journalists but among officials from Austria's government offices.

On the eve of the signing of a state treaty with Austria⁷, Safo received from the "Gehlen service" the assignment to activate his ties with Austrian government circles and offices, orienting above all toward those persons who had a relation to Soviet institutions in Austria and the prospect of traveling to the USSR. Safo's work in performing this assignment advanced "successfully". Materials systematically came into the BND on the targets he studied, and also information about political and economic issues concerning relations between Austria and the socialist countries. To be sure, in a number of cases when it was necessary, it was corrected preliminarily in our rezidentura, so that information did not fall into the hands of the BND which West German intelligence could use to the harm of our Motherland.

Thus, Safo's position in the BND provided us with the opportunity to use him in a false-flag recruitment action of Adviser, without fearing failure. In fact, even if Adviser rejected cooperation with the Germans or reported this to the Austrian authorities this could hardly seriously affect Safo's position; after all, he could always take cover under the BND. A big plus for using Safo in recruitment of Adviser was also the fact

⁷ The state treaty with Austria was signed on May 15, 1955.

that he was well known among Foreign Ministry officials in Austria as a journalist with a name.

His acquaintance with Adviser would not provoke suspicions either from Adviser himself or those around him. Safo's knowledge of the East's economic problems, his interest in these problems in conversations with Adviser also could not provoke disbelief, and besides, would create the grounds for obtaining information from Adviser on these issues and his gradual involvement in work with us.

Finally, in selecting his candidacy, yet another factor was taken into account, no less important, and that was the impossibility of using Safo further in recruitment by West German intelligence. The problem is that Safo, who was by that time about 50, while he had worked on assignment from Soviet state security agencies in the rear of the German fascist forces, and then abroad, had severely ruined his health. At a meeting with an employee of our rezidentura, he requested permission to return to the Motherland. He felt completely exhausted. Here the prolonged nervous tension and his personally unsettled state had taken its toll. In nearly 20 years of selfless work, he had been unable to make a family for himself, and despite the great concern about him by the Soviet state security agencies, he sometimes felt alone, especially abroad, where he could only rarely let down his guard at meetings with our operatives.

Such a request could not be ignored on our part. In that connection, a decision was made, after the recruitment of Adviser, to bring Safo secretly back into the Soviet Union and provide him the opportunity

which he had long sought to write a book about the work of Soviet intelligence officers in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

To be sure, the return of Safo to the USSR created additional difficulties for our operatives, since inevitably they faced the question of the need to put Adviser into direct touch with Soviet intelligence, which could have been avoided if Safo remained abroad and ran the work with Adviser under the name of West German intelligence.

Taking into account all these circumstances, and also the personal features of Safo and Adviser, our operatives came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to gradually draw Adviser into intelligence work, to the extent possible without revealing to him the proximity of Safo to West German intelligence, so that subsequently it would be easier to move Adviser to direct contact with the Soviet Union's state security agencies.

In accordance with these basic principles, a line of behavior for Safo was determined and an assignment developed, calculated to take him one to one-and-a-half years to complete.

First Main Directorate officer Maj. Pavlovsky was assigned to train Safo and guide his work in cultivating Adviser.

Safo's Report⁸

I have kept you informed of the progress of the cultivation of Adviser with brief encrypted reports. Since the task was assigned to me to study and cultivate Adviser, more than two months have passed, and now several preliminary results can be cited. Above all, I would like to note that the line suggested by you aimed at gradual cultivation of Adviser by establishing personal acquaintance with him, mutual exchange of information and drawing him into debts, has justified itself for now. I think that in the future it is advisable to operate in the same way, deepened by my personal contact with Adviser. And now everything in order.

I cannot rule out that there will be many trivialities in my report, but I will deliberately speak of them so that you can compile a fuller picture of Adviser.

In accordance with your recommendations, first I wanted to get acquainted with Adviser as a correspondent of a well-known paper and visit him at his office. In fact, Adviser is a regular reader of Österreichische Tageszeitung and had spoken quite well of my knowledge of the economic issues of the countries of Eastern Europe. As I already reported to you, however, I had to reject this option since my visit to Adviser from

⁸ The report was recorded on a tape recorder during the first meeting with Safo after the assignment was given and took place at the safe house in Vienna. The report is cited from a transcript of the recording.

official positions could produce a negative impression on him.

With your consent, I chose another path: so-called "accidental" acquaintance with Adviser through my connections in the Foreign Ministry since this created grounds for candor and gradual establishment with him of personal friendly relations. About a week after this baptism, I learned that Adviser was intending to travel with his wife to the Tyrol Alps and spend several days there, enjoying ski trips and the alpine air. Geshke, who is known to you, informed me of this. He also said that Adviser had reserved suites at the Golden Crown hotel near the Vorarlberg mountains in the town of Arlberg, and that using the protection of the minister's aide, he had the opportunity to enjoy a vacation even when other bureaucrats worked hard. This information was reported to me by Geshke as an aside. There was even a sense of a certain envy of Adviser. I did not ask Geshke questions about Adviser, so he could hardly link my later actions with this information, even if he learned about my trip to the Alps.

With this information, I decided to make Adviser's acquaintance in fact in the Tyrol Alps. I had the opportunity to make a trip there for 3-4 days, since at the editorial office, I had reserved a week of winter vacation back in the summer. I felt it was awkward to travel alone and invited my close friend Krantzl and his girlfriend to come with me. Krantzl had previously worked in the Austrian chancellery, knew many of the employees of that office, and had repeatedly told me various stories about Adviser, in which there was a lot of fabrication, as incidentally there was in a lot of what he said. He was not close to Adviser, but he knew

him and even his wife, which he had chanced to meet several times at official receptions. Now Krantzl was toiling in the field of journalism - he was head of the economic department in the newspaper Die Presse.⁹

By nature, he was quite direct, a dimwit, and in the presence of his girlfriend capable of not paying attention to anything except her. Thus, he was quite suitable for the role which I assigned him in our plans. Of course, I did not breathe a word to him about the fact that Adviser was vacationing in the Alps. I needed Krantzl to see Adviser first in Arlberg and express a wish to introduce me to him. And I had no doubts that Krantzl would not refrain from such a proposal.

On January 20, we (Krantz, his girlfriend and I) drove to Tyrol in my car. I had been in various regions of Austria, including in the Tyrolian Alps, but the road to Arlberg, winding through the mountains like a nimble snake, although it requires skill, dexterity and great attentiveness from the car driver, was always a great thrill for me. The highways loop upwards through the mountain slopes so that on one side of the mountain there is a wall of granite and on the other a dizzying chasm hundreds of meters deep. The trees alongside the road and the mountain vegetation are covered with a thick layer of fluffy snow. The trees and tops of the mountains are especially pretty in the sun's rays when the snow crystals reflect all the colors of the rainbow. There is the pure, ringing air, and the fairytale beauty, especially in mild weather. The trees and

⁹ Die Presse is a bourgeois newspaper published in Vienna, funded by Austrian industrialists, with anti-Soviet articles.

cliffs under the snow look as if they are statues made by brilliant artists. And it seemed to me that this marvelous mountain nature could not help but act favorable on all tourists coming there.

Getting away somewhat from the point, I would like to note that Krantzl's girlfriend, who was called Gisela, but whom Krantzl himself called Selchen, was a match for him. She clung to Krantzl, adored him, and it seemed could think of nothing in the world without this guileless fat man. She was - I'm sorry - a hausfrau by nature. I am certain then when they get married, Gisela will become a real housewife, will bear Krantzl a bunch of children and will not be interested in anything except their offspring, the kitchen and her husband's paycheck. I speak of her at such length only because the habits, inclinations and interests of this woman, her behavior and attitude toward Krantzl were quite helpful in enabling me to chat quietly with Adviser for many hours, without fearing that something outside would bother us. As soon as Krantzl appeared in our group, Gisela would also immediately come over and lead her future spouse into a secluded corner where they could bill and coo together. (I must admit that I do not know how long such a dove would last for Krantzl).

The ride to Arlberg passed unnoticed and without incident. We arrived at the village only toward evening. We had reserved hotel rooms back in Vienna. We settled in quite comfortably and after a modest supper went to our rooms, agreeing to go on a sky trip after breakfast the next day. I must say that I chose this trip deliberately. The fact is that in talking with the administrator, I learned that there was not a single guest in the hostel would not go skiing in the

mountains every day. Some enthusiasts made ski runs even before breakfast, although it began rather early. Guests with status did this after breakfast, unhurriedly, as is proper to people who have weight and influence in society.

Adviser should have gone in that category, by my estimation. I arrived at this conclusion also because from you I learned that Adviser's wife loves esteem and finery, and such a woman would hardly allow her husband to violate protocol in the hotel established by the powerful of this world. I hoped that in the morning, I could become acquainted with Adviser even before the outing, and then spend the time before lunch with him. But it did not work out. First, Krantzl and Selchen were late to breakfast, so that we were getting up from the table when the last skiers were leaving the hotel. But there was nothing for it, I had to patiently bear this setback. Although I lost any desire to go skiing after that, even so I agreed to go with my companions and headed off to the mountains reluctantly.

The trip somewhat calmed me. My thoughts, agitated from the morning's bad luck, settled down, and I began to build new plans to meet Adviser. Only just at that moment a thought came to me which once again disrupted my equilibrium. I will tell you frankly that I ceased to respect myself after that as an intelligence officer, and to this day cannot understand how I could let this negligence happen - in making plans to meet Adviser, I hadn't done the simplest thing - I hadn't determined if he had arrived in the mountains and stayed in fact at the hotel that Geshke had told me. I cursed myself for not taking care to see Adviser, at least from a distance, so that if necessary, I could

become acquainted with him without Krantzl's help. You can imagine how I felt: I was using my saved-up vacation days, I had dragged Krantzl off to the mountains, had wasted money - and now as a result - failure!

I returned to the hotel in a depressed state. I had tormented myself so with remorse that even Selchen noticed my mood. I had to allude to fatigue. After changing our clothes, we went down to lunch. There were not very many people in the hall, and I took a table with the idea that Krantzl could see well not only those sitting in the room, but those entering it. But lunch finished, and Adviser and his wife did not appear in the hall.

After lunch, sending the lovebirds off to rest, I went out to take a walk around the resort town. Besides the hotel where I was staying, there were several other rather comfortable pensions. Adviser could be in any one of them. Asking the porters of these pensions, I confirmed that Adviser was not staying in them. I did not risk asking about him in my own hotel, so as not to spoil the preconceived game of meeting him. But I did manage to find out a thing or two from the porter at our hotel. Striking up a conversation with him, I asked where the guests spend their vacation, do they go often to nearby towns, or do they vary their stay in the mountains with light jaunts to other places. The porter turned out to be talkative and, in several minutes, told me twice as much as what I had asked him.

In fact, he reported that today, that is, January 21, even before breakfast, a group of guests consisting of

two families had traveled to another resort spot in their cars, where apparently their Vienna acquaintances were staying. According to the porter, this group was intending to return no earlier than 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening, since the night before they had warned the oberkellner (headwaiter) that they should not be expected for lunch. I didn't ask the porter about these people, but for some reason he considered it necessary to inform me: "Important people. Diplomats".

The porter's words restored hope for me. I was convinced that among these "diplomats" was Adviser himself. There was a possibility of this. After dinner, all the tourists usually gathered in the large, bright hotel hall. Here you could dance, or play bridge, or have a cup of coffee if you wished. If not Adviser, at least his wife would not be able to pass by this hall.

And in fact, that evening my first acquaintance with Adviser did take place. When our trio went down from our rooms to the grand hall, Krantzl called out to a man in a light winter suit.

"There's another candidate for our company," he said gaily, turning to his three companions.

Krantzl's acquaintance turned out to be Springfelder, a Foreign Office official who was spending his winter vacation here with his wife and two school-age daughters. Springfelder introduced the women and Adviser to us. Krantzl in turn introduced Gisela and me to his acquaintances.

When Krantzl said my last name, Adviser looked at me attentively, and it seemed to me that a pleasant smile flashed across his stern face.

"I'm very glad to meet you. I have followed your articles for a long time," said Adviser. "I can only thank fate that she has led me to you".

I bowed and also uttered some sort of social courtesy.

Soon we all sat down in the hall and exchanged impressions about vacationing in the mountains. The conversation was light and easy, although practically only the ladies took part in it. Adviser only joined the conversation from time to time, supporting his wife on this or that issue. Springfielder and Krantzl were deep in recollections of their joint service at the Foreign Ministry, gossiping about their acquaintances, making wisecracks about them, and often guffawing. I also behaved unobtrusively, approximately in the same spirit as Adviser himself.

So as not to return to this issue in the future, I would like to say a few words about Adviser's wife. I must say outright that this is the kind of women who is worth being jealous about and for whose sake you could do more than borrow money from friends and acquaintances. A slender figure, a stern, beautiful face, soft, smooth rounded shoulders, a white swan neck - she immediately draws attention to herself. But she was extremely capricious. Unembarrassed by the others present, she would often turn to her husband with requests which he would unquestioningly fulfill. It

seemed she even liked having such power over her husband and demonstrated this at any convenient occasion. She dressed very simply, but her clothes were expensive and fit her beautifully. She came down to the hall, for example, in a sable cape. You sensed that Adviser was prepared to do anything for her, just as long as he would not lose her. I sat next to his wife and kept catching his jealous glances at me, so it seemed. Deciding to test this discovery, I invited Anna-Louisa to dance. Soon my hunch was proven - Adviser, sighing, watched as we slowly moved around the hall. Bringing his wife back to her seat after the dance, I sat down next to Adviser. The conversation would not stick. I did not want to start it out of tactical considerations, and Adviser, apparently could not suppress in himself for a time the feel of ill will that arose in him.

Finally, he asked me a casual question about my work at the newspaper. I told him as thoroughly as possible, but at the same time in such a way that he did not form an impression of me as a chatty and unserious person. Adviser praised my objectivity in covering the economic problems of Eastern Europe, meanwhile stating that he could not bear superficial people. He complained that there was no one to talk to in Arlberg, that he was with the Springfelder party accidentally, and only because his wife liked Springfelder's cheerfulness and frivolity. I did not start supporting this topic of conversation, although from the perspective of discovering Adviser's character it would have had some use. I considered it necessary to move the conversation to the area of our common interests. Adviser rather thoroughly described the state of the economy of the countries of Eastern Europe, although all of this was

clothed in general phrases which had no significance for me since they did not give me anything new.

In order to interest Adviser in an acquaintance with me, I decided on the spot to give him certain fresh information about the economic plans of Austria's neighbor - Czechoslovakia, which I had learned from my fellow scribe. This news interested Adviser. He tried to clarify certain issues, but I pretended that I did not know more than what my friend had told me. Then the conversation turned to domestic political topics which was also conducted in general phrases, clothed in the sweeping formulas. It was clear that Adviser did not like to be candid on the first meeting. Out of all of this conversation I would like to emphasize one issue, and that is this: Adviser's attempt to learn my opinion about the policy of West Germany regarding Austria. The question was put seemingly at random, during the course of the conversation, and could not have provoked surprise, if I had not been briefed earlier by you about Adviser's sympathies. I refrained from a direct answer to this question, telling him that "the Germans are Germans everywhere, no matter where they have lived". This answer apparently quite satisfied Adviser.

My first acquaintance with Adviser, in my view, went quite satisfactorily. At any rate, on the next day, the whole party which now consisted of seven people got on their skis and moved through the mountains. We wandered for about three hours. As at the evening before, our party was divided into two groups: in one there was Adviser and me, and in the other, all the rest. We skied along a well-worn trail, stopping often to rest, and gathering in one group, but that did not prevent me from talking with Adviser. One time we got so carried

away from our conversation that we did not notice that we had fallen behind the others, and when we caught up with them, we heard their reprimand. Krantzl came to our rescue, saying that he knew us both well, that we were both obsessed with work and that no particular demands should be made of us. Although we obtained absolution of our sins, nevertheless, we did not risk getting separated from the group the next time.

As a result of long conversations with Adviser, I got a quite definite impression of him, which gave me the opportunity to give some thought how to construct a flexible tactic for further development and strengthening of acquaintance with him.

For my part, I tried to do everything to interest Adviser in myself, within the bounds of what was permissible for a first acquaintance.

On the evening of January 23, I organized a small dinner in connection with my departure to Vienna. Adviser was remaining in Arlberg another 5 days. My decision to leave was made for the following reasons: according to my legend, my vacation was over, and I had to distract Adviser's attention from my deliberate interest in him, if he had sensed it, and create for a time a certain "vacuum" around Adviser, so as to stimulate his wish to meet me again in Vienna, now on his own initiative.

The dinner took place in a rather relaxed setting and enabled our acquaintanceship to grow stronger. After the third shot of cognac, when the conversation became

general, Adviser and I withdrew from the restaurant into the hall where we settled comfortably in armchairs and talked for about an hour and a half. Adviser smoked a lot, and complained that he had to work a lot, and carry great expenses for maintaining his family, since his kinship with a person close to the minister obliged him always to be neat, trim, and dressed fashionably. From these worries, according to him, his mood was ruined, and his nerves were beginning to fray. I then mentioned in passing that apparently the main expenses that had to be carried were for his wife's wardrobe.

"Well, what can you do," he said. "A woman is like that. And furthermore, as you have managed to notice, she isn't the worst".

This phrase was said with a certain challenge. I was surprised that Adviser's first impression had clung so long, although after the dance with Anna-Louisa, I had not given any reasons for suspicion. In that connection, I considered it possible to remark to Adviser:

"On the first evening of our acquaintance, it seemed that you were a little bit jealous of me with your wife. Drop it, my friend. I do not deserve suspicion on your part, and believe me, I am not so careless as to flirt with a married woman, especially if she is the wife of a person I like. And your wife isn't the kind to indulge in liberties with other men".

For Adviser, my comments were seemingly the most important of all those that I had said to him in three days of our acquaintanceship.

"You're right, Mr. Safo," he said. "At times I really get the blues. Thank you for your kind word and your opinion of my wife. I am very glad to have met you and I hope that we will see in other in Vienna often".

I expressed the same wish, noting only that I am often away and therefore I could not say in advance when our next meeting would take place.

I have told you about the start of my acquaintance with Adviser in great detail only because it was the chief difficulty and further work on our cause depended on it.

In discussing with you Adviser's file, as you will recall, it was recognized as advisable not to hasten events, not to be obtrusive and after becoming acquainted, not to remind him of myself for a time and if possible to meet with him again somewhere in a neutral place, so that the meeting did not look especially organized.

I had such an opportunity in early February. Through my informants, I learned about a visit to the opera by the top officials of the Foreign Ministry, and of course did not hesitate to make use of this to remind Adviser of myself. During the intermission, I did in fact meet Adviser and his wife, as always elegantly dressed and

blindingly beautiful. He once again thanked me for time well spent in the mountains, and said that he wanted to talk with me about a number of questions, and proposed that after the show (Die Fledermaus¹⁰ was performed on that day with some Parisian celebrity), to meet with him over a glass of wine in the restaurant. I did not refuse.

At the restaurant Zum Franziskaner near the opera, the conversation I needed did not take place, since we had to entertain Anna-Louisa, who, of course, would have grown bored from our conversations on economic topics. But the evening did not pass in vain. It enabled us to grow closer. Of some importance was the fact that to some extent I managed to win over Adviser's wife. When after dinner, Adviser invited me to his home, his wife supported his proposal with alacrity.

Now I was at Adviser's house. It was a five-room apartment, decorated in good taste. Modern furniture, no excesses, several decorative figurines and prints in the moderne style aptly decorated the rooms, creating coziness. A boy of about nine years, Adviser's son, came out to meet me with his parents and after greeting me, immediately retreated to the children's room. Anna-Louisa seemed completely different at home than she did in public. She was somehow simpler, more ordinary, but her captivating beauty only gained from this. I got the impression that this was the reason Adviser only patiently bore his wife's caprices among people, because at home he saw her completely different, the way he would like to see her always. There was a general conversation at the table. When the maid poured

¹⁰ The Bat, the operetta by Johann Strauss.

the coffee, Anna-Louisa went to her son, leaving us alone together. The "man's" talk then began. Adviser was interested to know if I had any more precise information about Czechoslovakia's intentions to develop its relations with Austria. I provided several figures more precise than the conversation we had in Arlberg.

I had no need to hide those figures from Adviser since I had obtained them myself just two days earlier from my informants in Austria's Foreign Ministry. I only told Adviser what should have been long ago known to him. I could make a judgement about this because this time, he told me more concretely and substantively about Austria's foreign policy plans, in particular about the orientation of certain ruling circles of the country toward a union with West Germany. I included myself as an advocate of such a union, noting as well that while the policy of neutrality did give Austria certain advantages for now, in the future it would better nevertheless to be in close alliance with the West, in particular taking part in the "Common Market". To my question as to whether the FRG would not undermine Austria just as Hitler had undermined it in its day, Adviser stated heatedly that if there were fascists in power in the FRG, he would never be for such a union; that is why he spoke of a union between Austria with the FRG, because there was a democratic government in power there now. Here he said various flattering things about Adenauer.

I must stipulate that this conversation took place after I had "let my hair down," and told him the story of my wanderings, starting with service on the Eastern Front to the present day. I deliberately did not say

that I had worked in fascist intelligence and how I came to the Germans, so as not to frighten Adviser with either my service in such an agency or my Russian origin.

Our business discussion was interrupted by the appearance of Anna-Louisa who, having put her son to bed and given instructions regarding the home, returned to us in the living room. We were still drinking a cup of coffee each, and, making my excuses to my hosts, I began to say my goodbye. The visit to Adviser's home gave me the right to invite them to my home.

Adviser and I met several more times until mid-February, twice face to face. This enabled me to obtain information from him, the most important points of which I have already reported to you and therefore I will not repeat myself. This information helped realize an important part of the tasks set to me, namely: to check Adviser's reaction to handing him cash and to establish the foundation for him gradually learning to take money from me. But first, I must go back a little bit and report on the fulfillment of the preliminary assignment.

In accordance with the recommendations I received from you, I asked the opinion of my chief from Pullach¹¹ about my intention to publish my articles under a

¹¹ A village outside Munich, where the center of West German intelligence, the BND, is located.

pseudonym in the newspaper Rheinischer Merkur¹², for which I did receive his consent. Then I made an agreement with the editor, and for the next month and a half, published four rather lengthy articles about the Russian economy, which suited the taste of the editors of that semi-official paper, and now I have an order for another three articles.

In the last two articles, I used some facts from Adviser's information, the source of which, naturally, I did not cite. This factor, as had been foreseen by us, was used for a tactful conversation with Adviser about money. I have to say that I received a rather decent honorarium for my articles, the lion's share of which I decided to give to Adviser as compensation for his participation in the preparation of these articles.

Our conversation on this delicate topic went approximately this way (I am conveying it almost word for word):

Me: "Mr. Adviser, I have a little surprise for you, which you did not expect. Read this article in Rheinischer Merkur, please". (While Adviser is reading the paper, I observe him, but from the expression on his face I realized that he does not completely get the point of my surprise).

¹² Rheinischer Merkur, a bourgeois newspaper close to Adenauer, expressing the interests of major industrial magnates, the mouthpiece of former FRG Chancellor Adenauer. Published in Cologne and Koblenz.

Adviser: "Interesting article. Obviously, the author is quite an informed person, but I don't understand what this has to do with me".

Me: "I am sorry, I have not been very tactful with you, but I did this out of good impulses, believe me. I wanted to make you happy. In this article, which was written by me, is used, to be sure, without your permission, certain information which became known to me from you".

Adviser once again dug into the newspaper and began to read it more attentively. Now he sometimes nodded his head, and a somewhat ironic smile appeared on his face. To be honest, I had expected a furious scene with accusations and even cursing, but that did not happen, fortunately. Chuckling, Adviser said:

"Yesssss. You really screwed me over there. I thought I was talking to an honest person, and completely forgot that I was dealing with a journalist. But why Rheinischer Merkur?"

Me: "You see, I am a correspondent of that newspaper. But that is not all my surprise. I really urge you to take part of the honorarium which I got for that article and which by rights belongs to you".

Adviser: "What are you saying, that's too much. After all, I didn't write a line".

Me: "But without your information, the article I wrote would have lost a lot. If it has received great appreciation, it is only thanks to you".

In short, Adviser did not take long to break down. Even so, he did take what was his, although the amount was small. Evidently, he really did need cash badly if he accepted a gift from me so easily. Continuing then the conversation about my collaboration with Rheinischer Merkur, I offered Adviser to submit an article to this newspaper himself. He liked the idea. He was only bothered by the fact that collaboration with a foreign newspaper ("even if it is German, it is still foreign," he said) could harm his position at the ministry. I proposed a way out: he would write the article; I would cover it then with my pseudonym and send it to the paper. So that was what we decided. Adviser began to get a side income, and we acquired a voluntary assistant in him, which would give me the opportunity to spend more time on fulfilling our operative assignments.

I believe that it was necessary to get closer to Adviser in the future. For that, we had to meet systematically approximately three or four times a month, to obtain from him verbal information about the situation at the Foreign Ministry, and also assign him draft articles for Rheinischer Merkur and regularly pay him for this work, so that he became use to the additional source of a regular income, even if small. At the same time, I supposed I would gradually teach Adviser not to especially broadcast to his relatives and acquaintances, especially at work, his connection to us, and to introduce certain elements of conspiracy in the relationship between us.

...

After reading Safo's report carefully, the operative Pavlovsky approved the work he had conducted, and also discussed with Safo the line of his further behavior. Pavlovsky agreed to Safo's proposals for cultivating Adviser.

After determining Safo's line of behavior regarding the BND, it was decided not to inform West Germany intelligence about Adviser as a possible candidate for recruitment. Moreover, it was taken into account that Safo, in his capacity as a journalist, had numerous ties among Austrian citizens and foreigners, and did not report all his acquaintances to FRG intelligence headquarters. Furthermore, Safo was not obliged to report to them all of his contacts without fail. Even if West German intelligence learned of his meetings of Safo with Adviser, he could always answer an inquiry from Munich by saying that he was familiar with Adviser, and was studying him, but he had not yet made a firm opinion about him.

Since, as was clear from Safo's report, the first stage of study of Adviser was completed quite satisfactorily, and the conditions were created for a more active involvement of Adviser in intelligence activity, Pavlovsky made the decision to continue working with him under the name of Rheinischer Merkur, although even so, we could not count on getting materials from Adviser that would tie him to us. The wisdom of direct recruitment of Adviser under the name of West German intelligence depended on whether we would get from

Adviser during the process of working with him information from the newspaper Rheinischer Merkur which would constitute a state secret of Austria, or not.

In the first instance, we could rely on transferring Adviser to direct collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence, without resorting to a preliminary recruitment of him on behalf of Gehlen's intelligence. In the second case, recruitment on behalf of the BND would become a necessity.

Safo set about implementing our designated plan. Two weeks after the first report from Safo, an encrypted report came in which he said: "I had an unpleasant conversation in Pullach regarding Adviser. I will come to an unscheduled meeting under Beta terms".

When Pavlovsky came to the restaurant Paris in Innsbruck, Safo was there. He was visibly agitated. Pavlovsky attentively listened without interruption to Safo's report of the conversation with him at the BND, and when Safo had calmed down, he asked him to describe in detail everything that had happened and what led him to such a nervous state.

"The cultivation of Adviser is under threat of collapse," Safo blurted out.

"Let's discuss this issue calmly, think over the situation carefully and let's try to find a way out of this situation," Pavlovsky offered.

Apologizing for his vehemence, Safo began to describe his trip to Pullach in detail. His story took up a rather long time, and the meeting thus lasted nearly three hours.

Pavlovsky's Report about the Meeting with Safo

"I am reporting that on March 17 of this year, I had a meeting with agent Safo, which took place at his request. Safo reported the following at this meeting.

On March 12, he was summoned to Munich, where Stark, an officer of the BND, Safo's immediate superior, met with him. The meeting took place in a room at the Hotel Regina and lasted almost five hours. Safo had to account for his work with the informers Geshke, Neiman, Fogel and Koenig in the first two months of this year. Safo informed him within the limits of the instructions in this regard from us, outlining the prospects of using Koenig, whose candidacy was being reviewed in the Austrian Foreign Ministry to be sent as an Adviser of the Austrian Embassy in Bulgaria. According to our instruction, Safo gave an unflattering assessment of Geshke as a person incapable of receiving serious information, not possessing the opportunities for this, but involved in the collection of various gossip, and proposed ending his financial support.

Stark approved Safo's work with Koenig, but rejected his recommendation regarding Geshke, and gave Safo the assignment to use him more widely to find candidates for recruitment from the perspective of studying their

habits, inclinations, weaknesses, desires for cash and women.

While characterizing Safo's work on the whole positively, Stark made some serious criticisms, saying that Safo had studied the Foreign Ministry officials with a pro-German orientation too poorly, and in recent years had not managed to carry out to the end a single recruitment from a number of officials who had a relationship to connections with the USSR and other socialist countries. Safo tried to prove to his chief that he was conducting such cultivation, but it was not always possible to complete within two or three months.

Stark paid no attention to Safo's arguments. He told the agent that he had apparently grown tired, he was losing his qualification aside from his journalistic duties, he was forgetting to report to Pullach about his ties to Foreign Ministry officials, among whom could be some very interesting people. Safo said that just as before, he was informing them of all those who from his perspective represented interest and could be recruited, but before informing Stark of this, he tried to create a quite definite, sufficiently full opinion of a person himself, so as not to offer things that weren't realistic.

In that connection, Stark remarked sarcastically that Safo apparently would need 10 years to form an opinion about Adviser, for example, with whom Safo had quite a few meetings and rather extensive conversations in the Tyrolian Alps.

Safo claimed that Stark put this question to him in exactly this way. In that connection, Safo was forced to inform Stark of his meetings with Adviser and tell him that he was conducting a study, but it was advancing slowly, however. Meanwhile, Safo was silent about the use of Adviser's information in his articles and of turning over to him part of his fees. Safo believed that these facts could not be told to the Germans, as Adviser would not be willing to share this information with anyone.

In characterizing Adviser, Safo indicated to Stark that Adviser was against fascism, against the rehabilitation of g in the FRG and the persecution of democratic organizations but at the same time he had certain sympathies to Germany, but a Germany that was democratized. Safo even hinted that Adviser's sympathy was more on the side of [Erich] Ollenhauer than the Christian Democrats Adenauer and Straus. These facts, as Safo told Stark, did not afford him the opportunity to say definitively that Adviser would collaborate with West German intelligence or not. Safo's attempt to portray Adviser in a disadvantageous light did not have an effect on Stark. He gave Safo the assignment to step up the pace on the study of Adviser, to strengthen their acquaintance and to make the recruitment, using cash as one of the means to influence him, and that Adviser will not be given assignments that would threaten Austria's security.

Then Stark added, according to Safo, that Adviser's sympathies to Ollenhauer should not be taken into account since the "Socis"¹³ differed little from the

¹³ Nickname for members of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG).

ruling party, and on the main issues of domestic and foreign policy supported the Chancellor.

Safo accepted this assignment from Stark and had to report back to him no later than mid-May of this year. Safo did not rule out that to put pressure on Adviser, the Pullach bosses could use his sister, who supposedly lived in Cologne, and possibly his father, who was in Salzburg.

As we can see now, we had clearly miscalculated by not permitting Safo to inform the Germans of his acquaintance with Adviser. Our intentions, which had counted on not letting the Germans at Adviser, had now been turned against us.

From Safo's report it was clear that the BND knew about Adviser and his acquaintance with Safo, and that they were tailing Adviser or Safo himself through other agents.

Safo ruled out that the German agent might be Krantzl since nothing was known of the meetings of Safo with Adviser after they left Tyrol. Safo suspected Springfelder who saw the meeting of Safo with Adviser at the opera and knew about their visit together to the restaurant. Safo had learned that from Adviser.

The circumstances outlined above brought about substantial corrections in the plans for our work with the Adviser file and caused the need to activate and complete his cultivation. Since I didn't have any

opportunities to seek advice with the Center, and scheduling yet another meeting with Safo in a situation where possibly he was under surveillance was unsafe, I was forced to make a decision myself on the further cultivation of Adviser which was discussed and agreed with the agent himself. The essence of our plan was as follows:

1. The line we had previously taken of gradually drawing in Adviser to intelligence work on behalf of the newspaper was cancelled. Two or three meetings would be conducted with Adviser, after which his recruitment would be formalized on behalf of West Germany intelligence. This would enable us to rapidly move Adviser to clandestine relations, thus eliminating the possibility that Adviser would accidentally speak of his further meetings with Safo. To his own circle, Adviser would if necessary, create a legend of his break with Safo due to jealousy. The relevant grounds for this would be created.

West Germany intelligence would be told that Adviser had refused to cooperate with the BND for motives of a personal nature, to be more precise: while remaining a friend of Germany, he rejected any ties with punitive agencies no matter whose interests they represented. For greater persuasiveness, the bosses from Pullach would be given a tape recording, spliced together from tapes of two or three especially-prepared conversations with Adviser.

It was possible that additional changes could be made to this option, but this would depend on the result of a check of Adviser's father and sister.

A check of the father was conceived to be organized through the Vienna rezidentura. Adviser's sister must be investigated within the next two weeks, so that by that time, we could decide whether to use our options.

2. In this connection, the need arose to hasten Safo's preparation for departure, the manufacturing of reserve documents for him and the legending of his disappearance from Austria. In order to enable work with Adviser in place on behalf of the BND, it was thought prudent to send a First Chief Directorate operative to Vienna through legal channels, with whom back at the Center, the issue must be carefully vetted regarding transfer of Adviser to collaboration with the state security agencies of the Soviet Union. I could remain here as a link between that operative and the rezidentura.

3. Taking into account Stark's criticism of Safo, I considered it necessary to permit Safo to recruit "Paul," an official of the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department, which previously we had not sanctioned, so as not to give into the BND's hands a source who was rather well informed about the USSR. That would give us the opportunity to strengthen Safo's position at the BND, which had become severely shaken after his conversation with Stark and would help soften the future blow on Safo when Adviser turned down the recruitment. The recruitment of Paul would be conducted before Safo's recruitment talk with Adviser.

Several days after the arrival of Pavlovsky's report at the Center, a report came in from Safo in which he

informed us that the development of Adviser was going successfully, and that the agent was preparing his recruitment. Further it was indicated that Safo had informed Pullach about his meetings with Adviser.

Then a communication came from Vienna about how Adviser's father was in the hospital with a broken spine which he had suffered slipping on the ice. Adviser was in Salzburg for three days and upon return he told his friends about how his father would hardly survive such a severe trauma. He also complained that his father received him quite coldly and even in such a hopeless state did not fail to reproach his son for changing his military career.

Thus, the possibility of the Germans' using the father in recruiting Adviser was lost.

Several days later, a telegram came in from Bonn. The rezidentura reported that it could only determine that Adviser's sister and husband really did live at the address known to us. But they could not answer the question of what she was like and what sort of social status her husband held.

This report to some extent made difficult the taking of the final decision about conducting the planned recruitment operation. Therefore, Pavlovsky was given the instruction to delay the implementation of the main part of the plan and take measures to clarify the real state of affairs with Adviser's sister. Pavlovsky passed on the relevant assignment to Safo through a dead drop, and soon he reported that no danger from

that quarter should be expected, since according to Adviser, he did not maintain contact with his sister for the reason that she had married a former Gestapo officer, and Adviser did not want to have any family ties with him.

After this news, the Center authorized the final part of the operation on the Adviser file except for the proposal to transfer him to direct communication with Soviet foreign intelligence.

In late April, a cryptogram came in from Safo: "Adviser has started cooperating for money. At the recruitment talk, he provided interesting information. The progress of the recruitment is recorded on tape. I informed Pullach of Adviser's refusal to cooperate and sent them the tape I spliced together. Awaiting meeting in personal. Safo. No. 14. End".

On May 10, Pavlovsky received Safo at the Vienna rezidentura safe house in Baden. After settling comfortably in the soft armchairs, they discussed thoroughly all of Safo's actions related to the recruitment of Adviser. Their talk was recorded on a tape recorder so as to have the opportunity to make sense of all the material again.

Safo spoke for a long time, now and then interrupting his story to answer Pavlovsky's questions or take a sip of coffee.

"Right after our meeting, I got to work preparing Adviser's recruitment. In accordance with your recommendations, I began with working out a plan of three talks with Adviser over several days, drafted with the calculation to obtain answers from him which would be useful to use in our interests for the disinformation of the BND.

I do not want to re-tell them, especially because I bought you a recording of these talks. But I dare say I can assure you that everything was done as we wished".

"Even so," Pavlovsky interrupted him, "I would like to hear at least one or two examples from you in person so that without listening to the tapes, I could get some notion of your work now".

"In order to get the negative answer to the main question, that is, to the question of collaboration with Gehlen's intelligence, I decided for that we had to strike up a conversation about the period of fascism in Germany, the activity of the Gestapo and other such institutions of Hitler's Reich. That part of our talk looked as follows.

I told Adviser, 'As a result of defeat, Germany suffered heavily in both the mental and material sense. This is a fact. But it is a fact that the fascists were guided by good intentions, trying through conquering Lebensraum to improve the life of their people. Moreover, they did certain things for this even without

battling, for example, they eliminated unemployment, and built first-class autobahns'¹⁴.

At this point, Adviser interrupted me rather abruptly and said:

'Don't remind me of fascism. I served in the army and I know what fascism is. I hate it and will hate it my whole life. I am for a great Germany, for the union of Austria with Germany, but with a democratic Germany, as now'.

Later, during the course of the conversation, I asked Adviser:

'Tell me, if during the war years, you had been offered to collaborate with the Gestapo, how would you regard this?'

He looked at me somewhat surprised and answered firmly:

'Never, and not for any amount of money. To this day, I cannot reconcile myself to the thought that the husband of my sister served in the Gestapo. I broke off communication with my sister over that. I know that establishment. It will never come to anything good''.

"Well, alright, if that's how it is, then that's great," said Pavlovsky. "It seems you really found the

¹⁴ Highways.

correct approach to Adviser. Pressing on a weak place, forcing him to say what we need. And how did you splice this together on the tape you sent to Pullach?"

"It cost me a great deal of work. But perhaps I will tell it in order so as to fully answer your question? So, now, my third conversation with Adviser was the recruitment one. I had a direct conversation with Adviser about his collaboration with West Germany intelligence and obtain, as you already know, his consent. Our conversation was rather extensive, but it took place without excesses. I will not say that Adviser immediately gave his consent, but he did not particularly hesitate. It is just that before giving an answer, he wanted to know what he would get out of that collaboration. I emphasize this: not what he should do, but what he should get. The recruitment talk was also recorded by me on the tape recorder. Before splicing the tapes, I copied that tape on to another tape which, as I indicated, I have delivered to you. If you do not object, you can listen to that tape since that will help me answer the question about how the tape for Pullach was prepared".

After getting Pavlovsky's consent, Safo took out the tape from his briefcase and inserted it into the tape recorder. For four or five minutes they heard music, taped, apparently, from a radio ("for camouflage," Safo explained), then Safo's voice could be heard. The tape was clear, and the voices almost not distorted. Adviser entered the conversation. They talked for a while, exchanging news and opinions about insignificant

political events. After 10 or 15 minutes, the conversation got down to business.¹⁵

Safo: "Listen, Hans, we have worked together rather fruitfully, your information for the newspaper has received a quite high appreciation from my bosses. Thanks to you, and I, as the author of the articles, have begun to enjoy serious authority with my editor. Should not you think about broadening our collaboration and say, provide information for some other agency. That would enable you, aside from everything else, to significantly increase your income. I know you as a sympathizer of Germany, a democratic Germany, you could do this in order to do a lot to bring Germany closer to Austria and for the return of the great German nation".

Adviser: "You have rightly noted that I am a sympathizer of today's democratic Germany and an admirer of Chancellor Adenauer. Therefore, where possible, I strive to promote the rapprochement of Austria and Germany, but if there are some other opportunities for this, I would be glad to make use of them. With what other newspaper do you propose I collaborate, of course through you, and in what form? Up until now, you and I have written only about the economy of the East Bloc, but for the rapprochement of Austria and Germany, that is clearly not enough".

Safo: "It's not about another newspaper, my dear friend, but about a somewhat different agency which knows about the information received from you and is interested in new information. In order not to torment

¹⁵ The whole tape is provided in translation from the German.

you, I will say right off: would you agree to help the Bundesnachrichtendienst with something? No, no, not in work against Austria, but for Austria. No more will be demanded of you than to provide information about Austria's relations with the Eastern Bloc, and to report on the policy of the Soviets regarding Austria and Germany. That in fact could be the start of what would foster rapprochement between our countries".

Adviser: "Our countries! Does that mean you are from Gen. Gehlen? And that means that everything I have told you has been sent there! Oh, yes, quite a situation!"

Safo: "Now, what are you saying, no need for dramatizing. You yourself know that your information was used in the Rheinischer Merkur, and only what could not be used in this newspaper was sent to my bosses in Pullach. But understand me correctly. If you do not wish such collaboration, then you can consider that I have not offered you anything".

Adviser: "I am a little upset at this offer. Mainly because such an offer is coming from you, my supposedly selfless friend. At first you drew me into work at the newspaper, and became my creditor, and now you're offering me to become a spy".

Safo: "What are you saying! What do you mean, spy?! There can be no question of that. I appealed to you, as to a person in whose veins flows German blood, who is interested in the flourishing of a democratic Germany. I appealed to you as a German to a German, and not as a spy to a spy. And then you offended me, I would say,

insulted me, if I did not know you better; ask yourself what kind of creditor I am when you honestly earned your money. You do not owe anybody anything. And now I have offered you nothing more than a reliable and regular income. And by the way, not a small one..."

Adviser: "You have simply knocked me over. Your offer is like thunder out of the blue sky for me".

The conversation ended. There is was the sound of chairs moving and loud steps around the room. Commenting on this break in the conversation, Safo explained to Pavlovsky that Adviser had jumped up from his chair, then sunk in thought, had paced heavily around the room from corner to corner. He had a cigarette in his hand, which he would bring to his mouth now and then and greedily inhale the smoke. But then once again Safo's calm voice could be heard from the speaker:

"I had simply no idea that you would take my offer so sensitively. I thought you were stronger..."

Adviser: "A fine state of affairs! You are dragged God knows where, and you have to smile and be grateful. Is that it?"

Safo: "Listen, Hans, what changes in our relationship? We have long been connected, and practically everything remains the way it was. I simply wanted you to know everything, and therefore I did not want to hide from you the true state of affairs. I know that you have

begun to demonstrate your pro-German sentiments very widely, which should not have been done until the right time; who knows what turn fortune will take? Furthermore, I thought that a new offer, if, of course, you accept it, would substantially improve your material condition..."

Adviser (after a brief silence): "You're as clever as the devil, but sincere, I think. Apparently, I will have to agree with you. But still, give me a definite answer: if I say 'yes,' what will I get in exchange, what will my family get, what will guarantee my security?"

Safo: "Now this is already a man's conversation. I should have started with that. I always considered you to be a man of business, Hans. You will get a sum every month, equal to half of your compensation at the Foreign Ministry. That will give you the opportunity to be more attentive to the divine Anna-Louisa. As for security, if case it is necessary to move to the Federal Republic of Germany, as you yourself know, the permission of the Austrian authorities is not required. And there you will receive everything that is necessary for the life of a self-respecting person".

Adviser: "Well, then, so be it! But one request: I do not want anyone to meet with me except you. I trust you, and besides, I don't want anyone else to know about the nature of our new relations".

Safo: "That goes without saying, Hans...What do you think, shouldn't we celebrate this event with a shot of

Napoleon? I got it just yesterday, directly from Paris”.

Pavlovsky turned off the tape recorder. In recounting further about the course of the recruitment of Adviser, Safo reported on what assignments he had given Adviser and how he had instructed him about the line of his further behavior. As had been stipulated in the plan, Safo made an agreement to move the work with Adviser to clandestine forms, stipulating the means of communications, the emergency signals for a meeting, and the meeting places. So as not to be noticed by those around him and not hand Gehlen's intelligence a reason to suspect Safo of dishonesty, it was agreed with Adviser that before the outside world, they would stage a break-up which if necessary would be explained by the fact that Adviser had become jealous of his wife with Safo.

Adviser was given the assignment to obtain information about the policy of the Austrian government regarding the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and also the position of the Austrian government regarding the FRG and persons from government circles with pro-German sentiments. The formulation of such an assignment for Adviser was justified, since in no way did it contradict the interests which the BND could show and reinforced the legend of the recruitment of Adviser on behalf of the West German intelligence. Meanwhile, information on these issues was of interest to the Soviet Union as well, and besides, enabled the creation of conditions to transfer Adviser to direct collaboration with the USSR state security agencies, since his work was of use to us as well.

Thus, Adviser's recruitment under a false flag was accomplished.

Safo's further actions were aimed at distracting the attention of the West German intelligence from Adviser as a possible candidate for recruitment, by obtaining from Adviser documented and other political information, to create the conditions for transferring him to direct communication with Soviet foreign intelligence, which according to the Pavlovsky's plan, approved by the Center, was supposed to occur on the basis of materials compromising Adviser.

The first task of promoting the disinformation to the BND about Adviser's unsuitability for collaboration with the Bundesnachrichtendienst was completed during the recruitment activities.

Safo spliced together a tape of the "recruitment conversation" from several specially-prepared talks with Adviser which he had recorded on the tape recorder. This tape was sent to the BND along with a written report about Adviser's rejection of collaboration. Safo reported to Pavlovsky the following about this activity.

"I had to spend a lot of time on the editing, although only a few phrases had to be inserted into the conversation with Adviser from tapes of my previous talks with him, which characterized him as a person who hated West German ways and especially the BND. From one of the conversations I took, for example, these words from Adviser: "I myself know what fascism is. I hate it

and will hate it my whole life. I am for a union of Austria with Germany, but with a democratic Germany". From another tape, I cut out a piece on which was recorded Adviser's agitated voice, exclaiming, "Never, not for any money. I know that establishment. It will never come to anything good". Carefully gluing these pieces together into one tape, at the places relevant to the topic of the conversation, I created the full text of our conversation. To be sure, I had to speak my own words again, in order to emphasize Adviser's reaction even more. I spliced them into the tape.

When all the pieces of the tape were properly put together, I re-recorded the entire conversation on a new tape, which I then sent to Pullach, and a second copy I have brought to you. I destroyed the original of the spliced tape. It will become clearer how my conversation with Adviser turned out if you listen to this tape..."

Once again, the light of the tape recorder switched on: a social chat, an insignificant conversation about the international situation, and now Safo's voice could be heard:

"Listen, Hans, you and I have become friends, I think. Can I speak candidly? You could, by occupying a certain position in an institution determining foreign policy, bring quite a lot of benefit to Austria - your homeland. For this, you would only have to carefully watch your neighbor to the West, the Federal Republic of Germany. This state may be not only a reliable companion but a defender of Austria from the communist danger as well, and from the threat of being swallowed

up by the East bloc. No matter what you say, the bastion of the German nation is now in Bonn.

Of course, there are such Austrians who shout on every corner that fascism is returning to our country. But certain facts are not the common rule and they do not define the essence of our system. I hope that you are related to these blind people and you do not have to be persuaded”?

“I myself know what fascism is. I hate it and will hate it my whole life. I am for a union of Austria with Germany, but with a democratic Germany”.

“If you would have taken our side, you would have had the ability to meet many more demands of your wife, and besides, secure yourself a comfortable future. You would not have to borrow money. So as not to torment you, I will say outright: would you agree to help the Bundesnachrichtendienst with something? No, no, not in work against Austria, but for Austria...”

“Never, and not for any amount of cash. I know that establishment. Nothing good will come of it!”

After turning off the tape recorder, Safo continued:

“In my report to Pullach, I indicated that the recruitment of Adviser broke down because my agents and I had apparently perceived Adviser inaccurately as a supporter of Bonn, and aside from everything else, Adviser turned out to be quite sensitive by nature, a

too-refined person who apparently consider collaboration with any intelligence amoral and anti-social.

Further I indicated that I had strictly warned Adviser not to blab about our conversation and not try to take any measures against me, as any attempt by the Austrian police to arrest me or force me to leave Austria will be treated by me and West German intelligence as treachery by Adviser, which could lead to unpleasant consequences for him himself and his better half. I expressed confidence that Adviser was not among the bravest of men who would risk my exposure. Regarding the tape, I indicated that on my own initiative I had made a decision to record the conversation, hoping that in the event of Adviser's consent, the tape with his statements could be a reliable reinforcing factor. When the recruitment broke down, at first, I had intended to destroy it, but then nevertheless sent it to Pullach; perhaps it would come in handy. This explanation of my initiative apparently suited my bosses since no questions or remarks followed from them.

I sent the tape and the report to the BND by courier. I had hoped that I would be summoned to Munich, but instead of that, the messenger brought a written instruction from my boss to temporarily refrain from active work with the agents' network from the Foreign Ministry, to meet with them only in emergencies and maintaining the strictest secrecy. My boss' letter contained many reassuring words, since, as he put it, he did not want me to lose faith in my powers in connection with the failure of the recruitment of Adviser.

At the same time, he expressed thanks to me for the "well-run" recruitment of Paul, which had failed not long before that.

After listening to Safo's report, Pavlovsky pointed out several minor mistakes the agent had made which must be corrected in future work with Adviser. In particular, he noted, that Adviser must be advised during his briefing that in the interests of his personal security and the secrecy of his connection with Safo, he must not advertise his pro-German sentiments and not make them widely known among his acquaintance, but to the extent possible, to withdraw from participation in meetings and conversations with pro-German elements. This briefing, as Pavlovsky indicated, also had another positive aspect. It would guide Adviser's behavior if West German intelligence happened to check Safo's information reported to Pullach. They could then confirm that the opinion about Adviser's pro-German orientation was mistaken.

Pavlovsky recommended that Safo should agree with Adviser how he would create a legend for his friends and his wife for how he came to have extra cash.

Safo accepted these comments as necessary and assured Pavlovsky that at the very next meeting with Adviser he would try to correct the mistakes made.

Since there was still no answer to Pavlovsky's proposal of the means of transferring Adviser to direct communication with Soviet foreign intelligence (Pavlovsky was informed that in the near future, his

boss, Lt. Col. Popov, was going to come to Vienna especially to plan this activity), he decided to limit himself to giving Safo tasks on the Adviser file which would need to be performed even if Pavlovsky's proposal was rejected. Therefore, obliged Safo to try to get from secret information from Adviser, especially in document form, and to tape all their conversations at meetings on a tape recorder. For this, the agent was equipped with a portable sound recording device of foreign make which fit easily in the chest pocket of a light sports jacket and was fitted into a pack of Krone Filter cigarettes, which Safo usually smoked.

After once again setting the conditions for communication with Safo during the period between their meetings in person, Pavlovsky warmly bid farewell to him. Several minutes later, he left the safe house.

Two days later, Lt. Col. Popov came to Vienna from the Center. Together with Pavlovsky, he took up the development of the final part of the operation to transfer Adviser to collaboration with Soviet state security agencies. Three options were discussed:

1. Pavlovsky's option, proposed by him in his memorandum (see above). Taking into account Safo's desire to return to the Motherland, to allow him another three or four meetings with Adviser, and then transfer the agent to another operative or illegal who would work with him for three or five months in the name of the BND, and then would undertake the obligation to transfer him to direct connection with Soviet foreign intelligence.

The Center rejected this option. Lt. Col. Popov explained to Pavlovsky in that connection that the big negative of this option is that yet another Soviet intelligence officer would become known to Adviser besides Safo. In the event of the failure of the planned scheme to bring Adviser over to the side of the USSR state security agencies, we would immediately lose not one but two qualified illegals. There was also the concern that after agreeing to work with another person, Adviser would begin to trust even more that he was connected to the BND, and would be convinced finally of this, and then his transfer to direct collaboration with us would be dangerous.

A new circumstance also had to be taken into account, which had appeared after the recruitment talk with Adviser, in which he had asked Safo not to turn him over to another person. Thus, there was the danger that Adviser might refuse to work with a new person even if by that time he was sufficiently drawn into intelligence work and held by information compromising him.

In discussing this option, Lt. Col. Popov raised another question as well: "Adviser will not betray us, since he will know that we had in our hands materials that incriminate him. But the mental trauma that he will suffer from our actions could be so profound that it could push him to extreme measures. Thus, we must put the question directly and say, 'Everything that you have provided is in our hands. Either you work with us, or these materials will end up at the appropriate agencies of your country'. Threats, blackmail - are such things so necessary in this case? Let us say Adviser, under pressure from these materials, agrees to cooperate with us. But we could ask whether after such a maneuver he would give us exactly the materials we

need. After all, he will only be working due to fear. And such a person will not be capable of sending us serious political information or will resort to deception when he does not have such information, and due to fear, will start sticking us with chickenfeed. We have to reject that option, evidently”.

2. Several of the operatives at the Center who had something to do with this case proposed re-recruiting Adviser on behalf of Soviet intelligence with the use of materials received from him which supposedly fell into the hands of the state security organs of the Soviet Union. Lt. Col. Popov regarded this option negatively, but before rejecting it, he wanted to discuss it with Pavlovsky who had the most direct relationship to the Adviser file, which he had created with his own hands.

Pavlovsky also did not approve this option, since it was his belief that in doing so, it would be impossible to avoid exposing Safo, and in fact it was an exposure that would be unjustified and senseless. Such a measure, without securing him with us could meanwhile push him into his own independent communication with the BND bypassing Safo, and that would inevitably end with the failure of Safo and all his cultivation of Adviser - the time, efforts, and funds spent on work on the Adviser file - all of that would instantly go to pieces.

And finally, there were no chances that Adviser, who had linked his destiny with the BND and felt such a strong organization at his back, would embark on

collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence, which he had already once categorically rejected.

"So, both those options are out," Lt. Col. Popov stated. "That means we have to look for a new, more acceptable and more advisable options under these conditions".

"Perhaps we should work with Adviser for several more years, under the name of the BND, after putting him in touch with an illegal. There is no great danger in that," said Pavlovsky. "Since all the threads in our hands, we can always get out of any difficulties. Even if Adviser demands a meeting with the bosses from Pullach, we can plant our worker under the guise of these bosses either in Vienna or Munich".

"Everything you say is true," remarked Popov. "But after all, the main point in transferring Adviser to direct contact with us is not the operational but a somewhat different point. We are now receiving from Adviser certain information, interesting, but far from what we need. Because we are appearing to him as BND workers, we cannot put such questions to Adviser as, for example, what are the positions of the FRG regarding Austria and the Soviet Union. We cannot ask him, but who, in his opinion, in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in particular in his department, determines Austria's policy regarding the socialist states, and is working for the Germans and on their instruction. In short, we are not able to get from him what we need especially, as long as we work with him under the name of the BND. We cannot get by without transferring

Adviser to direct contact. And therefore, let us together look for something new".

Pavlovsky, agreeing with Popov's reasons, expressed certain ideas about how to conduct an operation, with the immediate caveat that his thoughts were not sufficiently worked out and the main hindrance to taking a final decision is the opinion of Safo on this matter.

This option, according to Pavlovsky, was related to keeping Safo abroad at least for another year or year and a half, to which Safo may not agree, since recently he has been living and working obsessed with only one thought: to get home as soon as possible.

Pavlovsky's plan, which he outlined to Popov, consisted of the following: since Safo had rather close, even friendly relations with Adviser and enjoyed his trust, then no one better than Safo could prepare Adviser within a few months or a year to transfer him to direct connection to Soviet foreign intelligence. This preparation must not only consist of getting from him sufficient information but in gradually opening Adviser's eyes to the real state of affairs in West Germany, shake his faith in "democratic ways" of this country as the hope for Western democracy and thus in the end lead his thoughts to the inadvisability of continuing to collaborate with the BND and the need to actively fight for the independence and neutrality of Austria against the Anschluss policy conducted by the militarists of Western Germany.

This work, in Pavlovsky's opinion, must be conducted in such a way that Safo constantly orients Adviser toward a break with the BND and to collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence. Pavlovsky believed that such a path would avoid the possible consequences referenced in analyzing the first option.

"This thought," said Pavlovsky, "came to me after a thorough analysis of Safo's conversations with Adviser, especially those recorded on tape. It turned out that Safo, in the course of work with Adviser, sometimes diverged from the role of a BND officer and rather harshly commented on the ways of Western Germany. If Safo in the future would develop Adviser in the sense of which I have spoken, then for Adviser himself, there will not be any surprises. He may perceive this as a reflection of Safo's views which had been expressed previously in a somewhat restrained and perhaps veiled form.

After a thorough discussion of Pavlovsky's proposal, Popov supported it, but added that the final talk with Adviser be held by an operative in Safo's presence, who could continue the cultivation of Adviser during the recruitment talk and support the operative or smooth over the situation, if the need arose.

Since Safo could make objections to us with such an option involving a change of the initial plan and delay of his return to the USSR, it was decided that the next meeting with Safo would be conducted by Lt. Col. Popov together with Pavlovsky.

After discussing all the options for a possible transfer of Adviser to direct contact with Soviet state security organs, Pavlovsky and Popov began to familiarize themselves with the latest materials from Safo via the dead drop, and with the encrypted messages sent during his work with Adviser.

Safo sent the tape with the recordings of his conversations with Adviser on the questions which were set to him during the recruitment conversation. As was clear from this material, Adviser understood his assignment and already by the first meetings after recruitment passed on information about the officers of the Austrian Foreign Ministry who sympathized with the FRG, and several other ministers with detailed assessments of them and also on officials of the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department which, in his opinion, could provide assistance to West German intelligence.

Safo's cryptogram reported that work with Adviser was coming along nicely, that he instructed Adviser in light of Pavlovsky's instructions and Adviser accepted these recommendations as a necessity. At the end of his report Safo indicated that Adviser once again at both meetings raised the issue of not having Safo introduce him to some other BND officer. "I view you not only as an intelligence officer with whom I am related by business but as my friend, a person I like, and therefore it will be easy to work with you, especially for the first while," Adviser stated.

Safo's information once again convinced Popov and Pavlovsky of the correctness of the option that had

chosen to pull off the trick in Adviser's case - the transfer of him to direct contact with Soviet foreign intelligence. Moreover, in the same letter, there was something that gave the operatives the opportunity to convince Safo of the necessity of postponing his return to the Motherland until the work begun was completed.

A meeting with Safo took place on June 15 at the same safe house as the last time. Safo's report was short, since he had already managed to send us the main materials through non-contact channels of communication. The only addition to the material already known to us was apparently that Adviser, performing a task from Safo, had the relevant conversation with his wife, in the process of which he let her know that Safo would no longer be coming to their house.

Adviser also took the first steps toward reducing his meetings with his colleagues sympathizing with West Germany and not expressing his political views to them, without breaking ties with them.

After Safo's report, Col. Popov proposed selecting and discussing the most acceptable option of the plan to complete work on the Adviser file, having invited Safo to take an active part in this discussion. He asked Safo to express his opinion on the two options which Popov and Pavlovsky had rejected. Skillfully posing the questions which emerged, Popov and Pavlovsky led Safo to the conclusion of the unsuitability of the first two options. In fact, in discussing these options, Safo himself expressed a number of reasons for not

implementing them, which coincided with the opinion of the operatives.

Safo spoke against the options proposed. Popov posed the question to him: "So where can we find a way out?"

Safo proposed giving Adviser the task of trying to get an appointment to work at the Austrian Embassy in Moscow. After Adviser left for Moscow, to continue to work in the USSR in the name of the BND through him (Safo). However, in discussing this option, it turned out that Adviser's trip to Moscow could not be expected sooner than a year or two, since Austrian diplomats occupying the positions in the Moscow Embassy at Adviser's level were in Moscow for a half year to a year and a half. In that case, the completion of the action on the case would have to be put off for a long while. Moreover, as Popov said, making contact, and then meeting Adviser in Moscow in the name of the BND would be significantly harder since he could fairly easily check if among the diplomatic and trade representatives and also among the foreign journalists there was a person who would pass himself off as a BND officer. If Adviser found out that he was being led around by the nose, then the whole action would fail. "Finally," said Popov, "in Moscow it will be impossible to work with Adviser through Safo, since in that case, the news of Safo's presence in the Soviet Union could leak to the West, and our legend of the disappearance of Safo will suffer a total fiasco".

"But what if we were to assign you to finish this case to the end?" asked Pavlovsky, turning to Safo. "And

complete it here. But for that, you would have to stay abroad somewhat longer than supposed. Listen to this”.

And Pavlovsky laid out to Safo in general terms the option that our operatives had settled on.

After listening to the reasons of Popov and Pavlovsky, Safo agreed that out of all the options reviewed, the last one seemed the best. He also understood that he would have to put off a year his dream of a rapid return to the Motherland. The operatives did not hurry his answer, although they were prepared to employ all their ability to convince Safo of the necessity of such a step on his part. But this was not required.

Safo, always honest with himself, understood that he did not have the right to leave an interesting and necessary case half-finished. Later, after he had already returned to the Motherland, recalling this meeting, he said:

“At first, I really didn’t want to delay my return home. I was ready for the unexpected, but not to that, no. To find the correct decision and give my consent to continuing work with Adviser under the new plan, I was helped not so much by my personal character traits as by my awareness of the need to take this case, very interesting and necessary for us, to conclusion. Moreover, even before that I myself rejected the three options including the one proposed by me. I couldn’t reject the fourth, the one which in my heart I had accepted”.

After obtaining Safo's consent to continue work with Adviser, Popov and Pavlovsky discussed with him in detail the tactical line of work in disarming Adviser as an advocate of the FRG. This line was developed with consideration that Safo appeared to Adviser as an objective journalist and a man of common sense who, while remaining a patriot of Germany, did not close his eyes to the FRG's shortcomings both in the economy and in politics. Now Safo had to gradually increase his critical sentiments in talks with Adviser, putting more and more influence in the direction of compromising in his eyes the existing political regime in the FRG. Taking into account Adviser's hatred of fascism, he intended to base his cultivation on facts related to the fascisization of the politics and economics of Western Germany, with a rebirth there of fascism and militarism.

Operating according to the plan developed, in talks with Adviser, Safo gradually heightened the critical overtones against the FRG, first doubting the correctness of the actions of certain state figures of West Germany on trivial issues, then refuting the economic indications of FRG's development, the so-called "economic miracle," then moving to criticism of more general foreign policy and economic questions.

Thus, in one talk, Safo mentioned the topic of a fascist criminal who had burrowed into the West German government staff.

The basis for such a conversation was the scandalous story of Teodor Oberlender the former federal minister for refugee affairs, about whom a lot was being written

at that time in the world press and which as a result of exposure of his criminal activity during World War II, was forced to "retire".

Developing this theme, Safo said that he could not approve the fact that the FRG government was resorting to the services of military criminals and former bureaucrats from Hitler's government staff, that this would deal an irreparable damage to the German people and Germany, and make Germany a target for political accusations on the part of both socialist countries as well as all democratic powers of the West. As if in confirmation of his thought, Safo cited the names of Gen. Hans Speidel and Gen. Adolf Bruno Heinrich Ernst Heusinger, the state secretary Hans Globke; the chairman of the federal court/vice president Burkhard Jähnke, on whose consciences lay thousands of lives ruined in vain. Safo spoke about all this with great regret, as a patriot, interested that the cursed stain be finally washed away from the German people.

At another meeting, developing this same theme, Safo spoke heatedly about the so-called "Notstandsgesetze",

the law on declaration of a state of emergency¹⁶, as the onset of a major attack on the democratic rights of the German people, as a law which in the hands of irresponsible West German political and military opportunists served as a weapon to re-establish the regime of a dictatorship of a bunch of monopolists and revanchists.

Another time, Safo launched a speech about the dominance of American capital in the West German economy, about the outrages of the American military in the FRG, and sharply condemned the government of West

¹⁶ "Notstandsgesetze" ("emergency laws") is a series of draft emergency laws (about 10) prepared by the government of West Germany in place of the existing law supposedly in case of defense. The content of all the drafts remains strictly secret for now. But according to available information, the existing state institutions are to be replaced by essentially dictatorial ones. For example, under the guise of a state of emergency, a change of the constitution in effect is envisioned and transfer of the functions of the whole Bundestag (parliament) of the FRG to 22 deputies. This ersatz-parliament will be granted legislative powers, will declare a state of emergency in the country at its discretion which will lead to the imposition of a fascist dictatorship. Other such draft laws mentioned are "on civil defense," "on self-defense," "on construction of shelters," "on the imposition of a labor draft," "on the mobilization of means of transportation," "on the rights of the press" and others under which the government will have the right to abolish the democratic rights of labor unions and other civic organizations, including the right to strike and so on.

Emergency laws are the weapon of reactionary monopolist, revanchist, and militarist powers to prepare the FRG for a new war; they aggravate the situation inside Germany, in Europe and also threaten the cause of peace throughout the world.

In a statement from the government of the GDR dated May 1965, these draft laws were characterized a "new edition of Hitler's law on emergency powers," as "the nucleus of preparation conducted in West Germany for war".

Germany for allowing the Americans to stay in West Germany endlessly long and essentially had surrendered it to the rule of the occupiers. Safo stated vehemently that the FRG government had no independence in ruling the state, since it had subordinated its policy to Washington. Of course, all of this was nothing new for Adviser, but it forced him to dwell on these points, to pay attention precisely to the dark sides of the situation in Western Germany.

Adviser, listening closely to Safo, sometimes to his surprise remarked that his statements were reminiscent of the newspapers of Germany's Eastern zone.¹⁷ He told him that. To which Safo inevitably replied: "I am talking to you as a friend and as an intelligence officer, who knows what's what, and not as a reader of Eastern newspapers in which, by the way only the economic information interests me and nothing else. It is not my fault, however, that these newspapers sometimes say correct things".

And that is how it was at almost every meeting. These conversations, evidently, were not in vain. It cannot be said that Adviser was broken and took up a different point of view, but he began to listen to Safo more attentively, to object less, and even to put in his own remarks, arguing with him on different issues. And at one meeting, when Safo once again cranked up a speech about the return of fascism to West Germany, about the expansionist speeches of Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss and Transportation Minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm, Adviser frankly asked him a question: "If it's

¹⁷ This is how the German Democratic Republic is called in the West Germany reactionary press and in the capitalist states of Europe.

the way you say it is, then for whom are we working? Why am I striving? After all, I went to help the democrats, but it turns out I'm helping the fascists".

In order to retain Adviser and not push him away from himself, Safo replied, "For now we are serving the Germany which you and I would like to see".

This conversation with Adviser was evidently a culmination: from the nature of the question posed by Adviser, it was obvious that he had started to have doubts.

Therefore, at the next meeting with Safo which Pavlovsky conducted, it was decided to proceed to the final development of Adviser, to the stage where Adviser would be led to the thought of the need to break with West German intelligence. Safo performed this assignment. He had several brief meetings with Adviser saying he did not have time. At these meetings, he behaved with restraint, was sober and thoughtful and absently answered Adviser's questions. Once he scheduled a meeting with Adviser at his apartment. Here over cognac, he "let down his hair," complained to Adviser about his fate, on the collapse of his ideals, that his work during the war in the Abwehr, and then in the BND had made him an unhappy person.

The weariness, the despondence sounding Safo's voice made a big impression on Adviser. He himself did not notice how he succumbed to Safo's mood. Or perhaps the glasses of cognac produced their effect?

Safo, continuing his outpourings, kept a sharp eye on Adviser, watching his mood, ready at any minute either to pour fat on the fire of disappointment or to extinguish it in time.

Noting that Adviser was succumbing more and more to pessimistic moods, Safo continue to work on him.

As if in a burst of candor, he began to complain about how he was being passed over for promotions and awards, for a long time he had not received a raise, and he began to thoroughly curse his bosses from Pullach who didn't appreciate his work. "You're a friend," he appealed to Adviser. "Tell me what to do, where should I go. Germany, my Germany, to which I gave the best years of my life, is once again collapsing, everything is turning to the old way. Day and night, soldiers are marched around the platz, drilled until they faint. West Germany is becoming a big barracks. They are prepared to drop the atom bomb on people, they want to seize Austria again and make it its appendix. There are fascists everywhere, up, and down. I am tired, my dear Hans. Something must be done".

Adviser was silent. He sat in an armchair, his head hung low, and rubbed his temples. Finally, he sat up, stretched himself, and straightened his numb limbs and with difficult said, "I can hardly advise you about anything now. I think you and I have overdone it a little and drank one shot too many. I have not understood everything from your story and have not figured everything out. Furthermore, my head hurts like hell. Let us head for home today and finish this conversation with clear heads".

Safo did not try to detain Adviser and walked outside with him. After putting Adviser in a taxi, Safo returned home, but went out half an hour later, got into his car, and drove outside the city to the home of a woman he knew. This time, he did not want to spend the night at home, to avoid any possible unpleasantness.

Although Safo was certain that even after such a candid talk, Adviser would not go anywhere to inform on him, because in that case, he would only hurt himself, even so, some security measures had to be taken. Especially because Pavlovsky, with whom Safo had planned the staged "revelation," as they called it, had strictly warned Safo that he should not stay at his apartment until the circumstances could be clarified.

The next day, convinced that everything was quiet at his place of residence, Safo called Adviser and over the telephone asked him to forget about last night's conversation. At the same time, he agreed to meet Adviser in the evening at the Café Sacher Wien in the center of Vienna.

It should be noted that this time, Adviser agreed to meet with Safo with any particular enthusiasm. Apparently Safo's outbursts had left an unpleasant residue. Even so, after Safo's persistent request, he agreed to a meeting, saying he could not spend long with him.

At the meeting, Adviser at first behaved hesitantly, trying to get by with silence and only after Safo once again asked him not to recall the previous night and forget his chatter. Adviser became a little more talkative. He expressed surprise at Safo's behavior, saying that he could never have thought he would hear such statements from him. Saying he did not remember everything from the night before, asked Adviser to tell him the details. Of course, Safo did not need to "remember," since he remembered everything perfectly, but he had to determine what precisely had made such a depressive impression on Adviser, so this gave him a chance to construct the further conversation correctly. It turned out that what had affected Adviser was not Safo's actual statements, which he had been familiar with before in one form or another, but the completely different posing of the question and the very tone in which Safo pronounced phrases to which Adviser was on the whole accustomed, a tone of regret, impatience, pessimism and even hatred.

Adviser said later that after last night's conversation he wanted to stop meeting Safo, but now he was hesitant, since he saw that personal troubles related to his work and relationship with his bosses had influenced Safo. Adviser said that he understood Safo well, as a person, although he had not thought that personal hardships could erupt in such a form as they had last night.

Responding to these completely sincere words from Adviser, Safo noted that he had no troubles but, in his life, something really had happened which had knocked him out of his normal groove. "But now," said Safo, "I have calmed down. Yesterday there was an outburst after

a certain meeting, but today everything is back in place. If you do not object, we could meet in a little while and I could tell you everything”.

Adviser did not object to Safo's suggestion, although he wanted to find out what the point was immediately. From Adviser's behavior at the end of the meeting it was obvious that the talk with Safo had had a calming effect on him, there was no more restraint in his talk with Safo, as before, which had appeared at the start of their meeting at the Sacher.

In order to further calm Adviser and not provoke any unnecessary suspicions from him, before parting, Safo gave him an assignment to obtain additional information about the activity of the persons who sympathized with the FRG.

A week later, Adviser and Safo met in a small restaurant outside of town. Adviser was relaxed, joking a lot, and laughing, and in a word, behaving as if nothing had happened between them. He briefed Safo on a number of issues of activity at the Foreign Ministry and even handed to him several office documents for him to review.

When the business part of their conversation had ended, a relaxed conversation began during which Adviser wondered what had so infuriated him and pushed him into the deep end of pessimism. Safo had prepared such a question in advance, and told Adviser that recently he had been at a reception at the Finnish Embassy in Vienna where he had an opportunity to become acquainted

with a Soviet journalist and talk with him in detail about economic and political issues.

“When the conversation touched upon the FRG’s foreign policy,” Safo recounted, “the Russian remarked that in that sense the West Germany government assigns a serious role to the Bundesnachrichtendienst, and as proof he showed me the book Die Grau Hand¹⁸ published in the Eastern Zone of Germany. I asked for this book, and the Russian gladly gave it to me. The saddest thing in that book is that everything written in it is the purest truth. It was that book that so upset me, reminding me of what I had tried to forget, and led me to such a depressed state”.¹⁹

Safo took the book out of his briefcase and handed it to Adviser, advising him to definitely read it, and then they would meet and once again speak on this topic.

Thus, gradually, from meeting to meeting, the ideological work-over of Adviser was conducted. Almost a year was needed for our operatives and Safo to bring Adviser to that invisible line, when Adviser crossed it, he would be en route to collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence.

¹⁸ The Grey Hand was a book written by Julius Mader, exposing the activity of West German intelligence. It was published in the GDR in 1962. It was translated and published in the Russian language.

¹⁹ Julius Mader was a covert collaborator with the Stasi who published first an expose of the CIA, naming its agents, then The Grey Hand, described by historian Michael J. Neufeld as “an attack on the West German intelligence service as a nest of former Nazis (which in fact many were)”. See <https://repository.si.edu/bitstream/handle/10088/29800/SmashTheMyth.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y> -The Interpreter.

..The work began to conclude the operational maneuver. A plan to extract Safo to the Soviet Union was prepared in advance. The plan called for Safo, after completing the recruitment measures for Adviser, to leave for Prague with the passport of a British citizen and from there to the Soviet Union.

This was necessary to do because in the event of Adviser's betrayal, Safo would be the first to be in danger and could be arrested by the Austrian political police. Although our operatives were also sure that Adviser, given our possession of materials seriously compromising him, would not betray him, but such caution was warranted.

In order to create a legend for Safo's disappearance for the sake of West German intelligence and his work colleagues at the newspaper, it was planned for him to go abroad. This legend, which was decided after long and detailed discussions, worked as follows.

Safo would stage a break with the Bundesnachrichtendienst and leave Europe and go overseas. He would inform his bosses at Pullach of this in a letter, sending it to the safe address known to Safo from Gehlen's intelligence agency in Munich. In this letter, Safo would indicate that the many years of service in West German intelligence had ruined his health and not given him anything in return, he was left without a family, and felt a mental dissatisfaction; that he urge had grown in him to finally organize his personal life far from the hustle and bustle and to work on his writing. Further Safo

wrote that he would never tell anyone about his ties to Gehlen's service and about those assignment he had done for it, that he remained honest before his bosses and assured them that all the secrets he knew would die with him.

At the same time, Safo prepared a brief letter to the editor of the newspaper Weiner Tageszeitung in which he warned the editor he was breaking his contract with the newspaper and ending his journalistic activity.

Safo's letter was sent in advance to the rezidentura of Soviet foreign intelligence in Ottawa, which would send the letter by ordinary mail from Toronto at the Center's signal.

In order to strengthen this legend, it was ensured that after buying a ticket for a flight from Vienna to Montreal, Safo would have a meeting with agent Geshke, who was trusted at the BND, and during the conversation, he would seemingly by accident show him this ticket. If Geshke showed interested in this, Safo would say that on assignment from his boss, he would be going away for two weeks overseas. So as not to provoke Geshke's suspicions, he would schedule the next meeting with him in Vienna after returning from the supposed trip.

Meanwhile, it was planned to send Safo's double with his passport and the ticket purchased, so that he left a "trail" at border checkpoints in the cities of Vienna and Montreal. From Montreal, the double must leave for

Toronto, stay the night in a hotel, and then using other documents, leave Canada.

Thus, if West German intelligence began searching for Safo, it would record his flight from Vienna to Canada, his stay in a Toronto hotel, would get the relevant information from Geshke and from the editorial board of Weiner Tageszeitung. For greater authenticity, the double selected was approximately the same age as Safo and the same complexion.

During the period between meetings with Adviser, all the measures were prepared for creating the legend of Safo's trip overseas. The number of his flight and the date of his flight from Vienna were reported to the USSR KGB rezidentura in Ottawa, and it was proposed to send Safo's letter the next day after the arrival of his flight to Canada, and receipt of signal on a prearranged route to Toronto permitting the operation.

The meeting with Adviser took place March 27, 1962 at a safe hour of our rezidentura in Vienna, where Safo brought Adviser from his meeting place in the city.

Lt. Col. Popov was waiting for them in the apartment, and cordially greeted Adviser and Safo and suggested they be seated in soft, comfortable armchairs around a small table.

At the start of the conversation, Popov asked how Adviser was feeling, about the health of his wife and child, and his work affairs. Popov, who had spent a

long time at illegal work in Bavaria, spoke German flawlessly, sometimes deliberately inserting into his speech sayings characteristic of Bavarian commoners. Therefore, Adviser at first could not understand with whom he was dealing.

When the social part of the conversation could be considered exhausted by the rules of etiquette, Lt. Col. Popov said:

"Mr. Safo has told us a lot about you, about your sentiments and views. He said ever since you began to meet with him, your views underwent significant changes, that you began to think more about a neutral Austria, about the strength of the neutralist spirit and become more and more persuaded that West Germany can bring only occupation of the Austrian people, and not prosperity..."

"Yes, Mr. Safo has correctly noticed certain changes in my sentiments and views," Adviser interrupted Popov. "But before continuing the conversation, I would like to say that Mr. Safo has himself changed significantly in the last year. Furthermore, will it be possible for me to learn with whom I have the honor of speaking, since the start of the conversation seemed somewhat unusual and even strange".

"Hasn't Mr. Safo told you what has happened to him recently? No? How can that be, Mr. Safo; after all, you and I had agreed about this..."

"You see, Hans," Safo began. "I wanted to do this a long time ago, but I didn't find a reason to explain myself. I once tried to do this, but it seemed to me that you didn't understand everything... The fact is, dear Hans, that I, as you know, even before was critically minded toward the FRG, to its politicians and government figures. But even so, for a long time I lived with the illusion that this would change for the best, that inside West Germany, forces would be found that would lead it along the path to democracy, and therefore I tried to honestly serve the interests of my people, collaborating with German intelligence.

I was certain, just like many Germans defeated by the Russia, that the threat to the German people in fact comes from there, and thus for many years considered it my sacred duty to work against them. This conviction was reinforced by the fact that while living in the East, I saw only enemies surrounding me and I was certain that the Russians remain now the same enemies of the Germans as they had during the war.

But the years went by. I became not only an intelligence officer, but a journalist as well, and by the nature of my work, I would often encounter my fellow Russian scribes now at receptions, now at press conferences, or at parties. The meeting about which I told you was the last of such meetings but not the first and certainly not the only one. The Russians turned out to be not such bad guys as they had been described to me earlier.

Their arguments did not always seem correct to me. But unlike other colleagues of mine, I tried to validate

the claims of the Russians through experience, and not reject them out of hand as propagandistic. And here life compelled me to be convinced of the Russians' correctness, who regarded the German people with respect and fascism with hatred, and to change my opinion about what was going on in my country".

Adviser listened to Safo attentively, trying to grasp the main point of his "confession". His face was concentrated, the veins on his temples stood out from tension. Perhaps he wanted to hide his agitation in expectation of the unforeseen, but his entire posture gave evidence that he was impatiently awaiting the main point.

"I won't repeat for you everything I have already said many times," Safo continued. "But I must only say that as an intelligence officer and a journalist, it was easier for me than anyone else to discern the sores eating away at West Germany, the unhealed sores infecting more and more new parts of the organism. This is fascism, this is preparation for new slaughter, nationalism, calls for revanche, open appearances of militarist and neofascist unions, this is the systematic stupefaction of the people. And along with this is the persecution of anti-fascists, democrats, just people who do not want war.

"Look at how the rulers of the FRG are disparaging the scientists who are speaking out against atomic war, how

Pastor Niemöller²⁰ is persecuted for his protests against the policy of war. And this is at every step, in every city, and in every village community.

Dear Hans, I am ashamed that we Germans have not learned anything. And finally, I came to the conclusion that I must break with Gen. Gehlen, and end forever the aid to the internal enemies of my homeland - the fascists. Thus, my first step was made. The second step I made when I understood the necessity of not simply calm observation of what surrounds me but an active struggle for a really democratic Germany, against the revanchists against all those Strausses, Lemmers, Seebohms, Heusinges, Trettners, Globkes and their ilk who have seized power in my country with the help of the Americans²¹. The second step brought me here, to him..."

²⁰ Martin Niemöller, West German civic figure, pastor, and former president of the Evangelical Church of Hessen and Nassau land (FRG) [old-Prussian Union Protestant Church], active propagandist of the idea of peace, against the arms race and preparation of war. Boldly criticized the Bonn government for the effort to arm the Bundeswehr at any price with atomic weaponry; advocated the prohibition of atomic weapons and an end to testing of all forms of weapons of mass destruction, against the placement in Western Germany of atomic bases. In this connection, since 1959, a malicious campaign and persecution against Martin Niemöller were launched in both Western Germany and the countries of NATO. Former FRG Defense Minister Straus in 1959 even opened up a criminal case against Niemöller for "insult of the Bundeswehr". During World War I, Niemöller was a naval officer, and during the period of fascism in Germany a member of the resistance movement, an anti-fascist, who spent 8 years in a concentration camp.

²¹ The references are to Franz Josef Strauss, West German defense minister; Ernst Lemmer, a Christian Democratic Union politician who served as Federal Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, then Minister for Pan-German Affairs; and then Minister for Displaced Persons, Refugees and War-Affected Persons; Transportation Minister Hans-Christoph Seebohm; Gen. Adolf Bruno Heinrich Ernst Heusinge, whose career spanned the German Empire, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany and West Germany; Gen. Heinrich Trettner, Inspector General of the Bundeswehr; and Hans Globke, State Secretary. -The Interpreter.

"To the Russians!?" said Adviser, infuriated. "And you, you want me to follow you? After you already brought me to work on the other side. That is beyond my powers!"

"Mr. Adviser," Popov intervened. "Don't get angry. You can always leave. That is in your power. But I assure you that what you have heard and have yet to hear may be available only once in life and may be very useful for you. It is a question not of Russians or Germans but the threat of fascism and a new destructive war for all peoples, including for the Austrian. In the final analysis, it is a question of Austria's real and false friends. Do not make hasty conclusions, please. Let us hear what Mr. Safo still has to tell us".

Continuing his tale further, Safo described how, in the search for allies in the struggle for a democratic Germany, he had come to the Russians, in whom he had seen people really concerned about the fates of Europe and the German people, including their security and welfare. Safo said that he had come to the Russians not in order to serve them, but to fight along with them against militarism and fascism which had reemerged in the Western part of Germany. He said that he (Adviser), as an honest ally, had already made a contribution in this sacred cause and decided for the rest of his future life to do everything to help everyone who was fighting against death, for life and people's happiness.

Safo spoke passionately, sometimes breaking into emotion, but so sincerely and with such conviction in the correctness of his choice that Adviser, despite the agitation he had earlier experienced listened to him

with no less attention than at the beginning of the conversation. But when he heard mention by Safo of the "contribution" he (Adviser) had made, he asked with barely restrained agitation:

"What contribution of mine are you talking about?"

"I told the Russians everything I knew about the intentions of Gehlen's intelligence service against them and against Austria. I told them about the agents who were connected to me and worked in Austria's government agencies; I turned over to them all the materials of these agents, copies of which he had always kept in my apartment in a hidden safe".

"And about me, too?"

"Mr. Safo," Popov once again intervened, "never spoke of you as an agent. He always called you his friend who wanted sincerely to help. And it seems he was successful in this. Wouldn't you say, Mr. Safo?"

"Yes. The gentlemen from Pullach had long pressured me with a demand to recruit you, Hans, and bring you to collaboration by any means. I could not help but fulfill this demand, but at the same time I did not want to endanger you and push you into a place where I no longer had any desire. I even faked our conversation in which you supposedly promised to help Pullach. To be honest, I did not think that you would do that. But you did this mainly because you were in a very constrained material situation. But I knew your pride and realized

that you would not systematically take money from me if I did not offer you a job. In order to prevent you from harm and also extract myself from the situation, I went as far as reporting to my bosses of your refusal to collaborate with FRG intelligence. Perhaps I more saved myself with that step that you, since by that time I understood that soon or later I will quit this job which I have done for nearly 20 years.

I did not want some to come after me some Philistine in an SS uniform and cripple you. And then later...? Later I came here and told them about everything and about you, too. The Russians understood my step, they supported me, they helped me with advice and asked me to explain to you the essence of your misconceptions, to show you the true face of West German democracy, where the democrats, no matter how they are called - Christians or Socialists - are speaking as one with the raised head of fascism. To the extent of my powers I tried to do this, because the request of the Russians coincided completely with my wishes”.

“Mr. Adviser could listen to the tape of his conversation with Mr. Safo, which was sent to Pullach, as proof that Mr. Adviser rejected the Bund’s offer,” said Popov.

They turned on the microphone.

Listening to the conversation with Safo which was his and yet not his, Adviser bowed his head low over the table, clutched his head in his hands, and it seemed did not think about anything. What transpired in his

soul at that moment is hard to say, but there was no doubt that it was hard for him. When the tape recorder fell silent, Adviser, not changing his pose, asked, "More, tell me more. Now I no longer care. You can't get away from what is".

"What came next," Popov began instead of Safo, "was this...".

"No, let Safo tell it".

"Next, I met with you," Safo continued. "And got information from you, but I did not send it to Pullach in your name, because you didn't exist for Gehlen. I included it in the reports of other agents and passed it off as news obtained from acquaintances and random contacts. I did this, in order to maintain the appearance of work, so as not to prematurely give away my views, and the main thing, my intentions. Otherwise, I would be threatened with more troubles. After all, reprisals at the BND are swift. Later, when I met with the Russians, I began to transmit your information to them, so that your work did not go in vain. Moreover, it had already brought and will bring quite a bit of use to Austria, and the other countries of Europe. But if you join our ranks, the ranks of those against fascism, those who want peace and happiness for their families, friends, and their people, then you can bring even greater use to our common cause".

"So that means I am now in your hands," said Adviser, heavily raising his head. "Mr. Safo brought me from one place and took me to another. I want to believe that

Safo acted sincerely, wishing me well. But even so, he should have asked my opinion before telling about me, sending my reports and recordings of conversations with me to Mister Colonel. And now I am tied hand and foot, and even if I did not want to collaborate, apparently I will have to...".

Lt. Col. Popov intervened in the conversation. He stated that the Soviet Union quite positively evaluated the information that it had received from Adviser through Safo and hoped that Adviser would make a decision to provide further help to the Soviet agencies in their mutual interests.

"We," said Popov, "do not want to force you to cooperate with us. Our wish is that you yourself make this decision, since only under such a condition is fruitful collaboration possible. The circumstances are such that certain materials of yours are in our hands, but we do not have the intentions to pressure you with these materials and force you to join work. We believe that your views have undergone sufficient changes so that you yourself correctly appreciate what is going on in the modern world, and consciously choose for yourself a place in the struggle of peoples against the new military danger. We would like you to join our ranks."

Adviser objected to Popov's statement, saying that he had once been recruited by Soviet intelligence and that he had then rejected collaboration for the motives which were known to Mr. Popov. In that connection, Popov explained to Adviser that at the present time, he was not holding a conversation about recruitment and

did not intend to put Adviser in the position of his agent, but viewed him as a possible ally in the struggle against fascism. Moreover, during the period when the first conversation had been held with Adviser, he had different positions and did not see everything that was being done in the FRG which he considered a model of democracy. Now it was another matter: Adviser had figured out many issues, his views had changed significantly, if not radically, which gave a basis for the Soviet agencies to make a proposal to Adviser about collaboration.

The recruitment conversation with Adviser lasted about five hours. Adviser would at first calm down and discuss the questions of collaboration with us, then once again return to questions already covered, clarifying certain details of Safo's story and Popov's explanations, trying, as he said to be completely aware of his new position and the role which would be assigned to him in further work with Soviet intelligence. Although neither Popov nor Safo in the conversation with Adviser deliberately mentioned collaboration with the state security agencies, so as not to excessively traumatize Adviser, he himself, it seemed, did not doubt for a minute with whom he was dealing and was the first to mention Soviet intelligence. There was no necessity of dissuading Adviser of this since his awareness of the connection to the state security agencies of the Soviet Union bound him even stronger to us.

In conclusion of the recruitment conversation with Adviser, when consent was obtained from him for collaboration and the basic lines of work were negotiated, Popov agreed on the next meeting with him,

without giving him any intelligence assignments for now. A meeting with us was scheduled for three days later.

On the next day after the conversation with Adviser, Safo successfully departed for Czechoslovakia, and from there to Moscow. He had not spent the night in his apartment, and two days earlier had warned his landlady of his trip, settling up with her and taking necessities of which, in fact, there were not that many.

A surveillance put on Safo's former apartment through the efforts of our rezidentura indicated that the Austrian police had not taken any measures to check Safo. This proved that Adviser had not told anyone about our talk with him. In that connection, Safo's double was given the signal permitting him to perform his assignment.

A day later, Popov and Pavlovsky received a report that Safo had safely returned to the Motherland and that his letters had been sent from Toronto to their addressees.

Everything was done in accordance with the devised plan.

Ahead was work with Adviser, a psychologically broken person, who had consented to collaboration with Soviet foreign intelligence apparently more under pressure of circumstances and evidence than for personal

conviction. The future would indicate how decisive was the "yes" said to Popov by Adviser.

Adviser did not come to the next meeting. He did not come the next day (to the back-up meeting) as had been stipulated by the terms of communication with him. The case, begun and nearly completed with such difficulty once again wound up in a difficult position. In that connection, it was decided to verify what was going on with Adviser, what his position was, and try to determine whether he had reported on his recruitment by Soviet foreign intelligence to local intelligence services, and then only after that, to try to summon him to a meeting on behalf of Safo on his work telephone.

The agents with whom our workers spoke reported that for two days, Adviser had not gone to work. From Safo's landlady, with whom Pavlovsky met under a plausible pretext on Safo's behalf, it was learned that everything was fine at Safo's residence, and that no one had asked after Safo in recent days. The suggestion that Adviser could have reported to the position about Safo was dropped. But five days later, news was received that Adviser had fallen ill and was home. Popov and Pavlovsky were immediately relieved.

Several days after Adviser recovered, Popov intercepted him en route to his job and made an appointment for that same evening near the bridge over the Danube Canal on Mariahilfer Strasse. This meeting was thoroughly prepared. The plan for it involved counter-surveillance of the area of the meeting, of Popov and Adviser himself after he headed from the meeting place to the

Taler Restaurant outside of town on the way to Baden, which was chosen in advance for the conversation.

Adviser was put under surveillance not far from the meeting place where he had parked his car. Surveillance indicated that there was no tail on his car. The same was recovered by our rezidentura workers who watched Popov. They sent him a signal that there was no danger.

There were few people at the Taler restaurant. Popov went first to the cozy room and chose a seat for himself at a little table in the corner from where the whole dining room and the entrance would be well visible. He looked around. Sitting a little ways from him was our operative who was watching the meeting at the restaurant and also conveyed with a pre-arranged signal that everything was fine.

Soon Adviser joined Popov. He was pale and had lost some weight during his illness. He greeted Popov with a weak smile. He replied simply to queries about his health, and when Popov said he was very glad that Adviser was well, he joked:

“You likely were more worried that I would betray you”.

To this, Popov answered Adviser directly that he had such concerns until he learned that Adviser was sick, and only for that reason could not come to the meeting.

Popov didn't address in this conversation with Adviser questions related to obtaining information, since the

purpose of this meeting was only to strengthen the agent's faith in the correctness of the decision he had made, and lay the groundwork for establishing good personal relations with him. Popov was "honest" and candid with Adviser. He talked to him as an equal, asked his advice on several insignificant matters, and listened attentively to Adviser's opinion on the prospects for joint work, approved it, where it was advisable, or in a tactful form explained the error of this or that statement.

At the end of the meeting, Adviser also openly stated: "I agreed to provide help for you, but I will say outright, not out of the similarity of our convictions, but out of the fact that you have too many materials on me. But I would like to sense your views better, your worldview, and understand you. Possibly someday I could also become your ideological friend. But let me travel on this path on my own, and please, do not resort to agitational talk with me. Don't impose on me what I cannot yet accept".

This request of Adviser's was taken into account in subsequent work with him. Our operatives considered it prudent not to hasten with the "re-education" of the agent, but to subtly and unobtrusively at each meeting, if need be with facts and figures and documents in hand, prove to Adviser the inconsistency of his views on this or that issue and to strengthen in him the opinion that he was an equal ally of Soviet foreign intelligence in its struggle against the enemies of peace and progress.

At first, it was stipulated not to give Adviser any intelligence assignments, but to obtain information during the conversation from him. It was decided that so as not to push him away from us, not to demand written materials from him for the time being. In the future, it was planned to return to Adviser several old reports kept in our agencies, or destroy them in his presence (leaving, of course, a photocopy of them in his work file) and thus prove to him that we trust him.

Since Adviser was not sufficiently established and tested in work with Soviet foreign intelligence, it was decided temporarily not to turn him over to contact with the rezidentura, and to leave Lt. Col. Popov to work with him in Vienna.

All further work with Adviser was conducted according to this plan until important information began to be received from him, and documents concerning the state secrets of Austria. Then Popov put Adviser in touch with a worker of the Vienna rezidentura, and himself returned to Moscow where Maj. Pavlovsky and Safo impatiently awaited him, as well as his work comrades and new cases.

Adviser continues to work to this day. He firmly stands in the same ranks as us, on our side of the barricade.